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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the impact of corporate governance reforms (SECP code in Pakistan) on 
board structural characteristics, board roles and firm performance. Related research questions 
are: a) how and which board roles mediate the relationship between board structural 
characteristics and firm performance? b) And what is the influence of corporate governance 
reforms on this relationship? Based upon the existing literature, a model has been developed 
that relates board structural characteristics (Proportion of non-executive directors, CEO 
Duality, Diligence and Independence of Audit Committee) with firm financial performance 
(ROA, Tobin Q) through intervening variables of  dual board roles namely board monitoring 
role (Frequency of board meetings) and board resource dependence role (Board size) using 
multi-theoretic lens.  
This thesis uses an exclusive balanced panel data set of 200 companies listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange to examine the impact of SECP code on the model for the two equal time 
windows. The first panel comprises of the data for the years from 1999-2001 which is the era 
before the implementation of SECP code and second panel comprises of data for the years 
from 2003-2005. The data set straddles the year 2002 which is the year when SECP code was 
enforced.  
The study contributes to a sparse empirical literature on boards using data from Pakistan via 
multi-theoretic perspective to advance some understanding that if the boards’ monitoring and 
resource provision roles are strengthened through board restructuring, the financial 
performance (Tobin Q) of the organization has shown signs of improvement. However, the 
main findings of the study indicate that the mediated relationship between board structural 
variables and firm performance is stronger in the post SECP code era. The study also shows 
that firm value (Tobin Q) increased in the post SECP code era; however, the implementation 
of SECP code didn’t reflect any improvement in the profitability of the firm (ROA).  
This study has significant policy implications. It recommends the constitution of independent 
nomination committee on the board and envisaging an evaluation criterion for the board 
members performance. The study concludes that overall companies adopted a box-ticking 
approach for reporting corporate governance. The study concludes lastly that the SECP code 
overall proved ground breaking and the corporate governance canvas in the country embraced 
the global calls for the reforms.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
1.1 Outline of the Research Project 
The area of corporate governance has generated a large amount of interest both in the 
academic and public debates in the last two decades. Within public debates this is reflected in 
the ongoing development of the ‘soft’ codes of best practices in corporate governance. These 
codes evolved over time starting from the Cadbury Report (1992), then on to The Combined 
Code (2003). After the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009, a new wave of reports and reviews 
followed. In the UK, Sir David Walker was asked to review the governance of Banks and 
other financial institutions, and the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) decided to bring 
forward the code review and most recently the Kay Review (2012) was conducted for the 
equity market. All these reviews have contributed to the most updated UK Combined Code of 
2012. South Asia recognised the importance of corporate governance reforms much before 
East Asian crisis and India, took the lead by constituting the Bajaj committee on corporate 
governance in 1995. Pakistan was the second in the region to frame the corporate governance 
reforms by enacting the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act in 1997 and 
the introduction of the Code for Corporate Governance in 2002 (Gregory, 2002). However 
and regardless of the late start, the basic reason for corporate governance reforms was more 
indigenous as the local banks (mostly state owned) were not having sufficient liquidity to 
finance the growing operations of the corporate sector. This led to corporate governance 
reforms in order to mobilize domestic savings and foreign portfolio investment (Younas, et 
al., 2011). The development of soft codes in the UK and in India has been accompanied by a 
publication of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX, 2002) – a US government legislation relating to 
corporate governance. 
This increasing attention to corporate governance by the government departments has also 
been followed closely by the academia and a vast amount of literature emerged particularly 
over the past decade. Nevertheless, an overwhelming magnitude of research regarding 
corporate governance has adopted a finance and economics perspective by adopting Agency 
theory as their primary research mechanism (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Gompers et al., 
2003; Dahya and McConnell, 2005). However, recently many researchers (e.g., Daily et al, 
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2003; Ghoshal, 2005; Roberts et al, 2005) has raised questions on the capacity of agency 
theory to cover all aspects of corporate governance. Specifically, many researchers in the 
field of corporate governance consider the assumptions of agency theory too narrow to 
identify and explain the board roles performed at various organizations (Roberts et al., (2005; 
Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; and Aguilera, 2005). 
These shortcomings of agency theory have encouraged the scholars in the field of corporate 
governance to develop and propose an alternative theoretical framework.  The closest 
alternative theoretical framework available to researchers has been Resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). However, the researchers such as (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) are of the view that there is no single theoretical 
framework comprehensive enough to explain the dimensions of corporate governance in its 
entirety rather they are of the view that there is need to look on corporate governance 
particularly board related research through a multi-theoretic perspective. 
In the more recent times, research in corporate governance has more progressively moved 
away from conventional studies examining directly the impact of board structural 
characteristics on firm performance towards a greater interest in mediation based studies, 
which examine the impact of corporate governance reforms on board structural 
characteristics and firm performance through some intervening or mediating mechanism like 
board roles (Van Ees et al., 2008; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zahra and Pearce,1989). This thesis 
maintains this convention by developing and examining a model, derived from the extensive 
literature, to judge the impact of corporate governance reforms in shaping the board structural 
characteristics to strengthen the board roles and firm performance by combining agency and 
resource dependence theories perspective. Therefore, this study seeks to contribute to our 
understanding of board structural characteristics, board roles and firm performance in the 
backdrop of corporate governance reforms. The literature reviewed in chapter 2 identifies a 
research gap which shows that direct relationship of board structure and firm performance is 
ambivalent. This provides sufficient grounds for this study to question how board roles 
mediate their relationship and what is the influence of corporate governance reforms on it?  
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Specifically, the objectives of this study are: 
 To develop and examine a model of the relationships between board structural 
characteristics, board roles and firm performance; 
 
 To investigate the factors affecting board structure and firm performance relationship 
under multi-theoretic lens; 
 
 To judge the influence of SECP code on board structure and firm performance in 
Pakistan;  
 
 To develop recommendations for board members and policy-makers on their role to 
contribute to add value to the firm overall. 
 
1.2 Rationale for the Study and Contribution to the Knowledge 
This research is based in the recent tradition of input-mediation-output studies based upon 
board structure and board roles studies to explore this relationship. Through this research, a 
greater understanding has been developed of how the board roles can be strengthened by 
shaping the board structure. To investigate board governance, a model is developed and 
tested from a review of the existing literature using the listed firms form Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) by building a dataset consisting of two balanced panels for two different 
time periods of three years each. Specifically, this study examines the relationship between 
board structural characteristics, board roles, and firm performance after the implementation 
of corporate governance reforms in Pakistan under multi-theoretic perspective.   
The study uses a deductive, quantitative, positivist approach (Popper, 1959). It is often 
believed that quantitative research is primarily concerned with setting up causal relationships 
between theoretical constructs and endeavours to establish that the results of a particular 
research study can be generalised regardless of the research location (Podsakoff and Dalton, 
1987). The key characteristic of the quantitative research is to judge the application of 
established findings in a different context or physical setting (Bryman and Bell, 2007. The 
data were collected from annual reports of the listed companies from year 1999 to 2005. The 
nature of the study is such that it needs data on board members over 10 to 15 years, in order 
to obtain information about the control and resource provision aspect of the board. The 
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problem is that board members moved from one to other organizations in this time period and 
for their interactions we can’t depend solely on their memories. Therefore, the only option 
left for the reliable repository of data is the annual report of a company to test the model and 
hypotheses and it is widely used as a quantitative approach in the social science field (Alreck 
and Settle, 2004; Blumberg et al., 2008; Bryman and Bell, 2007).  
The original contribution to knowledge of this study is three-fold. First, board roles are found 
to be a partial mediator of the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm 
financial performance. Second, the study provides new knowledge about the boards structure 
and board roles after corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. It is the first empirical, 
quantitative study to examine board structural characteristics and their impact on board role 
and firm performance using data from Pakistani firms. Specifically, this study contributes to 
the existing literature in several ways.  
First, from a theoretical and empirical perspective, the study has used a multi-theoretic 
approach to illustrate the mediation of board roles between board structural characteristics 
and firm performance with respect to market based and accounting based measures of firm 
performance. Secondly, the study examines the effectiveness of corporate governance 
reforms in the context of Pakistan and thus contributes theoretically and empirically to 
knowledge on board structural change and board roles, in a previously little explored context. 
Thirdly, it provides firms with information pertaining to board structural characteristics that 
are likely to strengthen board roles and enhance firm performance.  
Specifically from empirical perspective this study has a number of contributions to 
knowledge on boards of directors. To summarise the contribution, firstly, the monitoring role 
and the resource dependence role are found to be partial mediators of the relationship 
between proportion of non-executive directors, separation of CEO/Chair duality, diligence 
and independence of audit committee and firm performance with respect to market measure 
of Tobin Q. There are three specific findings of note with regard to the mediation effect. One, 
both the control role and the resource dependence role of the board partially mediate the 
relationship between proportion of non-executive directors, separation of CEO/board 
chairman, independence of audit committee and firm performance. Two, the diligence of 
audit committee has a significant relationship with monitoring role of the board but 
independence of audit committee has a relationship with monitoring as well as resource 
dependence role of the board to find the firm performance. Three, SECP code influences 
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board structure which has an impact on firm value through the execution of the monitoring 
and resource dependence roles of the board. 
 
1.3 Summary of the Thesis  
This thesis contains seven chapters including the introduction. The following section provides 
a general summary of the content of these chapters. 
Chapter 2 – This chapter review previous corporate governance literature particularly 
focusing on the conventional board structure-firm performance empirical studies. It also 
covers the Agency theory and resource dependence theory which are the basic theoretical 
approaches used in this research. These are also the foundations to develop and test the model 
presented in chapter 3. This chapter identifies the research gaps based upon the literature 
reviewed. First there is need to understand the board roles under the multiple theoretic 
framework. Second, much of the focus of empirical work examining board structural 
characteristics and board roles has been limited to USA and UK mostly, with little attention 
paid to Pakistani boards. This lack of large empirical studies in the Pakistan examining board 
structural characteristics and their potential contribution to board roles and firm performance 
is a gap in the research requiring attention. Third, there is an observable lack of research 
specifically measuring influence of Pakistani corporate governance reforms (SECP code) on 
board structural characteristics, board roles and firm performance.  
Chapter 3 – In this chapter the researcher has built up the conceptual model and hypotheses 
to examine the relationship between board structural characteristics, board roles, and firm 
performance in the context of corporate governance reforms. Based upon the research gaps 
identified in the chapter 2 the conceptual model introduces board governance concepts 
derived from agency and resource dependence theories of corporate governance. The model 
takes the lead by investigating the impact of corporate governance codes on board structure to 
strengthen the board roles and financial performance of the organization. The model attempts 
to depict the board structure variables effect on board roles and firm performance after the 
enforcement of SECP code. The code specifically emphasized on the restructuring of the 
boards by inducing more non-executive directors (NEDs), mandating the separation of CEO 
from the role of chairperson of the board, and constituting the audit committees for better 
internal control. Therefore the board structure variables included in the model are proportion 
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of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the board, board leadership structure, diligence and 
independence of audit committee.  The board roles roped in the model are control role and 
resource dependence role based upon the two most influential streams in board research: 
agency theory and resource dependence theory respectively. The model maps the firm 
performance by market and accounting based measures. Therefore, this model provides a 
valuable contribution to this research by forwarding the relationship brought in the model in 
the Pakistani context than hitherto has been considered in the board roles literature. In 
addition, the model encapsulates the influence of board structural characteristics in 
strengthening the board roles for better corporate performance. This is a departure from 
previous studies which uses input-output model of the research. Overall, the model 
summarizes the hypotheses developed based upon various theoretical foundations. 
Chapter 4 - elaborates the philosophical foundations and methodological choices of the 
study. The researcher has employed the quantitative approach to study the proposed 
relationship. The data is panel in nature and the researcher has used panel estimation 
techniques using random effects. The sample frame was derived from the companies 
registered on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) in time span of 1999-2005. Data on a total of 
200 out of 464 companies were available for the two panel datasets for 1999-2001 and 2003-
2005.  The chapter discusses different approaches to research methodology and reports the 
process of research design, sampling, panel data analysis, specification test and random and 
fixed effects in the data. It also reports on the mediation and moderation measurement to test 
the model. Issues pertaining to the panel data sets are also discussed.  
Chapter 5 - presents the outcomes and findings of the examination of conceptual model and 
hypotheses to investigate the relationship between board structural characteristics, board 
roles, and firm performance. Random effect regression analysis is employed to test the 
hypotheses developed in chapter 3. The findings of the research show that proportion of non-
executive directors, separation of CEO/Chair of the board, diligence and independence of the 
audit committee were significantly related with Tobin Q after the implementation of SECP 
Code, 2002; mediated by the monitoring role of the board. Similarly, it also showed that 
proportion of non-executive directors, separation of CEO/Chair of the board, and 
independence of audit committee were also significantly related with Tobin Q after the 
implementation of SECP Code, 2002; mediated by the resource provision role of the board. 
Consequently that the overall results show support for the notion that the introduction of the 
SECP code created conditions in which change in board structures caused strengthened board 
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roles and enhanced firm performance with respect to the market based measure (Tobin Q) 
which might have been the good signal for the progress of the stock market as well. Overall 
the study outlines more support for the marketing measure of financial performance (Tobin 
Q) as compared to the accounting measure of the financial performance (ROA). However, the 
results show no mediation by board roles of the relationship between corporate governance 
indicators and ROA. 
Chapter 6 - This chapter debates the findings of the investigation from chapter 5 
corresponding to existing literature. The contributions to knowledge sprung from this study 
are identified and discussed. The chapter outlines the implications for board theory and 
repercussions for board procedure and policy as well. The study particularly finds out that 
there is a clear trend of increased activity from the period before the implementation of SECP 
code to after the implementation of SECP code. The values for the performance measures 
show an increasing trend. Similarly there is increase in the proportion of non-executive 
directors after the implementation of SECP code  which is in line with the requirement of the 
code. Therefore, this study is more comprehensive in a way that it accounts for the board 
structural changes leading to various board roles and firm performance as a result of 
corporate governance reforms by comparing two independent but related time periods. The 
study posts that all structural variables influence the higher board activity monitoring role 
while proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs), separation of CEO/Chair duality, and 
independence of audit committee also influence the board resource dependence role. A 
unique contribution of this research is the finding that the monitoring role and/or the resource 
dependence role of the board partially mediate the relationship between a number of board 
structure variables and firm performance. There are three specific findings of note with 
regard to the mediation effect. First, both the monitoring role and the resource dependence 
role of the board partially mediate the relationship between proportion of non-executive 
directors, CEO/chairman separation, diligence and independence of audit committee and firm 
performance after the enforcement of SECP codes, while independence of audit committee 
and Tobin Q relationships were partially mediated by board resource dependence role even 
before the enforcement of SECP codes.. Second, no significant relationship was found 
between diligence of audit committee and the resource dependence role which is represented 
here as size of the board. Third and finally, the monitoring role of the board and resource 
dependence roles showed stronger relationships with Tobin Q as compared with ROA. 
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Chapter 7 - is a wrap up of the whole project. It concludes the study by underlining the new 
contributions to knowledge emerging as a result of this research. It also outlines the 
limitations of this study and suggests some directions for future study.  Eventually, the study 
makes a number of new contributions to knowledge on boards of directors. It depicts that the 
control role and resource providing role are found to be mediators of the relationship between 
a number of board structural characteristics and firm performance. Previous research has used 
the monitoring role and resource role as outcomes. This study shows that the monitoring role 
and resource dependence role are mediating mechanisms that lead to enhanced firm 
performance. The study has built a unique corporate governance dataset comprising of two 
panel datasets that cover both the pre- and post-SECP code implementation periods. It also 
has investigated the changes took place in board structural characteristics since SECP was 
implemented. It proves that more members were added on the boards after the reforms to 
make use of member resources. This novelty will allow future research to assess the value 
creating potential of boards. The future research can be conducted by using the literature 
regarding top management team literature to measure the board roles by using an interactive 
process instead of using fixed proxies as well as adding more structural variables and 
expanding the size of data panels.  
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Chapter 2  
Corporate Governance Reforms, Board roles and Firm Performance 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The researchers in the past have argued that context plays the most important role in 
the development and implementation of various rules and regulations (Federowicz and 
Aguilera, 2003, Pye and Pettigrew, 2005). The study explores the corporate governance 
reforms and practices in a unique context of Pakistan. The country possesses the multi-
layered legal as well as financial system. Being in South Asia, it traces its background from 
the Anglo-India tradition of common law which got blended with Islamic laws after its 
independence in 1947 (Rais and Saeed, 2005). The country offers some interesting insights in 
its corporate governance structure. On the one hand, its stock market has shown promising 
progress and the country was second to India only in embracing the corporate governance 
reforms, on the other hand, founding families of the local corporates still enjoy an influence 
on the overall administration. Therefore, this study intends to look deeper into this interplay 
of various corporate governance practices, board roles and firm performance.  
This chapter mainly reviews the literature regarding corporate governance practices, research 
context, and more specifically the literature about board of directors to identify the research 
gap that will be used to guide this research. The chapter starts with the introduction of the 
corporate ownership and control debate within which this research is broadly positioned as a 
prelude to discussing various mechanisms of corporate governance control under the agency 
theory. The literature review moves further to review first the more conventional structure-
performance approach to corporate governance and identifies the limitations of agency 
theory. The next section discusses the introduction, adoption of worldwide corporate 
governance reforms and their implementation in Pakistan as SECP code, 2002. The chapter 
also elaborates on the corporate control environment and legal context of Pakistan. The 
chapter concludes by outlining the research gaps and proposing the research aims, objectives, 
and the research question. 
2.2. Corporate Ownership, Control, Mechanisms and the Agency Theory 
This study is situated within a wider debate on corporate governance and the observation that 
the modern companies are run by professional managers, who are unaccountable to disperse 
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shareholders. It has long been recognized that modern firms suffer from a separation of 
ownership and control problem (Berle and Means, 1932). The issue is how to ensure that 
managers follow the interests of shareholders.  
Agency theory offers a well-established view on how to address the corporate governance 
problem associated with dispersed owners (Van Ees et al., 2009; Huse, 2005). Predominantly 
the agency theory has been using the areas of finance and economics to explain the success of 
Modern Corporation regardless of the separation of ownership and control functions. There 
has been not much literature to theoretically explain the success of modern organization 
except the seminal work of Berle and Means (1932) regarding the discussion on ‘Separation 
of Ownership and Control’ in modern corporations. Therefore, the agency theory put forward 
by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as an explanation of the nature and existence of Modern 
Corporation in the context of self-interested managers whose decisions will not be in the best 
interest of owners of the organization. The contractual approach has been adopted by the 
agency theory which states that managers or agents try to maximise their personal utility as 
compared to striving for the utility of owners or principals in the context of separation of 
ownership and control in the modern firm (Williamson, 1984; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The principal faces the agency problem when the agent starts behaving in his best interest as 
compared to the best interest of the principal. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have described the 
agency problems as the costs needed to implement the mechanisms by the board on behalf of 
shareholders to judge that their money is being used in their best interest.  
Therefore, the agency theory primarily addresses the two main problems arising from the 
principal-agent relationship. Firstly, the cost involved in establishing of some mechanism to 
monitor the behaviour of agent by the principal and secondly the principal and the agent have 
fundamentally different perceptions about risk assessment in a certain situation, whereas, 
mostly the agent is assumed to be risk aversive and more focussed on saving his job while the 
principal will be more risk taking in his best interest (Eisenhardt, 1989). These problems have 
been referred to as agency cost by Jensen and Meckling (1976), incurred to establish a 
mechanism to judge that the agents make decisions in the best interest of principals. 
Therefore, the agency costs include all costs involved to develop and maintain a structure to 
monitor the agents (Jensen, 1983).  
The proponents of the contractual approach in the agency theory (Williamson, 1984; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) has viewed the firm as a legal entity created as 
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a nexus of contracts either written or unwritten amongst the factors of production and 
customers.  Another view is that nature of the firm is not different from the commonly 
existing marketing contract between any two people (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972). This 
contractual framework endeavours to explain that how the funds will be used by the agents 
provided by the principals. The basic objective of such contracts is to align the interests of 
principals and agents in the best possible manner. However, the optimality of such contract 
lies on the extant of information symmetry. If the principal can observe the behaviour of the 
agent then the contract will be behaviour-based and alternatively if it is not possible then the 
contract will be outcome based (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The agency theory also offers a very special characteristic in countries whose economy is not 
fully developed, as explained by Dharwadkar et al. (2000), called principal-principal 
problem. This is a distinctive situation, different from traditional principal-agent paradigm, 
when large or majority shareholders control the firm in such a way that minority shareholders 
are deprived of their due rights on their investments in the organization. This usually results 
from weak governance provisions (Lemmon and Lins, 2003). 
However, under usual business settings where the information is incomplete and 
asymmetrical and level of uncertainty is higher, normally shareholders can’t ascertain 
precisely the level of effort put forth by the agent to maximise the wealth of shareholders. 
Therefore, various classifications of corporate governance mechanisms have been identified 
by the researchers that can be employed to align the interests and objectives of agents with 
shareholders. In the next section, these categories of corporate governance have been 
elaborated. 
2.2.1 Mechanisms of Corporate Governance 
Based upon the discussion in the last section, it is needed to discuss the mechanisms required 
for effective corporate governance. These mechanisms have been classified in two categories 
as internal mechanism and external mechanism (Jensen, 1983). The internal mechanisms of 
corporate governance are fundamentally related with ownership structure including the 
capital structure of the firm and board of directors including their role in a firm (Gillan, 
2006). Jensen (1986) is of the view that the external mechanisms are primarily concerned 
with the laws and regulations regarding companies’ operations and market for corporate 
control which act as a mechanism of last resort. The vast body of research regarding 
corporate governance mechanisms has converged around these classifications as internal or 
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external. The overwhelming majority of the academia have taken their motivation form 
finance and economics while working on agency theory and have adopted a direct approach 
in elaborating the corporate governance and firm performance relationship (Dahya and 
McConnell, 2005; Johnson et al., 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
Research on boards has generated a substantial body of literature. Most of the empirical 
studies on the governance follow the direct link of governance performance linkage; 
however, the empirical results show lack of consensus regarding relationship between 
corporate boards and firm performance (Aguilera, 2007; Zajac and Westphal, 1996).  
Through the lens of agency theory the next section of this chapter introduces studies on board 
characteristics and firm performance in more detail.  
2.3 Board Structural Characteristics and Firm Performance 
There is an established theoretical consensus that board of directors and internal controls 
mechanisms help in bringing the concerns of shareholders with the interests of management 
team, thereby reducing the agency related costs (Netter et al., 2009; Jensen, 1983). Amongst 
these various internal control measures corporate boards are considered the most important to 
follow the shareholders objective for wealth maximization (Fillatotchev and Boyd, 2009; 
John and Senbet, 1998). Therefore, this is the prime responsibility of corporate boards to be 
more active in the changing circumstances to protect the shareholders’ from the vested 
interests of managers (Jensen, 1993; Brennan, 2006).The experts and activists of corporate 
governance have long advocated changes in the board structure by proposing reforms in 
corporate governance codes. The last decade witnessed the global initiative for reforms in 
corporate governance. UK and USA took the lead in this regard and introduced various 
reforms which will be discussed in detail later in this chapter (Section 2.6). Pakistan also 
introduced the corporate governance reforms in 2002 in response to pressure from 
international financial institutions (Rais and Saeed, 2005). Apart from other aspects, the most 
important aspects of the newly introduced reforms in Pakistan were mainly consisting of 
induction of non-executive directors on the board, separation of role of CEO and board 
chairperson and composition of audit committee (Bari et al., 2003). These changes in the 
board structure brought forward as a result of SECP code are also supported by the literature 
(Van den Berghe and De Ridder, 1999). They suggested various changes for example, the 
appointment of independent directors, the constitution and working of independent board 
committees in those areas where conflicts of interest might appear as well as the separation of 
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the roles of CEO and chairman of the board. It is further highlighted that right board and 
board subcommittees’ structure will lead to effective and efficient boards (Van den Berghe 
and De Ridder, 2004).  
The more recent perspective is that effective board monitoring is not only achieved through 
balanced board composition but also through adequately structured, staffed and efficiently 
managed board sub-committees e.g. audit committee.  Therefore, some studies for example 
Klein (1998) even go beyond just the board composition and elaborate that committee 
composition and performance is more important for better firm performance. It can be 
discerned from here that presence of non-executive directors on the committee may be 
helpful to tackle the agency issues while inside directors may better use their firm related 
knowledge for the issues like investment, finance etc. This kind of reasoning shows that 
composition and performance of board sub-committees will be having an effect on firm 
performance.   
Out of various board-subcommittees, the audit committee’s role is very crucial in monitoring 
and financial reporting (Carcello et al., 2002). Therefore, focussing particularly on the 
working of audit committee, the role of independent non-executive directors may provide 
important monitoring insight for the diverse shareholders as it can perform relatively more 
candid role being directly responsible for monitoring and audit related functions. This is also 
in line with recommendations of Blue Ribbon committee.  
Xie et al., (2003) claim that although an audit committee composed and headed by non-
executive directors may be better suited for effective monitoring but its efficient-functioning 
will largely depend upon its actively working. This argument is also in line with Sharma et 
al., (2009) who claim that in addition to the independence of audit committee, its efficient 
working is also important. Raghunandan and Rama (2007) have termed the efficient working 
of audit committee as diligence. However, it is difficult to measure the diligence physically 
for which they have used the frequency of the meetings of the committee as proxy for 
diligence. The same measure has also been used by De Zoort et al., (2002) in the past as well. 
Therefore, it can be inferred here that not only the structure of audit committee is paramount 
but also its diligence is of equal importance for performing the effective monitoring function 
within the organization. These structural mechanisms are considered to be important ways to 
enhance the board power for protecting shareholders rights and curtailing the self-serving 
agenda of the management (Becht et. al., 2002; Westphal, 1998). Therefore the next section 
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discusses the traditional relationship of some major characteristics of board governance and 
firm financial performance by advancing a critique on its equivocal nature. 
2.3.1 Non-Executive Directors and Financial Performance 
The prior literature provides us with equivocal evidence regarding the relationship between 
proportion of non-executive directors (NEDs) and financial performance of the firm. The 
boards dominated by insiders or executive directors are considered less answerable according 
to the conventional theories like agency and resource dependence theories as compared to 
their counterparts having majority of non-executive directors (Fama, 1980; Sonnenfeld, 
2002). The recent studies in board literature have argued that board dominated with non-
executive directors not only bring the objective and independent decision making to the firm 
but also enrich the firm with resources such as diverse experience, expertise, and strong 
business connections (Cadbury Report, 1992; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007). 
There is a positive relationship between proportion of NEDs on the board and market related 
performance measure of the firm (Tobin Q) (Weir et al., 2002). Similarly there is another 
study by Elmehndi (2007) on the Tunisian firms and reported the same positive relationship 
between NEDs and firm performance. The outside world takes the leaving of an NED from 
the board of a firm as negatively and Gupta and Fields (2009) report that, on average, there is 
net loss of more than 1% in a firm’s market value when an NED resigns from a firm. This 
means that the investors and shareholders assume that presence of NEDs on the board will 
cause an organization to better align itself with the shareholders’ interests. In the backdrop of 
recent steps taken by stock exchanges to ensure stringent corporate governance measures, the 
studies report that there are lesser chances of a firm to be suspended from a stock exchange if 
its board is dominated by NEDs (Mangena and Chamisa, 2008).This suggests that listed firms 
with a higher percentage of NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. 
On the other hand, there is no scarcity of studies who have reported a negative relationship 
between proportion of NEDs on a firm’s board and its financial performance (Yermack, 
1996; Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996; Laing and Weir, 1999; Bozec, 2005). Bozec (2005), in a 
longitudinal study of Canadian firms from 1976 to 2005, reports an inverse relationship 
between the proportion of NEDs and firm financial performance. On a lesser extent, Haniffa 
and Hudaib, (2006), couldn’t find any significant relationship between presence of NEDs and 
firm performance in a sample of Malaysian firms. In their review of the economic literature 
on boards, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) post that they couldn’t find the conclusive 
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evidence to link structural characteristics of boards and firms’ performance. Similarly, Daily 
et al. (2003) have also reported that they couldn’t find the clear empirical support between 
monitoring role of the board with respect to shareholders. The above inconclusive and mixed 
studies results suggest that multiple intervening variables mediate the relationship between 
NED and firm performance. This provides us with a reason to enquire whether the 
relationship between NEDs and firm performance could be considered afresh and through a 
different theoretical lens. 
2.3.2 CEO/Chair Duality and Firm Performance 
Traditionally the roles of the CEO and chair of the board have been merged together to be 
performed by one individual but over time, it was found that it caused more entrenchment in 
the boards. Although, the dual role of CEO and board chair has been under the lens by a large 
number of researchers yet empirically, the evidence regarding the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm financial performance is mixed. 
 The situation of duality in an organization occurs when the same person holds the positions 
of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the chairperson of the board. This is typical of CEOs 
with long tenure (Coles, McWilliams and Sen, 2001). Most of the researchers in Agency 
theory have expressed their concerns about CEO duality and concentration of executive board 
members (Van Ness et al., 2010; Gibbs, 1993). The practice of duality is considered 
unacceptable because it undermines the independence of the board and poses serious threat to 
objective corporate decision making (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). There is convincing 
evidence that a firm’s market value declines under the practice of duality (Carter et al., 2003) 
although this problem may be curtailed when the board is dominated by NEDs (Chowdhury 
and Wang, 2009). In fact, there have been calls in the corporate governance field since as 
early as 1980s regarding separation of the positions of CEO and Chairperson Board 
(Westphal and Khanna, 2003). Nevertheless, there have not been much attention to these calls 
and the powerful and autocratic CEOs maintained their dominance in the corporate world 
(Sheppard, 1994). Powerful CEOs tend to constrain boards’ input to strategic decision-
making (Ruigrok et al., 2006).  
The extant literature discusses that dual role of CEO is the symbol of entrenchment activity 
by the CEO, which compromises the monitoring role of the board members as well as 
reducing the board activity, which will cause reduction in board resource provision role 
(Lehn, et al., 2004). While we know that increased board activity is instrumental in reducing 
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entrenchment and improves firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Board activity can 
be affected when the CEO is the chair of the board of directors (Brick and Chidambaran, 
2010). Considerable attention has also been given to the role of boards in monitoring 
managers and in removing non-performing CEOs. Jensen (1993) observes that a lack of 
independent leadership makes it difficult for boards to respond to failure in top management 
team. Fama and Jensen (1983) also argue that concentration of decision management and 
decision control in one individual reduces board's effectiveness in monitoring top 
management.  
The relationship between dual role of CEO/Board Chair and firm financial performance 
calculated by three different accounting based measures proved that companies avoiding the 
dual role were performing relatively better than the firm with practicing duality (Rechner and 
Dalton, 1991). However, the results of Rechner and Dalton (1991) were criticised by 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) because of the reasons: firstly, they used all accounting based 
measures of performance and no other measure of performance was included and tested, 
secondly, they sampled only large firms and lastly they didn’t control for firm and industry 
specific measure like firm size and industry characteristics, therefore, these results couldn’t 
be generalised for other industries in different settings. However, the results from a study by 
Dahya et al. (1996) in UK revealed that when using a market based measure of firm 
performance (Tobin Q) the separation of roles of CEO and board chairperson was responded 
positively by the market and share prices went up. These researches favour that the role of 
CEO and chairperson of the board should be separated for the better firm performance.   
However, on the contrary, there is another chunk of studies which shows otherwise and 
comes up with the results that practice of CEO duality has a positive relationship with firm 
financial performance by clearly showing that companies practicing role Duality 
outperformed their counterparts with separate roles of CEO and board chairperson 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Boyd, 1995; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). These researchers were 
of the view that role duality encourages the unity of command and the decision making 
becomes more focussed. The similar kind of study was conducted in Australia by Kiel and 
Nicholson in (2003) and it also reported that combining the role of CEO and chair of the 
board produced positive results with respect to market based financial performance indicator 
Tobin Q.  
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The above discussion highlights that evidence regarding the relationship between CEO 
duality and firm financial performance is elusive and raises serious questions about the 
convincing nature of this relationship (Rechner and Dalton 1991; Brickley et al., 1997; Weir 
et al., 2002). Consequently, this necessitates further investigation of this relationship by 
omitting the direct relationship between board characteristics and firm performance 
outcomes. 
2.3.3 Diligence of Audit Committee and Financial Performance 
The role of audit committee has been important in providing mechanism for supervision and 
check and balance for a company. However, in the backdrop of recent corporate governance 
reforms this role has become crucial.  Nevertheless, the literature regarding the working of 
audit committee and firm performance has been at a developing stage.  
The limited literature on this topic reveals that frequency of audit committee meetings will 
increase with the firm growth (Vafeas, 1999). It is reasonable to anticipate that audit 
committees will meet more frequently if more important corporate events are taking place. 
Adams et al., (2003) is of the view that firm performance is an important determinant of audit 
committee activity. The principal function of the audit committee is to meet regularly with 
the external and internal auditors of the company to examine the internal controls system of 
the firm and to oversee the firm financial statements and audit process. This helps alleviate 
the agency problem by facilitating the timely release of unbiased and authentic accounting 
information by managers to shareholders, creditors, and so on, thus stimulating the effective 
monitoring which leads to higher day-to-day firm performance. To maintain integrity of their 
monitoring function, audit committees are required to perform their responsibilities 
effectively and diligently through showing more activity. As it is difficult to observe directly 
the performance of an audit committee, therefore,  the researchers have used the meeting 
frequency of an audit committee to act as a proxy for the diligence of an audit committee 
(Bhasin, 2012; Raghunandan and Rama 2007).But the picture is not that rosy as there is 
another stream of literature which reports that there is a negative relationship between 
diligence of audit committee and firm financial performance represented by Tobin Q (Vafeas, 
1999, DeZoort et al. 2002). However, DeZoort et al., ( 2002) are of the view that there is 
some evidence that those audit committees meeting relatively more frequently may have 
caused the better performance but there performance was realised in coming time period as 
the firm needed sometime to absorb the effect of these meetings which may bring enhanced 
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performance in the forthcoming years. Therefore, it may be a good idea to use longitudinal 
studies to get the grasp of the relationship between diligence of audit committee and firm 
performance.   
Prior research also suggests frequent audit committee meetings reduce the extent of financial 
misreporting (DeZoort et al. 2002) which enhances the market performance of the firm. 
Under such circumstances, the audit committee may be under greater pressure to meet more 
frequently for improved monitoring of management. Cohen and Hanno (2000) find that 
management control philosophy and corporate governance activities affect corporate audit 
related judgments. Klein (1998) reports that when he tried to judge the association between 
board committee workings and firm performance the results were ambivalent but he is of the 
view that working of board sub-committees is linked through the roles and working of the 
board.  
Consequently, in the light of above literature the equivocal association between the presence 
and working of board committees and firm performance makes it ripe area for further study 
(Dalton et al., 1998; Laing and Weir, 1999). The little available evidence also largely focuses 
on developed markets, such as the UK and the US. This makes generalisation difficult. 
Further, the limited evidence also offers contradictory results as Cohen et al (2008) are of the 
view that working of board committees may not be judged only under agency perspective. 
Therefore, board committee structures and financial performance is a fertile area for further 
research to be conducted under a different theoretical lens without directly examining this 
relationship. 
2.3.4 Independence of Audit Committee and Financial Performance 
Monitoring the actions and decisions of the management is the primary purpose of the 
board. The board discharges its functions through internal control mechanisms (Shleifer and 
Vishny 1997; Klein 1998). It is likely that an independent audit committee will ensure a 
sound internal control to strengthen the monitoring role of the board and at the same time the 
presence of independent board members in an audit committee will lead to resource 
dependence perspective and outside auditors will give more importance to the internally 
audited statements. This, in turn could mitigate the outsiders’ concerns about the authenticity 
of the financial data and soundness of the internal controls of the organization (Bell et al., 
2005; Cohen, 2008). These results are also according to the findings of Chhaochharia and 
Grinstein (2007) who have reported after examination of market reaction before and after the 
19 
 
inclusion of NEDs in audit committees that there was a significant improvement in share 
returns following the establishment of audit committees, which suggests that the presence of 
independent audit committees can enhance managerial accountability to shareholders in the 
eyes of investors. Similarly, Vafeas (1999) has also documented that organizations having 
independent audit committees were enjoying confidence of investors and shareholders. This 
implies that independence of audit committee can improve board quality, which may 
ultimately improve the effectiveness with which the board carries out its monitoring and 
resource provision roles. This indicates that independence of the board committees also 
influences their monitoring and resource provision roles and firms are under increased 
pressure to ensure that board committees are more independent. Carcello et al. (2002) suggest 
that the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee contribute to superior 
monitoring, meaning that independent directors on the board and in the audit committee may 
demand more monitoring over the financial reporting process because of their financial skills 
which will not only protect their reputation but will also increase their value in the market as 
a financial connoisseur. 
On the other hand, several studies show that there is either inconsistent or negative 
relationship between independence of board committees and the role which they perform. For 
example, Brown and Caylor (2004) show that independent audit committees are not 
positively related to financial performance. However, Klein (2002) documents that 
independence of audit committee didn’t have any relationship with restatement of earnings. 
Anderson et al., (2004) find that if a firm has entirely independent audit committees its debt 
financing costs will be lower.  
By looking at the results of a study from Pakistan conducted by Ashraf and Ghani in (2005) it 
is clear that weaker enforcement mechanism are the biggest hurdle in performing the standard 
accounting practices in developing countries. They have argued that instead of cultural issues 
as widely believed, the lack of investor protection laws and dismal situation of 
implementation of the law through the courts makes it difficult for the investors to maintain 
their confidence in the capital markets.  
Like boards, it is also important for audit committee to be composed of non-executive 
members (UK Combined code, 2003) but its relationship too with firm performance has not 
been unequivocal (Bell et al., 2005).The above studies show that the association between 
audit-related governance factors like presence of independent members on the committee and 
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performance is mixed. Therefore, it is needed to conduct further research in the area of board 
sub-committees and board roles and their performance in different contexts.  
2.4 Limitations of Agency Theory Research and direct relationship of board structural 
characteristics and firm performance 
For the last one decade Agency theory has come under mounting disparagement as the 
primary theoretical lens to undertake corporate governance research (Ghoshal, 2005; Roberts 
et al, 2005). Although the vast majority of the corporate governance researchers have taken 
an agency theoretic approach, however, the evidence supporting its recommendations is 
mixed. Therefore, increasingly the researchers are apprehensive of the much advocated 
fundamental role of the agency theory with respect to board roles and corporate governance 
(Dalton et al., 2003; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). 
A host of researchers have criticised the capacity of agency theory to explain various facets 
of the relationship between board roles and firm performance (Aguilera, (2005); Forbes and 
Milliken (1999); Lynall et al (2003); and Roberts et al (2005). They are of the view that 
agency theory is unable to explain the corporate governance and particularly board related 
matters and their relationship with firm performance. Therefore, in the backdrop of these 
studies there are increasing numbers of calls regarding investigating the relationship between 
board structural characteristics and firm performance through different theoretical lens by 
making use of intervening variables. The studies increasingly are deviating from the 
traditional direct relationship between corporate governance and firm performance to an 
indirectly measured relationship. There is no significant support found from the studies based 
upon the empirical testing of agency theory to work as a vehicle to explain the relationship 
between board structural characteristics and firm performance (Roberts et al., 2005). 
Similarly, Hermalin and Weisbach (2003) conducted a detailed literature review for the 
research published in a decade regarding corporate governance and they also came up with 
not much different conclusion that there is a scant evidence to talk convincingly about the 
relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance directly. Similarly, 
in a review of the management literature and from a shareholder value perspective, Daily et 
al., (2003) couldn’t find the support for only monitoring or control approach to governance 
Therefore, it appears that board composition is not related to firm profitability. Another point 
along similar lines emerges from board theorists such as Forbes and Milliken (1999) and 
Pettigrew (1992) who elaborate the tendency of agency theorists to examine the impact of 
input variables, such as board composition, to output variables, such as firm performance, 
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without examining the roles/functions, and mechanisms that link the inputs to the outputs. 
Consequently, and significantly for this study, a recent trend in board studies has been to 
examine board characteristics and firm performance relationship through different theoretical 
lens mediated through board roles (Roberts et al., 2005). In one of the first attempts to model 
boards of directors and firm performance, Forbes and Milliken (1999) suggest that both board 
characteristics and board roles influence firm performance. The role of board with reference 
to corporate governance practices and firm performance will be discussed further in the next 
chapter to converge to a single point and to build a model for testing. In the last, the most 
potent criticism on agency theory is that it highlights only the monitoring related role of the 
board and doesn’t throw much light on the role of the board as strategic resource provider. 
They are of the view that agency theory not only ignores the resource dependence role of the 
board but gives undue importance to the monitoring activity of the board (Dalton et al., 1998; 
Dalton et al., 2003; Daily et al., 2003). This has led a number of theorists such as Dalton et 
al., (1999) to advocate the application of resource dependency theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978) to the study of boards of directors. Resource dependency theorists argue that the 
provision of resources is a basic function of board in an organization (Pfeffer, 1972; Boyd, 
1990). The researcher will explore the resource dependency theory later in more details to 
discuss the application of this theory in the corporate governance literature.  
Hillman and Dalziel (2003) argue that agency and resource dependence theories will 
complement each other and in the theoretical setting the combination of both perspectives 
will be better able to explain the various features of the relationship between board structural 
characteristics and firm performance. They were of the view that board size is not only 
important in monitoring role but also in the resource dependence role of the board. This is the 
argument which this study will take further to look deeper into this relationship. 
This seems to be a point of agreement in literature that progress in the field will largely 
depend on a better understanding of the roles performed by a board of directors (Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2000; Pettigrew, 1992). Although there is an ample literature following the 
stream of qualitative design of analysis for board dynamics (Huse, 2005; Nicholson and Kiel, 
2004; Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003; Forbes and Milliken, 1999), however, the empirical 
studies regarding finding the mediating or intervening variables are scarce and unclear. 
Nicholson and Kiel, (2004) are of the view that board quality or effectiveness is determined 
through the set of roles they perform. But this set of roles is often not defined as an integrated 
set of activities. In contrast, based on diverging theoretical assumptions, the role of the board 
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is conceptualized in a multiple, and in some cases contradictory, way (Johnson et.al., 1996; 
Hung, 1998). Therefore, building upon the above discussion, the study discusses the board 
roles in more detail in the next section. 
2.5 Board Roles 
The board roles research is conceptually based upon the organizational theories like agency 
and resource dependency theories (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006). Zahra and Pearce (1989) 
were quicker than the other to give a theoretical explanation of board roles and they proposed 
three different types of board roles: monitoring, strategy and service or resource provision 
roles. Forbes and Milliken (1999) were of the view that boards mainly had two main 
functions: the monitoring and resource provision to the organization. Bainbridge, (2012) is of 
the view that amongst many roles of corporate boards, three are the most important; 
management, oversight, and service. The relative balance among these roles has always been 
difficult to maintain. He also elaborates that with the introduction of new stringent measures 
of corporate governance reforms the boards are no more passive structures, as argued by 
Eisenberg et al., (1998); rather they have become active monitors of top management team. 
While Hillman and Dalziel (2003) working in the same grounds proposed the monitoring and 
resource dependence roles of the board by linking the agency and resource dependence 
theory.   
The board members primarily work through a mechanism of collaboration and control on 
boards (Sundaramurthy and Lewis, 2003). So, either the board may place greater attention 
and resources on monitoring management (an agency role), and/or the board may emphasize 
proactively assisting management in helping provide access to external resources (a resource 
dependence role) (Cohen et al., 2008). This study gives more importance to the two-fold 
board role set comprising of the monitoring or control role and the resource dependence role. 
Different arguments underpin our choice. Previous studies on boards of directors have relied 
on a single theoretical perspective favouring one board role at the expense of the other, 
resulting in an incomplete depiction of board roles (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). This 
researcher, therefore, will discuss the roles put forth by Hillman and Dalziel, (2003), to make 
the roles of board of directors more parsimonious.  
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2.5.1 Board Monitoring Role: The Agency Perspective 
The literature gives much emphasis on the boards by arguing that boards have the lawful duty 
to oversee the work of management and provide them with direction continuously. The 
corporate governance experts are of the view that in the Anglo American context it is rightly 
expected from the directors that they will perform their duties diligently and with great care 
and loyalty to the shareholders and investors (Levrau, 2007). The board’s duty to monitor 
management and corporate performance has also been addressed in other disciplines than 
law. Initially, the prevailing disciplines in the field of corporate governance were finance and 
economics, therefore, the dominant perspective has been monitoring role of the boards.  
Monitoring has widely been considered as the predominant role of corporate governance 
reflected in the wide array of literature in the fields of law, finance, sociology, and strategic 
management as the agency perspective (Baysinger and Hoskisson 1990; Bathala and Rao 
1995, Klein 2003).  The monitoring role of boards (Bainbridge, 2012; Pearce and Zahra, 
1991; Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson, et al., 1996) relates directly to the responsibility of 
directors to monitor managers’ performance and behaviour on behalf of shareholders. This 
perspective assumes that managers usually work in their own interests and their decisions fall 
short of the prime objective of maximizing the wealth of shareholders. This perspective of 
managers will cause an increase in the agency costs. To trim down these agency costs, 
various contractual mechanisms, including corporate boards, are designed to align the 
interests of the management with those of the stockholders (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Klein 
1998). Hence, monitoring the actions and decisions of management is the primary focus of 
the agency perspective. If a board places importance on maintaining a strong monitoring 
perspective (an ‘‘agency’’ lens), it is likely the board activity will increase consequently.   
The monitoring of the firm by the board becomes crucial when the executives and managers 
are inclined to follow their own agenda instead of pursuing the shareholders goals of profit 
maximization, thereby increasing the agency costs (Berle and Means, 1932). Effective 
monitoring by boards may improve the firm performance by decreasing the agency costs 
(Fama, 1980; Mizruchi. 1983; Zahra and Pearce, 1989).  
2.5.2 The Board Resource Provision Role: The Resource Dependence Perspective  
Resource dependency theory views organisations as open systems which are linked with their 
external environment (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). It highlights the interdependence between 
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organizations and their environment suggesting that firms are not independent and they have 
to depend on their external environment for survival (Hillman et al., 2007).  
As Agency theory propounds more towards monitoring role of the board, the resource 
dependence theory leans towards resource provision role of the board (Hillman et al.,, 2000; 
Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), there 
are expectations from organisations from board members in terms of the resources they 
provide. The board helps in endurance of the firm by linking it to the outside world through 
its connections which may act as a resource for the organization (Singh et al., 1986; 
Wernerfelt, 1984). This proposes that composition of the board should be an ongoing process 
and it should reflect the changes taking place in the external environment.  The same has 
been proved empirically by Hillman et al., (2000) that composition and structure of the board 
changes as a result of change in the external environment in which an organization is 
working. 
However, some researchers have used Institutional theory context as well to explain the 
development of corporate governance in various cultures (Stedham and Beekun, 2000). They 
are of the view that similar to resource dependence theory, institutional theory also deals with 
the interaction between firm and its external environment, by assuming that firms deal with 
the external environment through board linkages to build legitimacy for their functions 
(Sherer and Lee, 2002). However, resource dependence theory goes one step further and tries 
to depict that how the firms have to adapt and innovate in the backdrop of availability of 
external resources to survive and to comply with the external regulatory pressures  to explain 
the resource provision or service role of the board(Hessels and Teriesen, 2008). Therefore, 
resource dependence theory and agency theory will remain the main theoretical lens in this 
study, following Hillman and Dalziel, (2003) to discuss further literature, however, 
institutional theory may be used at the end to explain the study findings if required. 
The resource dependency theory based research has depicted that boards prove to be the 
resource of the organization and they help improve the character and repute of the 
organization to the investors in the outside world and provide guidance in policy making and 
advice to the management (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal, 1999). Therefore, it 
may be inferred here that as more directors are added to the board size, the diversity and 
strength of the links increase to the external environment. This may help take better decisions 
on the basis of the board expertise and experience. There is also ample evidence that board 
25 
 
diversity achieved through this process improves functioning of the board (Brennan, 2006; 
Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). The board diversity is also supported by agency theory and 
resource dependence theory simultaneously, whereas proponents of agency theorists believe 
that presence of diverse background members on the board enhance its independence and its 
capability to monitor the executives (Van der Walt and Ingley, 2003; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 
2009) and proponents of resource dependence theory are of the view that by adding directors 
from outside the organization will help secure critical links from the external environment 
regarding much sought after skills, legitimacy, and business contacts (Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Rose, 2007). 
The discussion made on the resources provided by the boards in the above paragraph makes it 
clear that effective boards would have the capability to fulfil both the resource dependence 
and monitoring roles of the board (Jensen 1993; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Reingold 2000). 
Thus, rather than relying on one or the other role,  the study proposes an integration of the 
two ways of viewing board roles may be more valuable for both practical and theoretical 
reasons. The study theoretically develop the argument regarding integrating the two roles and 
their relationship with board structural characteristics and firm performance in the next 
chapter. The next section of this chapter engages with the topic of corporate governance 
reforms as a way to introduce the research context of Pakistan.    
2.6 Corporate Governance Reforms 
The last decade witnessed the rapidly increasing trend in governance codes 
promulgation and adoption by a number of countries of the world. Two different mechanisms 
for code implementation have been adopted in the world: hard and soft regulations. The two 
approaches can be explained by considering the two classic examples of legislations by US 
Sarbanes and Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 and the UK combined code of 2003(Balgobin, 2008). 
The UK combined code (2003) has been upgraded to UK combined code (2012) as a result of 
various governance reviews conducted over time. For example, The Walker Review (2009) 
for reforms in banks and other financial institutions and The Kay Review (2012) for reforms 
in equity markets. The demands by transnational institutions also pushed other countries to 
developing and adopt the corporate governance codes.  
Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007) have propounded that the governance structure and 
characteristics have been influenced by the corporate governance reforms diffused in the last 
decade. Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009), and Aguilera et al., (2008) also conclude that 
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governance structures worldwide have been changed after the implementation of corporate 
governance reforms. It is relevant here to discuss the examples of US and UK governance 
reforms because this study looks into the influence of corporate governance reforms on 
structural characteristics of the board to enhance the firm financial performance and also 
because Pakistan follows the Anglo-Saxon tradition of common law as the basis for her 
commercial laws (Ibrahim, 2005).  The next sections discuss the mechanisms developed as a 
result of corporate governance reforms to protect the investors, focusing on the US and the 
UK to set the stage for introducing the research context.    
2.6.1 Corporate Governance Reforms in US  
United States is the only country who adopted a hard code approach of legislation to 
implement the corporate governance regulations. The most prominent development in this 
regard is the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). The law requires the compulsory 
implementation of the Accounting Industry Reform Act of 2002 (O’Shea, 2005). The 
underlying objective of this enactment was to implement the laws in their true letter and spirit 
and not just to leave it to the discretion of the companies for selective implementation 
(MacNeil and Li, 2006). The law not only explains clearly the tasks and responsibilities of 
top management team but also it provides a procedure to independent directors for more 
diligence and effective monitoring (Linck et al., 2008). The law is not toothless and it has the 
provision to prosecute the perpetrators of wrong practices (Klein, 2003; Buccino and 
Shannon, 2003). This act has permanently changed the landscape of board role in the 
corporate management arena. Bainbridge (2012) states that as a result of SOX the monitoring 
role of the board has become more dominant than the rest of the roles. He is also of the view 
that now boards have to establish the sub committees to ensure the internal controls on each 
entity of the board.  
2.6.2 Corporate Governance Reforms in UK 
UK is the leader amongst the countries who adopted an alternative approach of soft codes. 
These codes are based upon the “comply or explain” mechanism. It says that if a listed 
company in a certain situation does not comply with the code then it has to explain the 
reasons for that. The logic behind this approach is to provide flexibility to some extant to the 
companies to adjust to the new laws as well as an assumption that the capital market pressure 
will dictate the company to implement these laws to be competitive in the business place in 
the eyes of the investors. These codes help not only in structuring the boards but also in 
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making the board roles more important from management and monitoring aspects (Aguilera 
and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009; Aguilera et al., 2008). Due to the influence of transnational 
institutions these cross national codes are converging closely to the shareholders or Anglo-
Saxon model. Although, there have been some changes in “comply” or “explain” 
characteristics of these codes, however, the case of developing and transition economies is 
more complex as they have less developed systems of corporate governance (Cuervo, 2002; 
Roberts, 2004; Okike, 2007; Reaz and Hossain, 2007). Dewing and Russell (2004) are of the 
view that as the corporate governance codes progressed since Cadbury Committee Report of 
1992, there have been gradually more stringent measures prescribed in the subsequent 
versions of codes such as Higgs review (2003) discussed the role of NEDs, Walker review 
(2009) came as complete overview of the previous corporate governance codes in the 
aftermath of financial crisis of 2008-2009 and finally the Kay review discussed and 
prescribed the good working practices in the equity markets which culminated into UK 
combined code (2012) . 
Therefore, most of the codes adopted in the last decade are no more the initial voluntary 
compliance codes rather they are tougher and provide with stern consequences if not 
complied with e.g. suspension from stock exchange or losing the status of a public limited 
company. As the codes have been revised the new requirements are more prescriptive and 
hard in nature in order to address the investor concerns (O’Shea, 2005). There are substantial 
penalties associated with boards that fail to exercise due diligence. Most of the governance 
code implemented as a result of recent governance reforms makes it easier to prosecute 
securities fraud, particularly financial fraud. In particular the developments in the UK 
combined codes over the passage of time have been based upon leadership, effectiveness, 
accountability, remuneration, and relations with shareholders (Lowe, 2013).  These principles 
have been the cornerstone for the corporate governance reforms in Pakistan known as SECP 
code first introduced in 2002. The SECP code is more vocal about board of directors’ 
composition, qualification and meeting frequencies. The code also made mandatory to have 
independent and working audit committees to implement an internal control system in the 
organization. This study will make use of these code guidelines to further progress with our 
research model. However, the code didn’t say anything particularly about the remuneration 
for the directors as these things are not part of disclosure requirements by the code. The 
markets initially gave a positive reaction but in the long run there have been weaknesses in 
the compliance mechanisms. They also argue that mere compliance to the code doesn’t 
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necessarily lead to better financial performance (MacNeil and Li, 2006; Maassen et al., 
2004).  Yet, it is not clear whether the provisions of these rules indeed lead to more effective 
supervision and to higher market value. Therefore, the next section discusses the relationship 
between corporate governance codes and firm performance in more detail.  
2.6.3 Impact of Corporate governance Reforms on firm performance 
The adoption and development of corporate governance codes and regulations  globally also 
paved the way for the corporate governance reforms in Pakistan through Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 2002 called SECP code.  
The compliance levels have significant variations depending upon the nature of country’s 
internal and external governance mechanisms and rule of law. The influence of these 
corporate governance reforms world over has been crucial in determining the board structures 
and board effectiveness as measured by firm performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; 
Daily et al., 2003) in different countries (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). But the 
studies show an inconclusive relationship between code compliance and firm performance. 
For example, Nowak, (2004) doesn’t report any association with the impact on the German 
capital market performance. The studies also reveal that straightforward applications of a 
U.S. market-based model in settings outside the U.S. context should only be made with great 
caution (Davis and Useem 2002). This means that it is needed to understand the diverse 
multinational nature of corporate governance before developing global solutions (Huse, 
2005). The question should not be which theory of governance is universally valid, but under 
which contexts or contingencies may one theory have explanatory power over another. That 
is why, the studies during the last decade has confirmed that there are no universally best 
corporate governance methods.  
The past studies in the field of corporate governance have been overwhelmingly under the 
influence of corporate governance and firm performance direct relationship but the empirical 
evidence produced by these studies is unable to prove the exact nature of this relationship. 
Therefore, the practitioners are not sure that the current wave of implementation of corporate 
governance reforms world over in the shape of either hard or soft codes will bring something 
concrete to the field of corporate governance in general and board roles in specific (Dalton et 
al., 1998; Bhagat and Black, 2001).  Consequently, following Hermalin and Weisbach, 
(2003), it can be said that it is needed to evaluate the more trivial linkage between board 
structure and firm performance through some intervening variables mechanism. 
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Nevertheless, in Pakistan, corporate governance reforms served as a push factor for 
companies to assume the governance requirements that catalysed the changes into structures 
of corporate boards (Rais and Saeed, 2005). This also paves the way for the current study to 
make a novel and timely contribution to the development of understanding of board structure 
and board roles in light of the Pakistan code of corporate governance (SECP code). Next, the 
Pakistani research context is discussed.  
2.7 Research Context and its Significance  
Federowicz and Aguilera, (2003) and Pye and Pettigrew (2005) were amongst the first to 
point out that the role played by context and variations in context reveal differences in the 
dynamic interplay of practices, processes, and performance over time. They were critical of 
the popular stance ‘one size fits all’ solutions often put forth in response to ineffective boards. 
They were of the view that there is a need for a strong argument for an increase in multilevel, 
multi-theoretic considerations of board roles. In the same line, there is another study that 
states that an essential and helpful international perspective on issues of board roles is 
important to judge the governance in different countries. This study argues that understanding 
impact of governance codes on board structure and board roles in the context of a global 
environment offers a strong foundation for advancing our theoretical understanding of 
governance codes and board structure and board roles beyond the boundaries of any one 
country or institutional setting (Aguilera, 2005). The context issue was further highlighted by 
Dalton and Dalton (2005) by understanding and presenting the relationships of board 
composition, leadership structure, and size with corporate financial performance as a way of 
demonstrating that agency theory is limited in its ability to provide prescriptions for effective 
board conduct. Their arguments provide an insightful look at many of the contextual factors 
that affect the board roles and remind us that only a multi-theoretic perspective examining 
both board role and structure can hope to provide a complete picture of the modern-day board 
of directors.  
There are some empirical studies that analyze the impact of different corporate governance 
practices in various countries (La Porta et al., 1999). An important study in this context has 
been conducted by Mitton (2001) with Korean Malaysian, Indonesian, Philippines, and 
Thailand firms’ level. The study found East Asian crisis was the basic reason behind 
promulgation of various corporate governance codes in this part of the world and it was 
identified that low compliance and loose corporate governance rules were also one of the 
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cause of the crisis in 1997, 1998. These differences in context of various countries have 
catalyzed to make their corporate governance practices more effective to attract more 
incentives. The basic reason for the differences among various countries’ control mechanisms 
is that their financial systems had developed separately and differently (Aguilera and 
Jackson, 2003). Over time a host of countries have issued their local corporate governance 
guidelines to develop mechanism for better corporate governance practices.  
The national legal systems of countries are the basic reason to issue different set of corporate 
governance guidelines for every country. The literature regarding developed economies like 
USA and UK is abundantly available on the evolution and shaping of their corporate 
governance culture and rules and regulations but it lacks fundamentally for the developing 
economies, therefore there is a need to fill this gap to know the differences in corporate 
governance mechanisms context used in various countries (Aguilera, 2010; La Porta et al., 
1999; 2000). These cross national codes mainly include recommendations for the structure of 
the board but does not reflect board structure contribution in shaping the board roles 
(Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). Furthermore, US-based evidence clearly reveals 
shortcomings in the practices and the role of the board in addressing risks, the importance of 
the board as a governance mechanism is not uniform and may significantly vary across 
different national settings (Ahrens et al., 2011). The advocates of the rule argue that such 
rules are necessary for the improvement of monitoring mechanism in the public corporations 
in US and to some extant in UK, while it is unclear that the passing of these laws have really 
lead to effective governance and improved corporate value in developing  South Asian 
countries such as Pakistan. 
2.7.1 The Research Context of Pakistan 
The corporate governance canvas in South Asia can’t be compared with the developed 
countries such as in US or UK in terms of development and compliance (Shil, 2008). During 
the last decade, corporate governance has become an important area of research in Pakistan, 
but most of the studies have used one-year cross-sectional data (Shaheen and Nishat, 2004; 
Shaheen and Nishat, 2005), Very few studies (Javid and Iqbal, 2007) have used three years 
data from 2003 to 2005 but they didn’t present a comparison of pre and post corporate 
governance law implementation effects on the corporate sector in Pakistan. In sum, we find a 
gap in the literature regarding development of governance codes in different countries and 
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their impact on shaping the board structure to foster the board roles for better financial 
performance. This further strengthens our motivation to conduct this research project.  
There is no uniformity in code compliance amongst different countries and the range of 
compliance is quiet diverse (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009; Aguilera et al., 2008). New 
corporate governance laws and codes are important because they set the stage for change. But 
given the vast differences in business practices and enforcement capabilities in developing 
economies such as Pakistan, merely believing that these codes will be having the same 
impact level as in UK and USA would be a mistake. What makes it trickier is that business 
and political circles are closely entwined, and the mechanisms for managing conflicts of 
interest are underdeveloped in developing economies. The problem gets further aggravated 
when the regulators face lack of trained staff and lack of adequate budgets to conduct 
thorough investigations thus exposing the weakness of the legal system and making 
prosecution even difficult.  
Furthermore, in Pakistan, a large number of companies have been family owned unlike the 
Anglo-American model of dispersed shareholding structure. These majority shareholders 
manage and control the organization and generally avoid raising equity which potentially 
may dilute their grip on the boards (Ibrahim, 2005). This situation is not much different from 
the rest of the world where, according to La Porta et al., (1999) even in the wealthy 
industrialised nations 30% of the firms have been closely held family owned companies. But 
according to Javid and Iqbal (2007) the board which are dominated by family members 
become less competitive in protecting the rights of minority shareholders. They are also of 
the view that family dominant companies become complacent and less motivated to excel in 
their relevant business areas. Although, it is found out in a study by Klein et al., (2005) that a 
particular ownership structure including family ownership structure doesn’t really affect the 
firms’ overall performance.  
However, a country wide assessment report on corporate governance by the World Bank 
(2005) indicates contrary to initial concerns of various administrative and public quarters 
about low compliance culture in Pakistan, most of the family controlled firms have been 
improving on the corporate governance compliance standards by implementing the guidelines 
of SECP code in creating a more transparent structure. These family owned firms have also 
introduced the independent non-executive directors which is the major step towards modern 
corporate governance structure.  
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Therefore, this is also heartening to know that the governments are now giving more attention 
and allocating more budgets to enhance the authority of the regulators and enacting adequate 
procedures to make it tougher and easier to prosecute. Countries now need to harmonize their 
local standards with international rules due to the pressure on transnational institutions to 
attract more foreign investments either directly or in their respective stocks (Balasubramanian 
et al., 2010). Generally there has been low compliance of corporate governance codes 
reported in various studies in case of particularly the developing economies (Krambia-
Kapardis and Psaros, 2006). While adopting the universally accepted governance guideline 
through transnational institutions, the countries have significant variations in the contents of 
the codes and their implementation mechanisms overall (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra 2009). 
They are of the view that context specific studies are important to be added to the literature as 
there are contrasting differences between strength of governance mechanisms, for example, 
free market controls, weaker capital markets, underdeveloped legal systems, and unreliable 
information flow. The immediate impact on the shaping of the board structure can be easily 
traced as a consequence of these regulatory reforms across the countries (Linck et al., 2008). 
Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the implementation of these codes in the context specific 
studies, which also provides motivation for the current study.  
Our case for context-specific studies is also supported by the fact that although the last 
decade has witnessed an increase in the number of articles published in corporate governance, 
their context has been predominantly USA and its organizations as the unit of analysis. The 
increase in publications shows the maturity and rigour in methodology but very few studies 
reported single country researches other than USA (Durisin and Puzone, 2009).  
A very limited number of studies have been found in the cross national context (Aguilera and 
Cuervo-Cazurra 2009) but there is real dearth of studies in the context of single countries. 
Most of the single country context studies are in European contexts, which are quite different 
from the South Asian contexts (Gollakota and Gupta, 2006). Therefore, it can be argued that 
the results from these studies can’t be generalized for the South Asian Pakistani perspective 
and the state of corporate governance research in emerging market context is likely to be 
different given its unique institutional contexts.  
The developments in the field of corporate governance, specifically SOX and various UK 
combined codes have also affected Pakistan (Malik, 2012). This paved the way for 
introducing governance codes in Pakistan. However, the corporate governance in South Asia 
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is not as developed as in UK and USA (Shil, 2008) as there is shortage of adequately 
qualified independent directors. Unlike most of the Asian economies, in which corporate 
governance grew in importance as a result of Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 (Chakrabarti et. 
al, 2008), in Pakistan the governance codes were introduced on the demands of the 
transnational institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF) as Pakistan is major 
beneficiary of IMF debt relief program (Malik, 2012).  This required Pakistan to implement 
these guidelines for its corporate sector as Gulzar and Wang (2010) have opined that to 
maintain steady and sustainable economic growth, corporate governance guidelines are 
crucial to be implemented. In a seminal work on Pakistani corporate governance pitch by 
Ashraf and Ghani (2005) who have recorded the history of accounting reforms and corporate 
disclosures and have outlined the factors which have influenced most. They recorded that 
deficiencies in the areas of investor protection (minority rights protection, insider trading 
protection), judicial inefficiencies, and weak enforcement mechanisms are more critical 
factors than are cultural factors in explaining the state of accounting in Pakistan. The study 
construed that it is needed to bring improvements in the enforcement mechanisms in the 
developing countries to reap the benefits of implementation of corporate governance reforms. 
In South Asia Pakistan shares the common background with India, where researchers have 
examined the recent Anglo-American model and its suitability to India (Reed, 2002; 
Afsharpour, 2009). This has given an edge to India in the global economic agenda and ‘the 
West’ is turning its attention on India’s companies as strategic business partners (Khanna and 
Palepu, 2006). This has also created impetus for imposing best corporate governance 
standards and practices as benchmarks of quality and reliability in Pakistan, which 
geographically shares the borders with India and China, the two economic giants amongst the 
BRIC countries (Rais and Saeed, 2005). Javid and Iqbal (2007; 2010) are of the view that the 
importance of corporate governance has been recently acknowledged in Pakistan and now 
there is a trend of research in this area. Similarly Cheema (2003) has stated that the most 
important reason for recognition of importance of corporate governance is to attract the 
foreign investment through diversification of stock market to bring it at par with international 
rules and regulations. In short, as a result of this study it would be possible to shed more light 
on the difference of Pakistani context as compared to US and UK. 
2.7.2 Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) Code of Governance 
Institutions are considered the most important mechanisms, in a society, to monitor the 
interaction process amongst various organizations (North, 1990). They help creating the level 
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playground for all the organizations and individuals to take benefit of the environment and 
opportunities arising as a result of rules and regulations (Li, 2004). These rules and 
regulations are set forth by the relevant institutions in a society to create constraints to avoid 
rent seeking behaviour by the managers and to define the rules for the fair game play (Li et 
al., 2008).  
Therefore, the government of Pakistan took the initiative and established the Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) in 1997 to lay down the ground work of good 
corporate governance by building institutional, legal and regulatory framework for the better 
management of the corporate sector entities. The SECP has put forward its policy of 
regulation and endorsed and enforced various laws, bylaws and regulations in order to create 
a level playing field and an “enabling business environment” to overcome the constraints 
confronted by the corporate companies for smooth and sustained economic development in 
the corporate arena of Pakistan. This institution can also be credited to draft the first code of 
corporate governance in March 2002 in order to further strengthen the regulatory mechanism. 
The law was enacted in 2002 in response to worldwide corporate governance reforms. It was 
designed, in part, to alter the behaviour of corporate directors. Among other things, SECP 
code affects the duties and responsibilities of officers and directors. The law has multiple 
sections, but some are particularly noteworthy e.g. introduction and proportion of non-
executive directors, separation of CEO and Chairperson of the board, and audit committee 
formation and activities. There is a legal binding on the boards that they should be active and 
develop a mechanism of internal control through which they are fully aware of the critical 
corporation conditions and financial reporting. This can be done by creating Audit 
committees on boards so that the company has an adequate system of internal controls to 
properly monitor the potential problems, and to preserve the integrity of financial reports. 
They are to oversee the financial reporting process and confirm the appointment of the 
independent auditing firm. Additionally, they are responsible for discharging independent 
auditors when appropriate. The effective corporate governance can only be guaranteed if the 
code is implemented in its true letter and spirit without just adopting the tick box approach. 
The rules may be very strong on the paper and look quite strong but it is the implementation 
mechanism and compliance procedures which make a rule effective. The drawbacks and 
imperfections of the regulatory framework can be immense and can have severe impact on 
the capital markets, ownership and control mechanisms, and productivity of firms leading to 
poor development of economic institutions as a whole. It is the level of compliance which 
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reflects the strength of any regulatory framework on the whole and the capacity of a 
governance system to perform (Rais and Saeed, 2005). This calls for a systematic appraisal of 
the possible impacts of the Code of Corporate Governance adopted by the SECP to make 
listed companies comply with the principles of corporate governance mechanisms. 
The Code was met with criticism from corporations and commentators in the start. 
Corporations believed that complying with the Code’s provisions would be very expensive. 
Most of the experts on the corporate scene of Pakistan, initially, were of the view that there is 
lack of indigenous expertise to implement the code and there will be number of political 
obstacles in its enforcement. In addition, some commentators believed that the Code was 
defective, outdated, and had “no utility to stakeholders” (Burki and Niazi, 2006). 
Nonetheless, the code pioneered the era of corporate governance reforms in Pakistan and 
despite all odds it brought the capital markets of Pakistan to be integrated with the global 
trend. Therefore, an overwhelming majority of the companies adopted it despite their initial 
reservations regarding its drafting and implementation (Rais and Saeed, 2005). Since its 
implementation, the Code is constantly developing and evolving through the elucidation of its 
provisions by the courts and the substantial revisions have been made to the Code itself by 
the SECP. Pakistan’s courts, for the most part, have not significantly criticized the Code’s 
provisions in the last three years. However, the courts are apprehensive of the weaker 
provisions of the code regarding protection of minority shareholders and have been willing to 
annul the decisions of majority shareholders in certain cases.   
The corporate governance background in Pakistan has also been saturated with local 
corporate scandals and frauds. The local companies like Taj company, Sarah Textiles, 
Crescent Investment Bank and Mehran bank scandals are but a few to be named here. These 
frauds shook the Pakistani corporate fraternity and the people started looking for some 
mechanism to avoid these misappropriations in the future (Dar et al., 2011). 
 Therefore, global voices for implementation of corporate governance rules and regulations 
were also heard in Pakistan and when Government of Pakistan along with International 
Financial Institutions, came up with the idea of corporate governance reforms, it was not 
resisted much and sooner a bigger part of the market showed compliance to it (Ibrahim, 
2005). 
The corporate governance scene in the context of Pakistan offers some interesting insights, 
keeping in view its legal background, cultural diversity and regional location. A survey of 
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corporate governance conducted in 2007 in Pakistan by IFC shows that high level of 
compliance is adhered in Pakistan regarding IAS/IFRS. Pakistan lies in the upper middle tier 
with a score of 70 out of 111 regarding compliance to international accounting practices 
(Ding et al., 2009).  
Therefore, it is multidimensional and is governed by various set of company laws as well as 
the recently developed corporate governance reforms. Viewing the relevant laws, along with 
SECP’s vision, offers the foundational perspective to understanding Pakistan’s corporate 
governance structure. The SECP code has provided a mechanism for making the board more 
independent from the influence of top management by introducing the minimum limits on 
presence of non-executive members and separating the role of CEO from chairperson of the 
board. 
In addition, the SECP appears to be efficient in facilitating and complementing the process of 
implementing capital market reforms to attract even more foreign investors (Ibrahim, 2005). 
It imposes penalties on the listed companies in case of non-compliance of the code. 
Therefore, after the implementation of SECP code, the events of delisting and other punitive 
actions such as not issuing the certificate of adherence to the principles of corporate 
governance according to SECP code has increased manifold. This has also resulted in a 
fifteen times increase in listed capital and an average increase in market capitalization of 
almost 95%, with fewer companies on board. The entrepreneurial activity also increased with 
more IPOs on board. The market capitalization grew almost 3.5 times from 1998 to 2005 
(KSE Annual Report, 2005). A comparative study of corporate governance practices in Asia 
commissioned by World Bank has also ranked Pakistan after India and Korea with a score of 
39 out of 50 with third position equally shared by Malaysia, well ahead of Vietnam, Thailand 
and Philippines (McGee, 2008). This shows a progress of capital markets in the country 
which is noted for bureaucratic restrictions and corruption.  
The literature regarding corporate governance in Pakistan is sparse given the lack of research 
culture in Pakistani academic and institutional areas. Among the comity of South Asian 
nations, India has relatively higher culture of research and therefore have more literature on 
boards and corporate governance than any other country (Khanna et al., 1998, 1999; Pankaj, 
1996; Goswami et al., 2002; Singh et al., 2002, 2003). Therefore this study strives to bridge 
this gap by outlining the corporate governance reforms introduced in Pakistan in 2002 by 
SECP and its impact on the board roles in the organization as a result of structural changes in 
board composition. 
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2.8 Chapter Summary and Identification of Research Gaps 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on various theoretical perspectives that has been the 
subject to recent corporate governance reforms and board roles research examining the 
structural characteristics of boards of directors and how this contributes to firm performance. 
This literature review has revealed that the research in corporate governance has seen a 
change in emphasis in recent years. This change is fundamentally in three different areas. 
Firstly, over the time more and more studies are using the multi-theoretic lens instead of 
relying on any single theory to study boards and corporate governance. Secondly, the trend is 
towards examining the impact of intervening or mediating variables and moderating variables 
which have opened more insights in the research arena.   Thirdly, it has been accepted that 
context or nation specific studies are important and need to be conducted on a wider scale.  
Following on these changes, the study identifies and links together three main areas where 
further research is needed. First, despite some impressive improvements in the knowledge 
about boards and what they actually do in recent years, many researchers still contend there is 
much to learn (McNulty et al., 2013; Hillman et al., 2008; Van Ees et al., 2008). Based upon 
the literature studied in this chapter, it can be argued that only a sub-set of board structural 
characteristics and board roles have been brought to empirical study, therefore, it is required 
to understand the board characteristics and roles under the multiple theoretical frameworks. 
This suggests a study that investigates a more comprehensive set of board roles.   
Second, as discussed earlier most of the empirical work examining board structural 
characteristics and board roles has been limited to USA and UK with almost no attention paid 
to Pakistani boards. This lack of large empirical studies in the Pakistan examining board 
structural characteristics and their potential contribution to board roles and firm performance 
is a gap in the research which demands attention.  
Third, the lack of research specifically measuring influence of Pakistani corporate 
governance reforms (SECP code) on board structural characteristics, board roles and firm 
performance is a noteworthy absence in the literature.  
Fourth, the researcher has responded to imminent calls for the development and empirical 
testing of alternative more comprehensive theoretical frameworks in corporate governance 
(Aguilera, 2005; Huse, 2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; Roberts et al., 2005) and specifically 
to address the need for a multi-theoretic approach is also a research gap identified through the 
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review of the literature. These gaps in the literature have helped identify the need for the 
development of a new model to investigate the board roles mediation on board structure and 
firm performance with a specific focus on corporate governance in Pakistan. There are many 
issues, yet, uncovered particularly the impact of these reforms revitalising the boards in 
performing various roles to protect the rights of shareholders has not been unearthed in its 
true letter and spirit and its effect on the valuation of the firm which is central issue of this 
area needs in depth research.  
Therefore, in the next chapter we strive to develop a model based upon the structural changes 
proposed in the SECP code (Proportion of NEDs, Board Leadership roles, and Audit 
Committee composition and working) as well as by Van den Berghe and Levrau (2004) and 
Levrau and Van den Berghe (2007), board roles and firm performance. This model will be 
based on a number of hypotheses that will be tested through the data of the boards of 
Pakistani listed companies.  
2.9 Research Aims and Objectives 
The main objective of the study is to fill the knowledge gap in the literature by examining the 
mediational influence of board roles on the relationship between board structural 
characteristics and firm performance. Specifically, the study aims to look beyond the single 
theory, such as agency theory, for board structure characteristics and firm performance 
relationship and discusses this relationship under the multiple theoretical perspectives of role 
mediation. The thesis also intends to investigate theoretical utility and empirical robustness of 
established distinctions in the literature about the monitoring and resource dependence roles 
of board under the multi-theoretic lens. As the literature leaves us with a key finding that 
direct relationship of board structure and firm performance is ambivalent therefore, the 
research question is how board roles mediate their relationship and what is the influence of 
corporate governance reforms on it? Consequently, this study will investigate the mediation 
of board roles under multi-theoretic lens between board structure and firm financial 
performance before and after the implementation of SECP code 2002 for the listed firms in 
KSE primarily for the non-financial sector in Pakistan.  
Most specifically, the objectives of the research are: 
 To develop and examine a model of the relationships between board structure, board 
roles, and firm performance; 
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 To investigate the factors affecting board structure and firm performance relationship 
under multi-theoretic regime; where more than one theoretical approaches can be 
combined together to develop a comprehensive theoretical corporate governance 
framework 
 To investigate the influence of SECP code on board structure and firm performance in 
Pakistan;  
 To develop recommendations for board members and policy-makers on their role to 
contribute to add value to the firm overall. 
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Chapter 3 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter reviewed the conventional direct linkage of structure-performance to 
corporate governance approach in general, and to board of directors specifically. This 
traditional input-output approach has been heavily criticised for three main reasons. Firstly, 
the agency theory is heavily reliant on the monitoring role of the board and doesn’t give due 
importance to other roles of the board such as resource provision and discussed in detail in 
section 2.5.2 (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Daily et al., 2003; Huse, 2005; Pye and Pettigrew, 
2005; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). Second, the conventional approach of direct 
relationships neglects the role of mediating or intervening variables that connect independent 
variables with the dependent variables under different environmental settings and the 
researchers like  (Forbes and Millikan, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Pettigrew, 1992; 
Roberts et al., 2005) are of the view that board structure help strengthen specific kind of 
board roles and not directly contributing to financial performance of the firm as well as the 
board roles like resource dependence and monitoring are not part of the board structure 
therefore, can’t be directly considered as a result of externally imposed regulations. These 
mediating or intervening variables may be various board roles/functions and environmental 
settings such as specific context may act as moderating variable to judge the relationship 
indirectly through input, mediation and output mechanism. This is in fact, a two-step process; 
in the first step the relationship is tested between predictors and mediating mechanisms, in 
the second step the relationship is tested between mediating mechanism and outcomes and 
finally an overall relationship is tested. This whole process has been explained in further 
details in Figure 5.1 and section 5.5. Third, methodologically, there has been a reliance on 
single period studies instead of studying the two independent time periods in comparison to 
each other with respect to before and after the implementation of corporate governance 
reforms in a country (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) to provide sufficient understanding of 
what boards actually do.  
Therefore, this chapter will discuss the broader literature studying board roles performed by 
board structure in the aftermath of corporate governance reforms. Specifically, it seeks to 
achieve two main goals. Firstly, it attempts to offer a review of the existing theoretical 
literature that tries to link board structural characteristics to board roles and firm financial 
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performance. The second objective of this chapter is to develop a conceptual model for 
conducting the study on board structural characteristics, board roles under multi-theoretic 
lens and firm financial performance in the context of SECP code in Pakistan. The main 
curiosity here is to examine whether SECP code changes the board structure and board roles 
relationship. Specifically, it traces the relevant literature in the context of input-mediators-
output model (Ilgen et al., 2004) to develop hypotheses among the variables examined in this 
study. The discussion then culminates on the development of the conceptual model to work 
as a blueprint of this study.  
3.2 Theoretical Motivation 
The study finds its theoretical motivation based upon the two functions of boards of directors 
(monitoring and provision of resources) and their association with firm performance as 
discussed in chapter 2. Generally speaking, the agency theory elaborated that the main 
obligation of the boards is to monitor the management of an organization while resource 
dependency theory treaded a distinct path, where they believe that the provision of resources 
as the main function of boards. Apparently, this gap between alternative explanations of 
theoretical frameworks needs to be embedded together. Therefore, this study looks further 
into the direction where these two alternative approaches could be combined together to 
develop a comprehensive theoretical framework under which the corporate governance 
studied can be examined. Also looking on the theoretical framework proposed by Hillman 
and Dalziel (2003), it can be said that integration of monitoring role and the resourced 
dependence role may be instrumental in overcoming the theoretical weaknesses in preferring 
one approach over another. Huse (2008) also suggested that multiple theoretical perspectives 
are required to fully understand board behaviour.  
Instead of relying on any one or the other role, we propose an integration of the two ways of 
viewing board roles may be even more valuable for both practical and theoretical reasons. 
Therefore, the study adopts a multiple-theoretical perspective and will consider board roles 
not only in agency theory perspective but also in the context of resource dependence theory.  
We discuss this rationale next and then integrate the two perspectives. 
3.3 Towards a More Holistic View of Board Roles  
Integrating monitoring and the resource provision roles of the board as an intervening 
variable between board structure and firm performance are important for practitioners as well 
as for corporate governance scholars, because directors engage in both functions 
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simultaneously. The separation of control and ownership in large public listed corporations 
started to look sharply on the control and resource dependence (Daily et al., 2003; Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976).The roles are often embedded in such a fine way that the boundaries 
between the two are often overlapping and sometimes conflicting (Bainbrigde, 2013). In 
another study the directors reported performing a variety of activities for both monitoring and 
providing resources, indicating that service on the board is not limited to one or the other but, 
rather, is a combination of both (Korn/Ferry, 2006). On the similar lines Cohen et al., (2008) 
elaborate that Board roles are expected to influence board judgements, since the agency and 
resource dependence roles are two dimensions that add to overall board effectiveness. The 
close monitoring of management through a strong agency perspective and the strong resource 
dependence perspective of the board will help mitigate the governance problems and enhance 
the leadership role of the board. 
Therefore, the diverse board abilities to control or monitor have not been considered 
explicitly by agency theorists and on the other hand the resource dependence theorists have 
focussed only on the resource provision function of the board. Therefore, it is argued that 
examining one without the other is insufficient. Specifically following the tradition (Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Wan and Ong, 2005; Zona and Zattoni, 
2007; Cohen et al., 2008) of moving a step further from examining a direct relationship 
between  board structural mechanisms (board composition, working of board sub-
committees, CEO/chairman duality) and performance measures such as accounting or stock 
performance, this study is the first which recognizes that board roles as a determinant of 
financial performance are shaped as a result of board structure characteristics.  
Therefore, in combining the two theoretical perspectives, this study argues that board 
contributes both monitoring and the provision of resources. An important contribution of this 
study is a more fully specified and richer model of the relationship between boards’ structure 
and firm performance mediated by board roles and in the context of Pakistan. The study 
considers both the direct effects of board structure on firm performance as well as the 
mediation effect of board roles moderated by recent corporate governance reforms. It is 
argued that proportion of outside directors on the board may bring more activity in the board 
and boards meet more frequently for effective monitoring as well as boards co-opt more 
outside directors with more experience and expertise which may increase the board strength 
and size to improve its capability at both providing resources and monitoring. The additional 
complexity provided by this integration allows for the development of propositions that shed 
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light on current mixed empirical results, serve to guide future research, and have implications 
for practitioners and regulators interested in board composition. 
The above studies suggest that the field of corporate governance research remains desperately 
in need of empirical researches that provide insight into the black-box of board decision 
making. A board roles perspective provides us with an opportunity to look deeper into the 
black-box of boards to try and establish the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance. In short, although there are two large, separate bodies of literature on the 
agency and resource dependence roles of the board and both have been discussed in depth 
separately but studying both these roles together is the objective of this study.  Based upon 
the literature discussed regarding board roles, we can conclude that our study is novel in its 
setting to empirically prove that changes in board structure after the corporate governance 
reforms will be helpful in strengthening the board roles to achieve the better corporate 
financial performance. The organizations need such mechanisms through which they 
establish and achieve strong boards to achieve success and provide vision to the firm by 
incorporating both agency controls and resource dependence.  
We have addressed the question that board roles provide as an intervening mechanism 
between the relationship of board structural characteristics and firm financial performance. 
Further, we contend that board structure does not directly help in improving the financial 
performance of the organization rather it helps strengthening the board roles which in turn 
help achieve better financial performance for the organizations.  
Therefore, in the next section, we discuss the board structure, board roles and firm 
performance under the lens of agency and resource dependence perspectives to be fully 
integrated into the central arguments in the context of corporate governance reforms.  
 3.4 Board Roles and Firm Performance 
Although developing a mechanism for measurement of board roles is still a problem as 
discussed in chapter 2, the researchers are gradually converging to a point that understanding 
the board roles is vital to understand the corporate governance and firm performance 
relationship (Hillman et al., 2008; Huse, 2005 and 2007). Drawing on this literature, this 
research proposes that firm performance is determined by the boards’ ability to successfully 
carry out their monitoring and resource dependence roles.   
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The South Asian country studies show that the taking notice of corporate governance was 
motivated not only by the East Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and scandals in America, 
Britain and Canada, in early 1990’s, which led to the high profile reports such as Cadbury 
committee, SOX and UK combined codes, but also by home-grown problems in their own 
financial and capital markets (Sobhan and Werner, 2003).  
The need to study board roles arises directly from two main concerns. Firstly, as a result of 
corporate governance reforms worldwide, boards are beginning to pay more attention to the 
way they operate (SOX; UK combined codes; Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazurra, 2009). 
Secondly, Cohen et al., (2008) noted that board effectiveness has to depend on the roles 
which the boards perform besides solid structure and substantive content. They argue that 
recent calls for stringent corporate governance mechanisms has given further impetus to 
study the board roles in relation with board structural characteristics and firm performance.  
The conceptual development of board roles is due to various theoretical domains existing in 
the board roles research (Van den Heuvel et al., 2006).  Forbes and Milliken (1999) are of the 
view that boards’ performance can be measured in terms of their functions of monitoring and 
resource dependence.   Similarly Petrovic (2008) is of the view that these board roles in terms 
of monitoring and resource dependence roles help achieve the shareholder objectives. 
Therefore, it can be said that there is no clarity in terms of board roles and different 
researchers have different views on them (Nicholson and Kiel, 2004; Van den Heuvel et al., 
2006). However, we stick to literature in the second chapter that resource provision and 
strategy role are not mutually exclusive rather they grossly overlap with regards to the set of 
tasks performed by the board, and therefore, discuss the board meeting frequency as the 
mechanism for monitoring role and firm performance relationship in the next section.  
3.4.1 Monitoring Role: board meeting frequency and firm performance 
From an agency theory perspective the principal role that the board has to play is a control or 
monitoring one (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Whilst many 
researchers have identified the importance of the board’s monitoring role (Dalton and Kesner, 
1987; Kesner et al., 1986; Mace, 1971; Molz, 1988) there have only been a small number of 
empirical studies that have endeavoured to gauge the extent to which board structure have 
influenced the fulfilment of the board’s monitoring/control role (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 
2000; van Heuvel et al., 2006). Therefore, an important aspect of agency and resource 
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dependency theories linked with corporate governance and performance is the intensity of 
board activity. 
The boards show its ability to perform through meetings and it can be said that the more they 
meet the more they perform better their roles as custodians of shareholders rights and wealth 
(Conger et al., 1998). Similarly the most of the problems organizations face is due to lesser 
meeting frequencies of the boards as Lorsch (1992) suggest that the most acute problem 
directors’ face is shortage of time to accomplish their duties. This elaborates directors in 
boards that meet more frequently are more likely to perform their duties in accordance with 
shareholders' interests. 
This study follows the theoretical proposition forwarded by Vafeas (1999) and Conger et al., 
(1998) that the frequency of board meetings measures the intensity of a board’s monitoring 
role, and the quality or effectiveness of its monitoring. It has been argued that higher 
frequency of meetings will grant directors with more time and effort to design strategy and to 
appraise the CEO performance (Vafeas 1999). It can help directors to remain aware and 
informed about important developments taking place within the firm and putting the directors 
in a better position to timely address emerging critical issues (Mangena and Tauringana, 
2006). Moreover, Sonnenfeld (2002) proposes that presence of directors in regular meeting is 
considered a quality of the diligent boards. This higher frequency of board meetings will 
bring the members closer to the organization and they can get sometimes important 
information through informal sideline communications (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992) which can 
be instrumental in strengthening the resource dependence role of the directors as well. In the 
post SOX scenario, the researchers suggest boards are more active than in earlier periods 
(Roberts et al., 2005). The quality of more active boards is that directors will be actively 
participating in discussions, helping the execution of specific board roles, and using their 
skills for the interest of the board (Gabrielsson and Winlund, 2000; Pye and Pettigrew, 2005; 
Roberts et al., 2005; Shen 2005).  
Vafeas (1999) reports a negative correlation between the frequency of board meetings and 
financial performance measured in terms of market based performance (Tobin Q). But his 
findings indicate that performance got better after a year of abnormal board activity. This 
illustrates that board meetings don’t yield immediate result and it takes some time for the 
organization to capitalize on them.     
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By contrast, there are some researchers who have posted a positive relationship between 
board meeting frequency and the market based measure of performance (Karamanou and 
Vafeas, 2005) which indicate that companies having more frequent board meetings had a 
positive impact on the outside investors. However, another study reports opposite to the 
above studies and claims that the frequency of board meetings did not has any relationship 
with financial performance. But the sample used for the study was too small to be generalised 
in a different setting. However, to get back to the point about significance of meeting 
frequency to firm performance Lipton and Lorsch (1992) suggest that the higher meetings 
frequency is likely to result in superior performance. Therefore, generally there is reason to 
believe board meetings on face value, may be an important resource and therefore frequency 
of board meetings, may influence the governance performance nexus.  
In this study, therefore, the relationship between board structure, board activity measured by 
board meeting frequency, and firm performance is investigated in the light of compliance 
with SECP code in Pakistan.  
H1 (a): Frequency of board meetings is positively associated with firm financial performance 
(Tobin Q) 
H1 (b): Frequency of board meetings is positively associated with firm financial performance 
(ROA) 
3.4.2 The Resource Dependence Role, Board Size and firm performance 
As said by Hillman, (2005); Hillman and Dalziel, (2003) and Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) 
and described adequately in chapter 2 that providing resources is the most significant task 
carried out by resource dependence theory in the field of corporate governance research. The 
theory further elaborates that board of directors are the primary link of the organization to the 
external world for provision of resources and reducing the uncertainties faced by the firm 
(Hillman, 2005; Boyd, 1990).  
Literature regarding resource dependence theory suggests that tasks performed by the board 
of directors range from providing vital resources for the firm thorough networking and 
counselling for better management  to provide direction and strategy to achieve its objectives 
(Huse, 2007; Davis et al., 1997).  Hillman et al., (2000) are of the view that board members 
inherently have different kinds of qualities depending on their backgrounds which can be 
helpful to the management and they should not just be judged as solely the monitors of the 
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management. They judged the importance of board roles by examining the board changing 
process of airlines when the economic environment got changed from regulated to liberal 
economic environment. 
Guest, (2009) are of the view that size of the board and background of the members are vital 
for the provision of advice, counsel, management, and policy oversight and monitoring. They 
also argued that the firms which previously were not compliant to SOX increased their board 
sizes because they added more outside directors than the insiders removed from the board. 
Carpenter and Westphal (2001) found that boards which had more resources in terms of 
networking and social capital caused improved financial performance. Larger boards may 
have an advantage to be able to attract more renowned directors (Certo, 2006; De Villiers et 
al., 2011). Therefore, in the light of above literature , it can be said that boards larger in size 
will be better able to attract more experienced and star directors to their organizations (Daily 
et al., 1999).  
The provision of resources through experienced and well-connected directors is directly 
associated with firm performance (Hillman et al., 2000; Yawson, 2006). The foremost 
advantage of the larger boards is that they become instrumental in access to critical resources 
like finance, raw materials, and vital information for the firm because of their background, 
expertise, and networking (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Pearce and Zahra, 1992). Another very 
significant advantage of the larger boards is to enhance the knowledge base to design strategy 
for getting competitive advantage in managerial capability and better decision making 
(Yawson, 2006; Pugliese et al., 2009). The enhanced resource capability of the board also 
increases its capacity for better monitoring of the firm management which shows that larger 
boards may be better able to perform their control role in the organization (John and Senbet, 
1998). The larger boards with diversified skill set of expertise will be better poised to 
ascertain the quality of decisions made by the CEO and in this way may neutralise the 
dominance of CEO. 
The literature reports that there is a positive association between size of the board of a firm 
and its market based measure of financial performance Tobin Q (Henry, 2008; Beiner et al., 
2006). Similarly the size of the board is also showing positive relationship with accounting 
based measure of the profitability such as ROA (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Sanda et al., 
2005). This suggests that differences exist between investors and companies in their 
perception of the relevance of larger boards. Theoretically, the finding of Haniffa and Hudaib 
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(2006) implies that larger boards enhance the knowledge base on which business advice can 
be sought, which increases resource dependence capability to make important and better 
business decisions.  
SECP code does not specify the exact number of directors that should form a board. 
However, it encourages having more non-executive board members with diverse 
backgrounds. This may be the reason to avoid any particular size for all the organization and 
to provide the organization with liberty to choose and design their board according to their 
particular business needs (MacNeil and Xiao, 2006). The studies by Guest (2009) elaborates 
that as the SOX (2002) was implemented in USA, more non-executive directors having 
background in finance and law were inducted on the board to comply with the law, which led 
to increase in the board size. The previous research (Goden and Zajac, 2001; Dalton et al., 
1999), also shows that by adding a representative from the block shareholders the boards 
contribute positively to the overall firm performance as it can be assumed that adding the 
financial experts as per the requirements of SOX (2000) and SECP code and inducting the 
representative from institutional shareholders on the board will not only bring the required 
resources/expertise on the board to enhance its capacity but will also add to already existing 
numbers because usually it is easier to add more numbers as compared to dislodge the 
existing members. This is also shown in Javid and Iqbal (2007) that in the context of 
Pakistani companies, board sizes enhanced after the implementation of SECP code which 
elaborates that large size boards will be consisting of large pool of human expertise and 
similarly the smaller boards may lack the essential intellectual mix needed for better steering 
of the organization.  
Therefore, it can be discerned that larger boards are likely to include more experienced and 
knowledgeable directors who possess better expertise to manage firm resources after the 
implementation of SECP code. In this study, it is endeavoured to empirically examine the 
relation between board structure, board resources role, measured by board size, and firm 
performance before and after the enforcement of SECP code in Pakistan. 
 Brennan (2006) is of the view that an adequate level of efficiency and effectiveness is 
needed on behalf of board of directors to safe guard the interest of the shareholders. But the 
effectiveness and efficiency of board of directors, as suggested by the past literature, depends 
upon the structural characteristics of the board such as composition of the board, leadership  
structure of the board and board committees structure, amongst others (Baranchuk and 
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Dybvig, 2009). Therefore, in the light of above discussion the following hypotheses are put 
forth: 
H2 (a): Board Size is positively associated with firm financial performance (Tobin Q) 
H2 (b): Board size is positively associated with firm financial performance (ROA) 
3.5 Internal corporate governance and corporate governance reforms 
As noted in chapter 2, and irrespective of the firms’ background the newly shaped board 
structures have two things in common throughout these global corporate governance codes: 
the independent non-executive directors (NEDs) and the presence of independent board sub 
committees like audit committee (Collier and Zaman, 2005).  All those directors are called 
non-executive directors who are not part of the management of the organization (Johnson et 
al., 1996). They are also called outside directors. The reforms in corporate governance 
require that non-executive directors will not be related with the organization or the executive 
directors on the basis of family relationships as well as will not have any business or 
pecuniary relationship (SECP code, 2002). Usually it is expected that NEDs will monitor the 
role of CEO which may be difficult to be monitored by the executive directors as being the 
subordinates which is close to the agency perspective. In addition to that, resource 
dependence theory proposes that organizations appoint these outsiders on their boards to 
append more resources from outside, however, proponents of institutional theory claim that 
appointing the outsiders may be the result of external institutional pressure to comply with 
the rules and that may not necessarily enhance the firm performance (Peng, 2004). Keeping 
in view the unique Pakistani corporate governance landscape, closed family shareholding, it 
might be helpful at the end to interpret the research findings with the help of Institutional 
theory if necessary, however, agency and resource dependence theories will remain the major 
theoretical vehicle of the study and all the hypotheses will be framed based upon these two 
theories.  
After the enforcement of Cadbury Committee Report, 1992; combined code, 2003; OECD, 
1999, 2004; and Sarbanes-Oxley act, 2002 (SOX), the corporate governance codes have been 
adopted by most of the countries of the world (Mallin, 2007; Aguilera, 2008). The codes 
provide recommendations regarding board structures particularly on the proportion of non-
executive and independent board members, the presence or absence of dual board leadership 
structure, and board committees. In a study by Gregory (2000), it is revealed that in almost all 
developed countries the good governance practices are enforced by the laws. In UK the 
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Cadbury Report emphasized that the calibre, skill, number and background of non-executive 
directors is crucial in setting and maintain high standards of corporate governance. The 
presence of non-executive directors on the board makes the disclosed information reliable for 
the outside investors and shareholders. Similarly, board leadership structure with respect to 
the separation of chair of the board from CEO is also very important. Boards have legal 
obligations to be fully informed about critical corporation conditions and financial reporting. 
Audit committees are required to show a level of due diligence and independence to ensure 
that the company has an adequate system of internal controls to foresee the potential 
problems and to produce the trustworthy financial figures. They are to oversee the financial 
reporting process and confirm the appointment of the independent auditing firm. 
Additionally, they are responsible for discharging independent auditors when appropriate 
(Van Ness et al., 2010). Therefore, the question addressed here is that board roles provide an 
intervening mechanism between the relationship of board structure and firm financial 
performance.  
We have found out in the chapter 2 that board structure does not directly help in improving 
the financial performance of the organization rather it helps strengthening the board roles 
which in turn help achieve better financial performance for the organizations. Our study 
additionally investigates the impact of corporate governance reforms to shape the board 
structure which helps invigorating board roles to enhance the firm financial performance. The 
board structure not only helps in improving monitoring capability of the board as well as 
improving board resources to advise the top management team.  The selected literature will 
be discussed in the following section to put forward the mediated relationship of board 
structural characteristics and firm performance through board roles which also sets 
foundation stage for our conceptual model and provide rationale for this research project. 
3.5.1 Non-executive directors, board roles and firm performance 
According to Agency and Resource dependence theorists, boards dominated by executive 
directors are relatively less answerable to diverse shareholders (Fama, 1980; Sonnenfeld, 
2002). Therefore, presence of non-executive directors is deemed beneficial for the outside 
investors. The NEDs are considered useful in bringing independence to board decisions 
(Combined code, 2012; Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007) and adding the resources to the 
firm in the shape of experience, expertise, business contacts and reputation (Klein, 2003; 
Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Baranchuk and Dybvig, 2009). However, the relationship of 
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proportion of NEDs with firm financial performance has not been straightforward (as noted 
in chapter 2 in detail) (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; McNulty et al., 2005). Thus, it can be 
argued that despite the documented role of independent directors as having an important 
impact on monitoring and resource provision activities (Weisbach, 1988; Cotter et al., 1997; 
Boone et al., 2007; Guest, 2008), the relationship between non-executive directors and firm 
performance can’t be measured with a direct link Forbes and Milliken (1999); Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) and McNulty et al., (2013).  
Therefore, it can be inferred that the relationship between board structural characteristics and 
firm performance is ambivalent and in line with the arguments by Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003), as well as, the nature of the relationship between board structure and firm 
performance is not of a direct or input-output relationship but, rather, it is mediated through 
board roles (McNulty et al., 2012). The scholarship in the field of corporate governance has 
acknowledged various roles played by the directors (Ruigrok et al., 2006; Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001; Stiles, 2001). However, the monitoring and resource dependence role of the 
board in firm management have received wider attention (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003).The 
monitoring role of the board has been documented by the increased activity of the board in 
the shape of the frequency of board meetings (Vafaes, 1999; Adams, 2009). The frequency of 
meeting can be defined as the times the board meets in a year to discuss and approve the key 
organizational issues (Carcello et al., 2002; Laksmana, 2008). 
Brick and Chidambaran (2007) find some evidence of a positive relationship between 
independent directors and board meetings which can have a plausible explanation that more 
members would need more time to be briefed about the situation and would consequently 
need more time to discuss the issues on the board and hence will be demanding more number 
of board meetings. The evidence also suggests that when board meet infrequently, they are 
hardly able to exert any meaningful influence over corporate performance (Useem, 
2006).Guest (2009) finds a strong empirical foundation for the monitoring role of the board 
based upon the board size. Al-Najjar (2012) suggests that presence of more independent 
directors on the board will increase the frequency of board meetings.  Consequently, more 
meetings will permit directors to give more time for strategy formation and performance 
appraisal. Therefore, if higher board activity facilitates better board monitoring, outside 
directors are likely to demand more board meetings to enhance their ability to monitor 
management. Simultaneously, in boards with more outsider participation, more time is likely 
to be spent in briefing board members than would be required in boards with high insider 
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membership. Thus there should be a positive relation between the representation of outside 
directors on the board and the level of board activity. The independent directors will need 
more meetings of the board as they need more time to brief the board members (Vafeas, 
1999).  
Furthermore, the literature provides enough evidence that as the proportion of non-executive 
directors’ increases on the board the intensity and frequency of board meetings also increases 
(Beasley et al., 2000; Klein, 2002; Uzun et al., 2004). In the post SOX scenario, the 
researchers suggest boards are more active than in earlier periods (Roberts et al., 2005). This 
is in line with Lynall et al., (2003) that institutions impact firms and in response firms adopt 
the external institutions’ pressures for the sake of legitimacy which is similar to the resource 
dependence perspective that resources are added by the firms to enhance their legitimacy and 
reputation. Therefore, over the passage of time, these rules become institutionalized to 
legitimize their existence.  
This provides us necessary reason to believe that presence of more NEDs causes more board 
meetings which is an important resource and therefore frequency of board meetings, may 
influence the governance and performance nexus. Therefore, it can be contended that 
relationship between NEDs and firm performance is mediated by frequency of board 
meetings (monitoring role) of the board after the implementation of governance reforms. 
In the context of NEDs and resource dependence role of the board, Dalton et al., (1999) 
suggest that larger boards better represent the resource dependence role of the board and are 
associated with better firm performance. Consistent with these findings and above mentioned 
arguments regarding NEDs, it can also be contended that board with a higher concentration 
of NEDs is more likely to objectively direct knowledge and expertise towards stronger 
resource dependent role. Linck et al., (2008) and Gordon (2007) resolve that board 
composition changed by adding more lawyers and financial experts and fewer executives 
than before SOX. They are of the view that the firms which previously were not compliant to 
SOX increased their board sizes because they added more outside directors than the insiders 
removed from the board. Therefore, it can be contended that relationship between NEDs and 
firm performance is mediated by board size (resource dependence role) of the board after the 
implementation of governance reforms. 
In line with this aspect of the study, there is a relevant revelation that firm with higher NEDs 
on the boards had lesser probability of suspension from the stock exchange (Mangena and 
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Chamisa, 2008) as found in a study in South Africa. This suggests that listed firms with a 
higher percentage of NEDs are less likely to be suspended from the stock exchange. 
Therefore, in combining the two theoretical perspectives, it is argued that board contributes 
both monitoring and the provision of resources. This shows that it is unlikely that the 
relationship between NEDs and firm performance would be a simple direct one. Therefore, 
an important contribution of this study is a more fully specified and richer model of the 
relationship between boards’ structure and firm performance mediated by board control and 
resource dependence roles.  
However, in Pakistan, another very important issue is the induction of closed family members 
as board members to strengthen the founding family control over the organization. However, 
this leads to further entrenchment of the board by compromising the rights of minority 
shareholders. This causes tight alignment of ownership and control in the organization which 
can only be encountered by introducing independent non-executive directors on the board 
(Nishat and Shaheen , 2005). This issue has also been addressed by SECP code which 
requires that independent directors should be appointed on the board. To ensure 
independence the code requires maximum disclosure should be made regarding the 
biographies of the directors and a statement regarding their independence should be 
submitted with the SECP.  
Recommendations of SECP code 
SECP code requires every public company to appoint at least one third independent NEDs on 
their boards. The criteria of independence require that a board member shouldn’t have been 
in full time employment with the firm in the last 3 years, shouldn’t have a current business 
stake with the firm, and shouldn’t be an immediate family member of any executive or any 
director of the firm. KSE Listings Rules also require Pakistani corporate boards of directors 
to consist of a majority of NEDs. SECP code further requires that the majority of the NEDs 
be independent of management to ensure that minority interests are adequately protected. 
This suggests that SECP code expects firms with more NEDs on their boards to be better 
monitors of the firm management and resultantly improved financial performance than those 
with less NEDs. Consequently, this study proposes to further this research by examining the 
extent to which governance codes affect board structure to strengthen board roles and firm 
performance. Accordingly, the following stream of hypothesis would be:  
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 H3(a1): There is positive relationship between proportion of Non-Executive Directors and 
frequency of board meetings 
H3(a2): There is positive relationship between proportion of Non-Executive Directors and 
board size 
 H3(b1):The relationship between proportion of NEDs and firm performance (Tobin Q) is 
mediated by board control role (frequency of board meetings) and  board resource 
dependence role (board size).  
H3(b2):The relationship between proportion of NEDs and firm performance (ROA) is 
mediated by board control role (frequency of board meetings) and  board resource 
dependence role (board size). 
 H3(c): The above relationships are moderated by SECP code such that they are stronger after 
the implementation of SECP code. 
3.5.2 CEO duality, board roles and firm Performance 
The literature discussed in chapter 2 reveals that despite the importance of role duality of 
CEO/chairperson in both agency and resource dependence theories there is little agreement 
on how it affects the firm performance.  CEO duality refers to a board leadership structure in 
which one person undertakes the combined roles of chief executive officer (CEO – 
management) and chairman of the board. The chairman of the board is responsible for 
managing the board. In contrast, the CEO is responsible for the day-to-day management of 
the company, including implementing board decisions. 
Weir et al, (2002) explain that the resource dependence theory supports the dual role of the 
CEO and board chairperson as they found that firms with existence of role duality had better 
performance. This repercussion may have a plausible explanation that with duality CEO 
becomes more powerful with unity of command and being an insider enjoys strategic 
knowledge of the firm better than any outsider chairman.  According to this theory if the 
CEO has dual powers he will be able to focus more closely on the firm objectives by 
knowing the organization affairs in more depth (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). This entails that 
a powerful CEO will have the minimum board interference in his decisions and will be able 
to carve out a detailed long term strategy for the firm (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). Lastly a 
valid reason for duality is considered to be accountability as the responsibility can be easily 
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fixed to one person as compared to a group of people for poor performance of the 
organization (Bozec, 2005). 
However, there is no scarcity of the literature regarding negative effect of CEO duality on 
firm performance (Haniffa and Cooke, 2002).  As indicated by Jensen (1993) the role duality 
increases the agency problem because powerful CEOs may not be accountable to the board as 
well as their role as CEO overshadows their role as chairperson and in this way the board’s 
effectiveness to monitor is compromised and they start protecting and defending the 
executives. Therefore, separating the roles between two people will improve the board 
capability to monitor as well as curtail the entrenchment behaviour by a CEO (Lipton and 
Lorsch, 1992; Haniffa and Cooke, 2002). It will also help get rid of a non-performing CEO 
(Monks and Minow, 2001). This can help in developing mechanism to curtail agency 
problems by preventing managers from pursuing goals that advance their self-interests to the 
disadvantage of shareholders. Therefore, in the light of above discussion, the quandary is that 
agency theorists reflect that boards’ effective monitoring role is affected by role duality and 
separation of the two roles is necessary for better performance of the firm while the school of 
thought related with resource dependence theory claims that CEO role will be more effective 
when coupled with board chair and makes the organization more focussed and efficient 
(Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Hence, it can be contended that relationship between dual role of 
CEO/chairperson and the firm financial performance is equivocal and can’t be determined 
through a direct link (Boyd, 1995; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; 
Forbes and Milliken 1999). This opens up a way to look into this relationship under the 
mediation effect of board roles (McNulty, 2013). Various roles have been suggested in the 
literature by the scholars but control role and resource dependence role have been given more 
importance (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Board activity as meeting frequency is the symbol 
of process of board which proxies the board monitoring role under agency lens and board size 
as a measure of board resource dependence role under resource dependence lens. The extant 
literature discusses that dual role of CEO is the symbol of entrenchment activity by the CEO 
which compromises the monitoring role of the board members as well as reducing the board 
activity which will cause reduction in board resource provision role (Linck, et al., 2008). 
While we know that increased board activity is instrumental in reducing entrenchment and 
improves firm performance (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), board activity can be affected when 
the CEO is the chair of the board of directors (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). Similarly, the 
independence of the board can be undermined when the CEO also serves as the board 
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chairman (Boyd, 1994; Westphall and Zajac, 1994). Coalescing the roles of the CEO and 
board chairman places a great deal of power with one person and therefore causes agency 
problems in the form of increased information asymmetry between the CEO and the board 
(De Villiers et al., 2011).  
Consistent with this argument, empirical evidence has linked CEO duality to reduced board 
activity causing unfavourable outcomes for shareholders, resulting from decisions imposed 
on the board including excessive managerial compensation (Boyd, 1994).  It can be furthered 
that in this case CEO would be able to monopolize board meetings and advance its own 
agendas which might not be congruent with the aspirations of shareholders of the firm 
(Kelton and Yang, 2008). Conversely, the separation of the CEO and board chairman roles 
will increase the board activity by making the CEO accountable to his actions. As this study 
has adopted the Vafeas (1999) argument that board activity measures the board monitoring 
capability, it can be contended that boards with an insider chairman would meet less 
frequently.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) suggest a model in which board structure is the product of an 
intercession between the CEO and outside directors. While Lehn et al., (2003) are of the view 
that monitoring is more efficient with a larger board having a sizable proportion of outside 
directors because of better repository of joint shareable information. Therefore, separation of 
roles of CEO and Chairman will be instrumental in expanding the board memberships with 
more people having diversified backgrounds from outside. The same is resolved by Guest, 
(2008) and Gordon (2007) that board composition changed by adding more lawyers and 
financial experts and fewer executives after the implementation of SOX. Evidence shows that 
firms that require more advice gain greater value from larger boards (Coles et al., 2006). 
Therefore, following Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and arguing that a CEO with duality 
will be more likely to promote his/her cronies and executives to the board, leading as a result 
to a smaller and less independent board. 
Historically in Pakistan, a large number of companies have been following the family-owned 
structure where family head is traditionally the chief executive as well as the chairman and 
other members of the family are appointed as directors on the board. This arrangement 
though seems quiet expedient but has been risk laden as public money is involved in the 
business of listed companies (McGee, 2010). That is why; many stakeholders consider this 
arrangement as one of the basic reasons for weak monitoring and enforcement. To counter 
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this chronic issue, SECP code requires that the position of CEO and Board Chair shouldn’t be 
held by the same person to avoid entrenchment. Further details regarding separation of CEO 
and Chairperson of the board under SECP code can be found hereunder.  
Recommendations of SECP code 
SECP code and KSE Listings Rules state explicitly that the positions of the chairman and the 
CEO should not be held by the same individual. Also, it states that the chairman must be 
independent, who bears the responsibility for the running of the board, while the CEO is 
responsible for the day-to-day running of the company’s business. This suggests that after the 
implementation of SECP code it is imperative to investigate this mediated relationship under 
the dual lens of agency as well as resource dependence roles after the introduction of SECP 
code. Therefore, our hypotheses would be: 
H4(a1): There is a negative relationship between role duality and frequency of board 
meetings 
H4(a2): There is a negative relationship between role duality and board size 
H4(b1 ): The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (Tobin Q) is mediated 
by frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource dependence role).   
H4(b2 ): The relationship between CEO duality and firm performance (ROA) is mediated by 
frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource dependence role). 
 H4(c): The above relationships are moderated by SECP code such that they are stronger after 
the implementation of SECP code. 
3.5.3 Diligence of Audit Committee, board roles and firm Performance 
The empirical literature regarding the association between the presence of board committees 
and financial performance is still at its nascent stage (Dalton et al., 1998; Laing and Weir, 
1999). The little available evidence also largely focuses on developed markets, such as the 
UK and the US. This makes generalisation difficult. Further, the limited evidence also offers 
contradictory results. This makes board committee structures a fertile area for further 
research, especially within a developing country context. It may help shed additional insights 
on the board committees-performance relationship. The results can also be compared with 
previous international studies on board committees. 
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Prior literature suggests that audit committee helps improve the effectiveness and efficiency 
of corporate boards (Jiraporn et al., 2009). According to resource dependence theory board 
committees give their expert advice to board and management on crucial business decision 
(Harrison, 1987). On the other side, their agency counterparts are of the view that audit 
committees intend to protect shareholder interests by providing objective, independent review 
of corporate executives and affairs. They are also of the view that a central monitoring 
function of the board is to ensure that corporate activities are properly audited (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen 1983). The principal function of the audit committee, for 
example, is to meet regularly with the firm’s external and internal auditors to review the 
company’s financial statements, audit process and internal accounting controls. These will 
facilitate timely release of unbiased accounting information to shareholders to reduce agency 
costs and information asymmetry (Klein, 1998). Audit committees play an important role by 
advising and monitoring the financial reporting process, internal controls, and the external 
audit. The audit committees serve as a contact “bridge” between management and the internal 
and external auditors (Sharma et al., 2009). To maintain integrity of their monitoring 
function, audit committees are required to perform their obligations diligently by meeting 
more frequently (Bhasin, 2012). Various researchers have used audit committee meeting 
frequency as a proxy for diligence (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Braswell et al., 2012). 
The past literature concentrates on the consequences of audit committee meetings and 
elaborates that higher activity on behalf of audit committee will be helpful in improving the 
financial quality and reducing the misreporting of figures (DeZoort et al. 2002; Sharma et al., 
2009). 
Despite their increasing popularity, however, there are still conflicting theoretical 
propositions about the nexus between board committees and financial performance. One 
stream of the theoretical literature suggests that the establishment of these committees can 
impact positively on performance (Sun and Cahan, 2009) because of their small size as 
compared to boards they are more efficient and can meet more frequently and this provides 
ample time for meaningful dialogue and in reaching to an agreement quickly (Karamanou 
and Vaefeas, 2005). The board committees are composed in such a way that they help 
bringing each director’s specialist knowledge and expertise to bear on the board decision-
making process in line with resource dependence perspective (Harrison, 1987). This also 
allows the main board to devote attention to specific areas of strategic interests and 
responsibility. On the contrary, there is a stream of literature that suggests that board 
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committees and firm performance are negatively related to each other. The first and foremost 
is the cost consideration, as more and more mechanisms to avoid agency problems are built 
they drain the resources of the firm in terms of travel expenses and other allied remunerations 
(Vafeas, 1999). The second issue is that extreme managerial supervision will hamper 
executive initiative and vision (Goodstein, et al., 1994; Conger et al., 1998; Vafeas, 1999). 
The third point is that it may replicate corporate board duties and responsibilities and 
therefore create redundancies. This will have additional costs implications for the firms. 
Lastly, by creating generalists and specialists among board members, board committees have 
the potential of generating conflicts in ideas and impairing boardroom cohesion. The above 
account of literature shows that the relationship between audit committee diligence and firm 
financial performance is not unequivocal and can’t be determined through simple direct 
relationship (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). Rather, it can be contended that the relationship 
can be determined through board roles mediation (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Finkelstein and 
Mooney, 2003). In this study, we focus on the dual board roles of control and resource 
dependence, which are in line with Hillman and Dalziel (2003). The same has also been put 
forward by Carpenter and Westphal, (2001); Stile, (2001); Ruigrok, (2006). 
As we have discussed in section 3.3.1, the frequency of board meetings serves as proxy for 
the board monitoring role (Vafeas, 1999) under agency lens and board size serves as a proxy 
for the board resource dependence role (Dalton et al., 1999) under resource dependence lens. 
The extant literature highlights the importance of subcommittees on board activity, and 
includes the number of standing board committees in his model (Vafeas (1999). Al-Najjar 
(2012) argues that more authority delegation is required in the process of constituting sub 
committees which will lead to more coordination among the directors and indeed, will create 
more need for board meetings which may improve the monitoring capability of the board.  
In fact, almost every corporate governance code of the modern era has called for the 
institution of board committees like audit committee (UK Combined Code, 2003, 2006, 2012; 
SOX, 2002; and SECP code, 2002). They require the presence of an accounting expert on the 
audit committee because prior research shows accounting experts are associated with fewer 
financial misreporting (Dechow et al., 1996; Sharma et al., 2009). Raghunandan and Rama 
(2007) report that presence of an accounting expert on the audit committee causes better 
performance of the committee because of the expertise used for effective monitoring of 
financial reporting. There is also another evidence on the same lines that if the members of 
the audit committee possess more collective financial and legal knowledge and richer 
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experience of audit committee members they will lend higher support they provide to 
auditors regarding materiality judgments (DeZoort et al., 2003). According to Linck et al., 
(2008), legal, financial experts from outside were more likely than the insiders to join the 
boards after SOX implementation and in this way firms which were not compliant with SOX 
in the past increased their board size after implementation of the law. Therefore, it can be 
contended that new worldwide codes have been instrumental in higher frequency of audit 
committee meetings which will cause an increase in the board size.   
In the light of above literature and as mentioned in the start of this section, there has been no 
prior research to investigate the impact of the audit committee diligence on board roles 
(agency, resource dependence) which serves as one of the objective of the current study.  
Therefore, based upon the preceding discussions, it is expected that audit committee diligence 
will be contributing towards more holistic view of the boards and will be increasingly 
cognizant of the value and importance of not only monitoring but also the resource 
dependence roles of the board by adding more financial experts on the committee through 
board. This is in contrast to the previous studies where auditors’ role was considered and 
studied only limited to more activity on the board, which leads to monitoring role of the 
board. Therefore, conceptually, it can be envisaged that more activity in audit committee will 
be instrumental in strengthening the board roles as a whole.  
Recommendations of SECP code 
SECP code requires every public company to establish an audit committee which must have 
at least one meeting in every quarter of the year. They will also be mandated to establish the 
internal controls of the firm and authorise the half yearly financial statements of the firm. 
They will also look after the appointments of the external auditors to conduct the annual audit 
of the firm. Ibrahim (2005) suggests that the proper functioning of audit committees can 
improve managerial monitoring. Therefore, firms with active audit committees would be 
better able to institute prudent financial controls and Abbott et al. (2002) find that firms’ with 
financial experts on audit committees are less likely to experience financial reporting 
restatement or fraud, so, for these firms chances would be lesser to be delisted from the stock 
exchange. Hence, the following hypothesis can be contended:  
H5(a1): There is a positive relationship between audit committee diligence and frequency of 
board meetings 
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H5(a2): There is a positive relationship between audit committee diligence and board size 
H5(b1): The relationship between audit committee diligence and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
is mediated by frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource 
dependence role).  
H5(b2): The relationship between audit committee diligence and firm performance (ROA) is 
mediated by frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource dependence 
role). 
H5(c): The above relationships are moderated by SCEP code such that they is stronger after 
the implementation of SECP code.  
3.5.4 Independence of Audit Committee, board roles and firm Performance 
The call for audit committee independence is not new. The assumed benefit of improved 
audit committee independence stems from the belief that independent directors are better 
monitors of management than are executive directors (DeFond and Francis, 2006). Consistent 
with this argument, recent studies (Braswell et al., 2012) document the benefits associated 
with higher levels of audit committee independence. The previous research on audit 
committee independence has primarily focused on whether committee independence is 
associated with enhanced effectiveness.  
In general, these studies have found that greater the independence of the audit committee the 
greater will be transparency in the process of financial reporting (Carcello and, 2000, 2003; 
Klein, 2002; Abbott et al., 2003, 2004; Lee et al., 2004).There is no significant relation found 
between firms’ financial performance and the independence of audit committee as a whole 
(Klein, 2006). Similarly, another study states that independence of audit committee may be 
costly and may not serve for the growth of the organization (Klein, 2002). However, there is 
no unanimous literature that the independence of an audit committee is considered a vital 
characteristic influencing the organizational performance. The independence of an audit 
committee can serve as active to control the financial reporting. Therefore, audit committee 
independence has been found to be significantly related with degrees of reporting quality in 
prior studies (Baxter and Cotter, 2009). On the other hand, Nimer, et al (2012) reported that 
there is no significant relationship between audit committees’ effectiveness factors and 
market measure of performance on a sample of 63 listed Jordanian firms. 
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If the account of literature regarding relationship between characteristics of audit committee 
like independence and firm performance doesn’t provide us with clear link then it can be said 
that this relationship may be mediated by some board roles (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003). 
Following the tradition of Hillman and Dalziel (2003), the study proposes control and 
resource dependence roles of the board. The study takes Vafeas (1999) who has used 
frequency of board meetings as the control role of the board and Dalton et al., (1999) who 
have used board size as the board capital to represent board resource dependence role. The 
same has been discussed in detail in section 3.4.1 above.   
The presence of more independent directors on the board and audit committee facilitates 
more effective monitoring of financial reporting (Beasley 1996; Dechow et al. 1996; Carcello 
and Neal 2003) and the external audit (Carcello et al. 2002; Abbott et al. 2003, 2004). Such 
empirical associations are explained by agency theory, which argues that independent 
directors provide effective monitoring over management. Therefore, it is likely that an 
independent audit committee will ensure a sound internal control to strengthen the monitoring 
role of the board and at the same time the presence of independent members in an audit 
committee will lead to resource perspective and outside auditors will give more importance to 
the internally audited statements. This, in turn could mitigate the outsiders’ concerns about 
the internal controls of the organization (Bell et al., 2005; Cohen, 2008). Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010) are also of the view that independent audit committee structure is 
associated with an increase in the board monitoring activity measured through frequency of 
board meetings.  
The results suggest that completely independent audit committees are positively associated 
with audit fees (Abbott et al., 2003), and negatively associated with auditor resignations (Lee 
et al., 2004), and the occurrence of restatements (Abbott et al., 2004). Therefore, Klein 
(2002) documents a negative relationship between performance and audit committee 
independence. Similarly Brick and Chidambaran (2007) are of the view that more emphasis 
on the independence of the audit committee was the result of implementation of SOX. 
Following the hypotheses that independent board will cause more activity of the board, Klein 
(2002) contended that percentage of outside directors on the audit committee will lead to 
effective monitoring by demanding more activity on the board to discuss the committee 
proceedings and will ultimately lead to better financial performance. The study by Ashraf and 
Ghani (2005) examines the sources, evolution, and the progress of accounting practices and 
disclosures in Pakistan and the factors that affected them. They record that lack of investor 
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protection mechanisms  such as (minority rights protection, insider trading protection), 
judicial incapacity, and weak enforcement apparatus are more critical factors than are cultural 
factors in explaining the state of accounting practices in Pakistan. Similarly, it is reckoned 
that it is the implementation instruments that are supreme in recuperating the quality of 
accounting in developing countries (Javid and Iqbal, 2010). 
Depending upon the arguments forwarded by Vafeas (1999), it can be contended that more 
independent audit committees will cause higher activity on the board and forwarding the 
arguments of Conger et al., (1998) about board independence, the same can be suggested for 
the board subcommittee and following Al-Najjar it can be suggested that if the committee is 
comprised of more independent members will demand more activity for the board as boards 
would have to ratify the performance of the committee. The independence of the audit 
committee will need more frequent board meetings as they need more time to brief the board 
members (Vafeas, 1999).  
Consistent with these findings and above mentioned arguments regarding committee 
independence, it can also be contended that committees with a higher concentration of 
independent directors would be more effective to contribute more objectively direct 
knowledge and expertise towards stronger resource dependent roles of the boards as well. 
Prior to SOX, the audit committee’s role and its responsibility over the audit and the 
preparation of the financial statements were implicit. Following the enactment of SOX, the 
structure of the audit committee has changed and its roles with respect to resources and 
control have been expanded (Hoitash et al., 2009).  
Brodsky et al., (2003) stated that after the implementation of SOX, the role of the audit 
committee has become very important in appointment, compensation, and retention of 
outside auditors, therefore, committees are required to be headed by independent non-
executive directors having some professional financial backgrounds so in this way, they not 
only help board improve its monitoring task but also supplement the technical input to 
improvise the board resource dependence role. They are also of the view that committee 
independence increased in the post SOX era to comply with the demands of the new law. 
Therefore, Cohen et al, (2003); DeZoort et al., (2002); and DeFond and Francis (2005) are of 
the view that independent audit committees perform better in producing more reliable figures 
and giving a signal to outside shareholders that organization really takes care of their capital. 
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After the introduction of SOX, it is mandatory for the organizations to induct more NEDs on 
the audit committee and to ensure its independence which is causing increased board size 
gradually eventually. Gordon (2007) suggests that after the implementation of SOX, the role 
of audit committee has become more significant as it needs to add financial experts on the 
board who will be heading the audit committee. Therefore, it can be contended that 
independence of the audit committee will not only contribute to strengthen the monitoring 
role of the board but also the resource dependence role of the board. We extend previous 
research by examining the association between audit committee characteristics and firm 
performance following the mandated changes in its composition and responsibilities. This 
research is important, as it has implications for policy makers in assessing the impact of audit 
committee independence after SOX on the firm performance under the dual lens of agency 
and resource dependence roles.  
Recommendations of SECP code 
SECP code demands that every public listed company will establish an audit committee, 
which will consist of at least three members out of which at least two would be independent 
NEDs. Further, the audit committee members must be financially literate and an independent 
NED would head the committee who must be other than the chairman of the board. Similarly 
the listing rules of KSE also need that every listed company on the stock exchange will have 
an independent audit committee. Further, the audit committee members must be financially 
literate and should be chaired by a person other than the chairman of the board. This suggests 
that SECP code and KSE listing rules expect that firms should have independent and 
effective audit committees with the presence of financial expert in the committee. 
 Saifullah (2012) reports that Pakistani listed firms with independent audit committees 
according to SECP requirement are less likely to be suspended from the KSE than those 
without audit committees. This suggests that the presence of audit committees can improve 
managerial monitoring as well as better protect shareholder rights. Therefore, it is reasonable 
to expect that independence of audit committee after the implementation of SECP code will 
be associated with strong board roles which will help improve the image of the organization 
in the eyes of external auditors and outside shareholders to enhance firm value. This provides 
the basic motivation for the study as a whole and makes it a ripe area to be looked in to the 
context of a developing economy like Pakistan. This study contributes to the literature on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms, especially for both pre and the post-
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SECP period. The study also sheds light on the efficacy of SECP requirements on the 
composition of the audit committee. 
It can be interesting to investigate the relationship of independence of audit committee and 
firm performance mediated by board roles after the introduction of SECP code. 
Consequently, the respective hypotheses to be tested here can be: 
H6 (a1): There is a positive relationship between independence of audit committee and 
frequency of board meetings 
H6 (a2): There is a positive relationship between independence of audit committee and board 
size 
H6 (b1): The relationship between audit committee independence and firm performance 
(Tobin Q) is mediated by frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource 
dependence role).  
H6 (b2): The relationship between audit committee independence and firm performance 
(ROA) is mediated by frequency of board meetings (control role) and board size (resource 
dependence role). 
H6(c): The above relationships are moderated by SCEP code such that they are stronger after 
the implementation of SECP code. 
3.6 The Conceptual Model 
This chapter started by highlighting the concerns of many researchers that despite over 20 
years of extensive research in the field of corporate governance there is much we still do not 
know about the factors that contribute to board roles and ultimately firm performance. Whilst 
there have been a few recent studies examining board structure and how they affect the way 
boards undertake a variety of roles, there have been numerous calls for more research 
studying board roles. This chapter provides a contribution to this board roles research with 
the development of a new model from which a variety of hypotheses are developed.  
The model in Figure 3.1 introduces board governance concepts derived from agency and 
resource dependence theories of corporate governance. The model uses three stages of 
relationship. The first stage is the influence of SECP code on the board structural variables. 
This has been executed by introducing the interaction term to unmask the differences in the 
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board structures as a direct consequence of the code. The board structural variables include 
board independence, board leadership structure, and independence and diligence of audit 
committee on the board. The board independence is measured by proportion of NEDs on the 
board, the board leadership structure is measured by presence or absence of CEO/Chair 
duality on the board, diligence of audit committee by frequency of committee meetings, and 
independence of audit committee has been gauged through a dummy which assumes value of 
1 if an NED is the head of the committee otherwise zero. The second stage of the model is the 
relationship between the board structural variables and board roles. The board roles include 
control role and resource dependence role determined through agency and resource 
dependence lens. The monitoring role has been quantified by the activity of the board 
precisely the frequency of board meetings and resource dependence role has been appraised 
through the board size. The third stage of the relationship is between board roles and firm 
financial performance. The firm performance has been measured on the basis of two different 
aspects: market based measure and accounting based measure. The market based measure is 
Tobin Q and accounting based measure is Return on Assets (ROA). Therefore, the model is a 
response to the call by researchers and scholars of corporate governance and board of 
directors (Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). The argument here is that boards have alternative 
approaches to corporate governance. These different approaches can help explain the extent 
to which boards may vary in the emphasis placed on the different roles they undertake.  
The model takes the lead by investigating the impact of corporate governance codes on board 
structure to strengthen the board roles and then on financial performance of the organization. 
This model provides a valuable contribution to this research by identifying new insights into 
board structure, board roles and firm performance relationship in the Pakistani context than 
hitherto has been considered in the board roles literature. The model adopts the board roles 
suggested by Hillman and Dalziel, (2003) and similar to empirical studies by Gabrielsson and 
Winlund, (2000).  
The thesis follows the classical input-mediators-output approach taken in conventional 
research. In this model the output, firm performance is a dependent variable. The inputs are 
board structure and board roles. The mediating variables are drawn from board role literature 
keeping in view the requirements of SECP code (such as Guest, 2009; Vafeas, 1999; Zahra 
and Pearce, 1989; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). 
67 
 
The following is the conceptual model in Figure 3.1 which follows the approach of recent 
research on boards by examining the impact of board structure on board roles and firm 
performance in the backdrop of SECP code in Pakistan. In addition, the model contributes to 
existing literature in a number of ways. First, the model introduces a new research orientation 
in board structure and board roles studies using agency and resource dependence theory 
simultaneously. Second the model encapsulates board structure behaviour in strengthening 
the board roles for better corporate performance. This is a departure from previous studies 
which uses input-output model of the research. The model summarizes the hypotheses 
developed based upon various theoretical foundations.  The next chapter will outline the 
methodology and methods used to test the model and the hypotheses outlined in this chapter. 
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Figure 3.1 Hypothesized Models of Corporate Governance Reforms, Board Structural 
Characteristics, Board Roles and Firm Performance 
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Chapter 4 
Research Design and Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter addresses the choices of research design and methodology used in this study. 
This research aims to identify causal relationships between variables; therefore research 
design and methodology used here are primarily quantitative. Data analysis is conducted 
using STATA. The very nature of quantitative research needs that the research constructs, 
model and hypotheses should be based upon strong theoretical and conceptual foundations. 
To fulfil this need, a wide-ranging literature review has been conducted and is presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3. This chapter is structured as follows. First, there is a discussion of 
philosophical underpinnings of the researcher and the research with ontological assumptions 
and epistemological stance of the study. Second, there is an outline of the selected research 
method and design for this study. Third, it provides a detailed description about the 
quantitative approach which is the primary research approach for this study. It also discusses 
the population, sampling technique, and data collection method. Hussey and Hussey, (1997) 
elaborated that every scientific work should be replicable and this can be done by providing a 
clear trail of the research procedure used in the study. At the end, this chapter provides details 
about the rationale behind the choice of research method used in this study as well as the 
panel related estimations techniques and explanations.  
4.2 Philosophical Underpinnings 
The research methodology can be defined as ‘the overall approach to the research process, 
from the theoretical underpinning to the collection and analysis of the data” (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). The choice of research methodology is driven by a researcher’s philosophical 
assumptions about ontology and epistemology (Gill and Johnson, 2002) as well as the 
research question under examination (Collis and Hussey, 2003).  
The ontological assumptions are the views or opinions of social scientists about world and 
human beings regarding various epistemological and methodological positions (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980). In the ontological assumptions, the researcher has to answer the questions 
about the nature of reality (Creswell, 1994). The ontology has been defined as “the ideas 
about the existence of and relationship between people, society and the world in general” 
(Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008). It implies that whether the reality is objective or subjective. 
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In case of objective reality human beings are considered a product of the external reality and 
in case of subjective or constructionist reality the human beings are considered to be able to 
shape the world within their own experience (Morgan and Smircich, 1980).  
The objective view says that social reality is independent of social actors and is dependent 
only on accurate observations and measurements while the subjective view of ontology is that 
social reality exists as an imagination of human beings and “reality is masked by those 
human processes which judge and interpret the phenomenon in consciousness prior to a full 
understanding of the structure of meaning it expresses” (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). 
Therefore, human beings are capable to shape the world according to their culture, 
perceptions, and past experiences (Gill and Johnson, 2002). The objectivism causes the 
epistemological approach of positivism and the subjectivism causes the approach of 
phenomenological epistemology. However, between the extreme of objectivism and extreme 
of subjectivism, there are various ontological positions on the continuum (Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980).  
In this thesis, the researcher takes a position which is closer to the objectivism but lying 
somewhere near the middle of the continuum by accepting the human beings as social actors 
(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). The researcher is of the view that human beings are 
capable of interpreting and modifying the surroundings to enact the reality (Morgan and 
Smircich (1980). In this study, the phenomenon investigated is composition of boards, audit 
committee and their diligence to study the board roles based upon the figures as provided in 
the annual reports to identify their causal relationship with other social phenomena (Firm 
Performance). In particular, how the board members perceived and interpreted the SECP 
code to reshape the boards. 
Given the nature of this research and the broad assumptions about how the reality is, it is also 
important to consider ways of how to study this reality. Epistemology primarily questions the 
relationship between researcher and researched (Creswell, 1994). Therefore, it can be said 
that epistemology is related to study and validity of knowledge (Collis and Hussey, 2003). 
The objective and subjective ontological assumptions pose two epistemological positions: 
positivism and interpretivism (Collis and Hussey, 2003; Bryman, 2004). 
The positivism is concerned with studying the nature of causal relationship amongst elements 
constituting the model (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). The positivist believe that researchers 
can only observe the phenomenon and the relationship between various constructs without 
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interfering in these relationships by maintaining their independent stance (Keat and Urry, 
1982).  
There are several characteristics of positivism: a) the phenomena and knowledge can only be 
confirmed by the senses; b) the function of the theory is to produce hypotheses which will be 
tested to explain the law; c) facts are gathered to reach to the knowledge; d) science must be 
carried out in value free manner (Bryman, 2004). While phenomenological epistemology 
deals with the processes through which human beings identify their relationship to their 
world (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). It also maintains that people and their institutions are 
fundamentally different from natural sciences. Therefore, human beings try to lessen the 
detachment between themselves and researched area (Creswell, 1994; Collis and Hussey, 
2003). 
As the researcher has taken a position in the middle with closer to objectivism in ontological 
assumptions, therefore, he has also taken a position on the epistemology closer to positivism. 
The researcher views that knowledge can be gained through social reality without separating 
the researcher and the area to be researched (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Consequently, researcher has the conviction that it is essential to examine the nature of 
relationship amongst social phenomena, which is the relationship between different elements 
of board composition, board roles and firm performance. It is these notions that inform this 
research design, which is discussed next.  
 
4.3 Research Design 
Various authors have defined the research design for example Saunders et al., (2009) is of the 
view that it is the overall scheme of the study to answer the research question, while, Royer 
and Zarlowski (2001) has defined the research design as “the framework through which the 
various components of a research project are brought together: research question, literature 
review, data, analysis and results.” Kerlinger (1986: 279) has provided a more comprehensive 
definition: 
“Research design is the plan and structure of investigation so conceived as to obtain answers 
to research questions. The plan is the overall scheme or program of the research. It includes 
an outline of what the investigator will do from writing hypotheses and their operational 
implications to the final analysis of data. A structure is the framework, organisation, or 
configuration of ... the relations among variables of a study. A research design expresses 
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both the structure of the research problem and the plan of investigation used to obtain 
empirical evidence on relations of the problem.” 
The above definitions make it clear that research design has the pivotal role in the entire 
research activity. Blumberg et al., (2008) is of the view that it is an outline of the relationship 
amongst various constructs to be studied. It is also elaborated by Bryman and Bell (2007) that 
research design is selection of research method, sampling decision, collecting and analysing 
data, and interpreting the results with time and cost decisions as well. The most common 
research design in social sciences is non-experimental research design where the researcher 
doesn’t interfere in the natural settings of the organisation (Smith and Dainty, 1991). 
Traditionally there are two approaches to research methodologies: quantitative and 
qualitative. The quantitative methodology is closer to positivism objectivism while 
qualitative methodology is closer to interpretivist or constructivist approach in 
epistemological stance (Monk and Raphael, 2001).  
4.4 Research Design and Methods 
The review of literature in the above section advocates that no single or standard method of 
conducting the research is without its pros and cons. However, the availability of resources 
and the nature of required information will decide the research design and data collection 
method (Smith and Dainty, 1991). The study spots itself in the board structural characteristics 
related literature (Huse, 2005; Van Ees et al., 2009) which is deductive in nature and builds a 
model to epitomize the causal relationship based on existing theoretical notion (Monk and 
Raphael, 2001). Pakistan traces its financial and accountancy legacy from Anglo-Saxon 
background and the financial and auditing and accounting institutions have been fairly 
developed as a survey of corporate governance conducted in 2007 in Pakistan by IFC shows 
that high level of compliance is adhered in Pakistan regarding IAS/IFRS. Pakistan lies in the 
upper middle tier with a score of 70 out of 111 regarding compliance to international 
accounting practices (Ding et al., 2009). The capital markets have been performing and the 
banking sector has been vibrant (Khalid and Hanif, 2005), therefore, in this study, the 
quantitative approach seems the most appropriate to establish the relationship between board 
structural characteristics, board roles and firm performance following the board research 
studies for example Gabrielsson and Winlund, (2000); Van den Berghe, (2007) and Minichilli 
et al., (2009).  
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The data collection technique used in this study is based upon the analysis of previously 
collected data in the form of annual reports which comprise of official and certified statistics 
of public listed companies on the Karachi stock Exchange (KSE) of Pakistan from year 1999 
to 2005. In keeping with the nature of this study, the researcher had to depend on the archival 
data. The time period selected for this study is from the year 1999, with the only reliable 
document in this time period was the published annual reports of the companies. To ensure 
the validity and reliability, this study conducted a thorough literature review in all 
perspectives pertinent to corporate governance, and specifically corporate governance 
reforms in Pakistan, board structural characteristics and board roles. The following sections 
will discuss the issues regarding sampling and data collection in this study.  
4.5 Sample Selection and Data 
This section describes the procedure adopted for sample selection, the kinds of data used, and 
the sources of the data used in executing this study. In particular, the section is divided into 
four subsections. Subsection 4.5.1 will describe the procedure for sample selection; 
subsection 4.5.2 will describe the rationale for selecting the sample, whilst subsection 4.5.3 
will present the types and sources of data used in the study. 
4.5.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
The sample firms used in examining the board structural characteristics, board roles, and 
financial performance link were drawn from companies listed on the KSE Ltd, Pakistan. As 
at 31 December 2005, a total of 662 companies were officially listed on KSE. The official list 
of all the listed firms was obtained directly from the archives of the State Bank of Pakistan 
Library and KSE. The list was also crosschecked against the list provided on the KSE’s 
official website, which is available at: http://www.kse.com.pk, accessed in July 2012.  
In the beginning, the financials industry with 164 firms, oil and gas sector 15, and utilities 
industry with 13 firms, which together accounts for approximately 31% of the entire 
population were excluded from the sampling frame for three eminent reasons. Firstly, they 
are heavily regulated, which may influence in a different way on their governance structures 
and financial performance (Yermack, 1996; Cheng et al., 2008; Guest, 2009). SECP code 
does not apply to financial firms, such as banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, and 
modarba companies. These financial sector companies are governed by special statutory 
legislations by the regulations from the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP). Secondly, financial 
firms are highly geared and have unique capital structure, which can affect financial 
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performance differently (Lim et al., 2007). Finally, excluding these financial sector 
companies and heavily regulated state owned enterprises can help making comparisons with 
past studies (Bontis et al., 2000; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006) who have also excluded such 
firms. 
In total, there are seven major industries, including textiles, consumer goods, financials, 
chemicals, industrials, oil and gas, and utilities. However, the firms were selected from only 
four major sectors namely, textiles, chemicals, consumer goods, and industrials. Table 4.2 
presents a summary of the sample selection procedure. Appendix-A shows the industrial 
composition of all companies that were listed on the main board of the KSE as at 31 
December 2005. Table 4.2 presents the industrial composition of listed firms available to be 
sampled and final sample of the firms for which full data is available for all the six years. 
Appendix-B gives the names of all the companies included in the final sample. Together, the 
four industries account for approximately 69% of the entire KSE population of listed firms. 
To qualify for the final sample, a firm has to complete the following two decisive factors: 
Firstly a company’s full six-year annual reports from 1999-2001 and 2003-2005 both periods 
inclusive must be available because the researcher has built up a special data set for 
comparison of two time durations of 3 years each to judge the performance of the companies 
prior and after the implementation of SECP code following the method adopted by Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010). Our data sample is on both sides of the passage of SECP code, 2002 
because 2002 is the year when SECP code was enacted and therefore, was in transitional 
phase of implementation. Secondly, its corresponding six year stock market and financial 
accounting related information must also be available for calculating Tobin Q. These criteria 
were imposed for the following important reasons. 
Table 4.2: Sample Characteristics 
Type of Business Number of 
Companies 
(Data 
Available) 
Total Sample Size 
(n = 200) 
Total no. of 
companies 
listed 
% of Total  
Non-financial 
Companies listed  
(n = 464) 
 
Textiles 80 40 % 220 47% 
Consumer goods 50 25%  104 22% 
Chemicals 36 18% 70 16% 
Industrials 34 17% 70 15% 
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Firstly, the criteria helped in meeting the conditions for a balanced panel data analysis, which 
is feasible for only those firms having data available for several consecutive years (Cheng et 
al., 2008; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). The two time periods provide identical time slots to 
judge the effect of an externally imposed regulation (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010) such as 
SECP code. There are several advantages for using panel data in the studies. By combining 
time series of cross-sectional observations, balanced panel data provides: (i) more degrees of 
freedom; (ii) reduced collinearity amongst variables; (iii) more margin for cross-sectional and 
time series variability; (iv) more asymptotic effectiveness; (v) more revealing data; and (vi) 
account for increased observable and unobservable firm-level heterogeneity in individual-
specific variables (Gujarati, 2003). It is also a well-timed appropriate answer to recent calls 
for the use of panel data in corporate governance studies to address inherent statistical 
problems, such as endogeneity (Larcker and Rusticus, 2007). A potential drawback of the 
data collection may be that it might bring survivorship bias into the sample selection process. 
Nevertheless, and as will be discussed further in the next section, this criteria generated 
relatively larger sample size in comparison with those of prior Pakistan centric studies to the 
extent that the generalisability of the research results may not be significantly impaired.  
Secondly, it is in line with prior researchers of corporate governance who have used panel 
data (Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008; Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010). Thirdly, contrary to much of the existing literature that uses only one 
time window to judge the influence of a law (e.g. SOX), this study takes two time slots of 
equal time durations with balanced panel data set by collecting data for only those companies 
for which the data is available for both of the time slots. Fourthly, the first panel of the 
sample begins from the 1999 financial year and goes till 2001, making three years before the 
introduction of the SECP code of 2002 and second panel of the sample starts from 2003 and 
goes till 2005 to make a data set for three years after the introduction of the code. Because 
2002 was the year SECP code came into force for all public limited companies listed at KSE 
to either comply with its provisions or explain that why they were unable to comply. Finally, 
the sample ends in 2005 and thus enables comparison of two equal time windows, taking the 
year 2002 as the mid-year and going three years in the past before the implementation of 
SECP code and three years after the implementation of SECP code.  
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4.5.2 Rationale for Sample Selection  
There are several theoretical, empirical, and practical reasons which motivated our research 
and sample frame to be based upon public listed companies on KSE in Pakistan. Firstly, the 
public limited companies are subject to more strict regulations regarding disclosure quality 
and quantity therefore, it is easier to collect data for the required variables (Beattie et al., 
2004; Hassan and Marston, 2008). In Pakistan there are no publicly available records for 
small firms. Specifically, there is evidence that shows that corporate disclosure is positively 
correlated with firm size. Lang and Lundholm (1993) are of the view that public firms can 
meet the expenses needed to disclose information as per the requirement of the law while 
non-listed companies struggle to afford in comparison with their listed bigger counterparts 
due to cost implications. Secondly, public firms are usually under more public pressure and 
stringent institutional scrutiny because of their size and the involvement of public money 
which compels them to disclose more. Thirdly, public firms are more diverse and complex 
with respect to the scale of their business operations, segments, markets served and dispersed 
geographical locations (Marston and Shrives, 1991), and therefore are bound to disclose 
more. For example, it can be said that a multinational organization would have to disclose 
more than a small local non-listed firm. 
Fourthly, prior literature advocates that firm size is positively associated with the political 
costs of strict regulations, nationalisation, taxation, and break-ups (Andreasson, 2009). 
Therefore only comparatively larger firms can cope with the requirements of these externally 
imposed regulations as they have more incentives resultantly (Shrives, 1991). Finally, prior 
literature suggests that larger firms are prone to greater agency problems and are in higher 
need to woo new external capital (Core, 2001; Beiner et al., 2006). Therefore, it is clear that 
public listed firms are required to disclose more in order to diminish the information 
asymmetric problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Fifthly, the final 200 sampled firms, which made a total of 1200 firm-year observations, form 
a significant percentage of the total possible sample, drawn from the KSE population. It 
constitutes approximately 43% of the useable final sample of 464 and the total population of 
KSE listed firms of 662, respectively, which is a sufficiently large sample according to 
central limit theorem (Anderson et al., 2007). Table 4.2 also shows the industrial composition 
of the 200 firms for which a full six-year data is available. The textile sector remains the 
largest with 80 firms out of the total 200 firms, accounting for 40%. By contrast, consumer 
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goods, chemicals, and industrial manufacturing industries together accounts for 60% of the 
total 200 sampled firms. This is consistent with the composition of the total population of 
these industries. Some of the sectors had very small number of firms. For example, 3 
pharmaceuticals companies were added into chemicals.  
Finally, for practical implications, the sample of 200 was on the higher end because the 
corporate governance variables had to be manually extracted as no database had these 
variables, which had been a highly labour-intensive activity (Hussainey et al., 2003; Beattie 
et al., 2004). Consequently, practical restrictions of time, effort and finance meant that the 
sample had to be modest as well as significant and reliable enough to make a noteworthy 
contribution, while simultaneously ensuring that the study can be concluded within the 
stipulated time-frame of a PhD. 
4.5.3 Data Collection Process 
The collection of old archival data physically was the most daunting effort in a country with 
low research culture and no proper arrangements of storage of annual reports. The study 
needed to extract two types of data in examining the relationship between board structural 
characteristics, board roles, and firm financial performance in the backdrop of the impact of 
externally imposed regulations by SECP. The first category comprises of the board structural 
variables and the second category was financial data. Therefore, all the corporate governance 
variables were extracted from the annual reports of the sampled companies listed on the 
Karachi stock exchange (KSE). In Pakistan, the old archival data is not available in digitized 
form. It was the most difficult task to find the annual reports for the companies listed on KSE 
in 1999 and going forward till 2005. The annual reports were not available at one location. 
The biggest collection of annual reports was only available with the library of State Bank of 
Pakistan (SBP) which is the central bank of the country. The problem further deepened when 
the reports for the consecutive six years were not available for many companies. As a result, 
those companies whose annual reports were not available in SBP library were contacted 
personally.  
After all efforts we were able to find the reports for almost 200 companies for consecutive six 
years. Most of the reports were stored in the godowns which were full of dirt, mud and 
moisture. Consequently, the researcher had to take out these reports by physically entering 
into such old and dark rooms with some of them having small insects on them. Every day, 
when I ended up to find these reports in the store, the people working over there were unable 
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to recognize me as my clothes and hair were full of dirt and spiders’ webs. Eventually, I got 
these reports photocopied. Now the next big task was to go through these almost 1200 annual 
reports to extract the required information manually. This took me almost six months to 
extract and key in the data. A significant strength of this study is the data collected  which  is 
now the biggest data repository regarding KSE listed companies. A considerable amount of 
effort were put down to increase the sample size but the available data volume could not 
exceed 200 listed companies excluding the financial and those sectors which have presence 
of State funded enterprises. We have taken only those companies for which data for 
consecutive six years were available. In the past studies, nobody has taken more than 50 
companies to conduct research on corporate governance area in Pakistan (Javid and iqbal, 
2008). As we have explained in the earlier paragraph, the criteria was to find the annual 
reports for consecutive six years as well as the availability of financial data in the DATA 
STREAM for 6 consecutive years from 1999 to 2005.  
Using the above criteria, the data required is obtained for a total of 200 firms (43%) out of the 
464 firms constituting the remaining four industries as shown in table 4.2 above. For the 
remaining 264 of the 464 firms, all six years of financial performance data and/or annual 
reports could not be found. The sample of 200 firms is still large when compared with 
previous Pakistan based studies (Javid and Iqbal, 2007; Nishat, 2006; Saifullah, 2012). Javid 
and Iqbal took a sample of 50 companies for one year data to examine a direct relationship 
between board structural characteristics and firm performance (2007) while Saifullah (2012) 
took a sample of 30 listed companies also for one year cross sectional data. As far as our 
knowledge is concerned, ours is a novel study with panel data in Pakistan with comparison of 
two time periods. 
4.5.4 Data Sources 
The researcher has made use of annual reports to manually extract the corporate governance 
data for several reasons despite the existence of other means by which companies can 
disclose timely corporate governance information (Hassan and Marston, 2008). Firstly, the 
Companies Act of 1984 and the KSE Listings Rules instruct the listed firms to issue and 
publish the data in the annual reports. In the literature, it has been argued that the mandatory 
nature of audited annual reports makes them a regular and most reliable source of corporate 
governance information (Lang and Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). In keeping with the 
provisions in law, a firm can be sued for providing incorrect information. 
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Secondly, prior evidence suggests that annual report disclosures of the data are positively 
associated with the magnitude of disclosure provided through alternative media (Lang and 
Lundholm, 1993; Botosan, 1997). 
Thirdly, the major independent professional corporate governance research and ratings 
organisations, for example AIMR, CLSA, GMI, and S&P give 40 to 50 % more weight to 
annual report disclosure as compared to other media or reports for example quarterly or other 
published information (Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Hassan and Marston, 2008). Therefore, 
annual reports are considered as one of the most reliable sources of corporate information. 
Fourthly, there is evidence in the literature that the annual reports are the most important and 
trust worthy corporate reporting document, and every other financial report or document is in 
one or other way subsidiary or supplementary to them (Botosan, 1997). Fifthly, practically 
only company annual reports were consistently available in the printed format in Pakistan as 
there was no trend of keeping digital archives of data before 2009. Finally, using company 
annual reports is also in line with prior studies in the corporate governance literature, which 
can make possible the direct comparison with the past results (Yermack, 1996; Cheung et al., 
2007). 
4.6 Using the Panel Data 
Panel data analysis has gradually become a more popular form of longitudinal data analysis 
amongst the social and behavioural science researchers. A panel is a cross-section or group of 
entities whose information is periodically collected over a period of time; however, the 
regression results of a panel data are different from a normal time series or cross-section 
regression by nature as it accounts for not only the time effect but also the entity effect. Panel 
data has an inherent advantage over the time series and cross-section studies to control for the 
heterogeneity as it also controls for individual heterogeneity by suggesting that entities are 
heterogeneous while time series and cross-section studies don’t control for heterogeneity and 
therefore are prone to the risk of receiving biased results. Panel data provide more 
information, increased variability, less collinearity among the variables, more degrees of 
freedom and increased efficiency while time series are beleaguered with multicollinearity. 
However, the presence of multicollinearity in the data has been checked in the later section 
4.6.4. Another very important feature of the Panel data is that they are better able to study the 
dynamics of adjustment. The panel data also overcomes the inherent weakness of Cross-
sectional distributions that seem relatively stable but are actually unable to realize and show 
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the changes over the time span. Panel data are better able to ascertain and gauge even those 
effects which may not be detectable by simple cross section or time series. The panels allow 
the researcher to test and examine more comprehensive data models by using the techniques 
of mediation and moderation (Baltagi, 2001). Panel data are usually gathered on micro units, 
like firms and many variables can be operationalized more precisely at the micro level, by 
eliminating their inherent weaknesses (Blundell and Meghir, 1990).  
There are some limitations of panel data as well for example data collection and data 
management is a big issue as there may be non-response errors or the data for the same entity 
may not be available in the subsequent waves of data collection. Similarly, measurement 
errors may arise due to memory errors, unclear responses, and misrecording or misreporting 
of data. The researcher has overcome this problem by using only the balanced panel data 
from the annual reports in spite of trusting on the memory of respondents and used only 
certified and officially presented data. The researcher has also chosen the sample for the 
firms having the data available for all the number of years to be studied in this study. As 
discussed in the section above, the annual reports data is widely considered the most reliable 
data source for a public listed firm.  
Panel data analysis is a technique of studying a particular subject within multiple positions, at 
regular time intervals observed over a defined time frame. Within the realm of social 
sciences, panel analysis has enabled researchers to carry out longitudinal analyses in a vast 
variety of fields (Yaffee, 2003). This study uses panel data to investigate and examine the 
relationship of board related data with the performance of firms over time. This study uses 
panel data for a period of six years from 1999 to 2005. This is the period when SECP code 
was promulgated which increased the pressure upon the firms for making changes in their 
board structure. The novelty of this study is to take two panels of equal time duration and 
compare the results before and after the implementation of SECP code by using a mediation 
model. Choosing the period from 1999 to 2005 enables us to capture the impact of the SECP 
code on corporate governance in the Pakistan. However, not all companies complied with the 
Code immediately (Ibrahim, 2005) after it was introduced. Therefore, to judge the influence, 
we took a period of three years excluding 2002, as it was the starting year. The Code required 
the compliance of corporate governance rules immediately for all the firms excluding only 
financial sector firms and state owned enterprises (SECP code, 2002). The researcher 
therefore chose the non-financial firms registered on KSE from 1999 to 2005 to analyse the 
impact of SECP on Pakistani firms.  
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 4.6.1 Fixed Effect versus Random Effect Models: The Hausman Test 
Panel data models examine fixed or random effects of entity (individual or subject) or time. 
The major difference between fixed and random effect models lies in the role of the dummy 
variables associated with each entity in the panel. If dummies are considered as a part of the 
intercept – i.e. a different effect for each entity –this is a fixed effect model. In a random 
effect model, the dummies are subsumed into the error term. A fixed group effect model 
examines group differences in intercepts, assuming the same slopes and constant variance 
across entities or subjects. A random effect model, by contrast, estimates variance 
components for groups (or times) and errors, assuming the same intercept and slopes. The 
difference among groups (or time periods) lies in their variance of the error term, not in their 
intercepts. According to Baltagi (2001), there are too many parameters in the fixed effects 
model and the loss of degrees of freedom can be avoided if the unobservable individual 
specific effects are assumed to be random.  
As a result, the researcher had to select one specific model as presenting all possible models 
may not be feasible. The Hausman specification test is the classical test to determine whether 
the data possesses the fixed or random effects. The Hausman specification test compares the 
fixed versus random effects under the null hypothesis that the entity or individual effects are 
not correlated with the other regressors present in the model (Hausman 1978). Therefore, the 
important question is whether there is significant correlation between the unobserved firm-
specific random effects and the regressors. If there is no such correlation, then the random 
effects model may be more robust and parsimonious. If such a correlation exists in the data, 
the random effects model would be inconsistently estimated and the fixed effects model 
would be the model of choice (Greene 2003). However, the Hausman test is also not free of 
limitations. The test needs such estimators which are completely efficient by nature but may 
not be available in most of the studies because of their nature such as in case of analysing 
complex survey data. But as the design of this study is such that it is not using any kind of 
survey, therefore, this limitation can be avoided. Second, the commonly used Hausman test is 
concerned only to the test of the equality of two estimators. (Baltagi, 2001).  
This study found out, after applying Hausman test by using STATA, that null hypothesis on 
no correlation between firm-specific effects and regressors can’t be rejected  because the 
value for chi2 =  4.67, Prob>chi2 = 0.8453 and chi2 = 4.45, Prob>chi2 = 0.8148 for both the 
models respectively which clearly indicates that Prob>chi2 is higher than 5% and is 
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insignificant for both the models which shows that the assumptions for the fixed effects 
estimators are not feasible and statistic favours random effect.  
Therefore, it is appropriate to use regression using random effects model to test the 
hypotheses of this study for both of the panels (before and after the implementation of SECP 
code). Therefore, the regression has been run by using random effects to analyse the 
moderation effect in the mediation model.   
4.6.2Testing for Serial Correlation in the Data 
The classical error term disturbances given by panel data regressions assume that the only 
correlation over time is due to the presence of the same individual across the panels. This 
may be a restrictive assumption for economic relationships where an unobserved shock will 
affect the behavioural relationship for at least the next few time periods (Baltagi, 2001).  
Consequently, the presence of serial correlation in linear panel-data models biases the 
standard errors and causes the results to be less reliable. Therefore, researchers need to 
identify possible serial correlation in the idiosyncratic error term in a panel-data model 
(Drukker, 2003). Baltagi (2001) extensively discusses testing for serial correlation in the 
presence of random and fixed effects. Though serial correlation tests apply to macro panels 
with long time series (over 20-30 years) and it is not a problem in micro panels (with very 
few years). Although our data is for 2 panels of 3 years’ time period each, we have used this 
test to judge the effect of cross-sectional dependence. Serial correlation causes the standard 
errors of the coefficients to be smaller than they actually are and report higher R-squared. The 
null is no serial correlation. Our test results reveal that F (1, 200) = 0.214 and 
Prob>F=0.6603. Therefore, the null can’t be rejected and it can be conclude that the data does 
not have first-order autocorrelation.  
4.6.3 Testing for Heteroskedasticity in the Data 
The standard error component model in a panel data regression assumes that the regression 
disturbances are homoskedastic with the same variance across time and entities. This may be 
a restrictive assumption for panels, where the cross sectional panels may be of varying sizes 
and may exhibit a different variation. The large panel with longer span of time have more 
chances to be overwhelmed with heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, 2001). In order to control the 
effect of heteroskedasticity, the study has used the balanced panels with short span of time. In 
addition, a test called the modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity was conducted 
and it revealed that Chi2 (200) = 42.77 and Prob>Chi2 = 0.000 there is presence of 
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heteroskedasticity; therefore, it is needed to run random effects with ‘Robust’ command in 
STATA to control for heteroskedasticity.   
4.6.4 Testing for Multicollinearity in the Data 
If the explanatory variables are independent beyond the influence of other explanatory 
variables, then it will not cause any change in the coefficients of other variables if they are 
removed or added in the regression equation and they are called Orthogonal (Brooks, 2003).  
Researchers expect that there will be no relationship between explanatory or independent 
variables. Practically, however, the relationship between variables is non-zero. Thus, 
changing variables will lead to a change in the value of the coefficient of the regression 
equation. However, the smaller degree of association between the variables will not cause 
much harm to the precision of the values, however, if the correlation between explanatory 
variables is above the appropriate level, the glitch of correlation between explanatory 
variables will have a serious effect on the regression equation and the results may be 
considered as biased and would be plagued by multicollinearity problem (Brooks, 2003).  
According to Chatterjee and Price (1991) the value of the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
most commonly used and is popularly known as ‘rules-of-thumb’ for evaluating 
multicollinearity. If the value is larger than 10 then it is the evidence of multicollinearity as 
well as a mean of the factors considerably larger than one suggests multicollinearity. In our 
case the mean value of VIF are 2.53, which is less than 10 as well as individually none of the 
variables had VIF more than 10 and thus suggests absence of muticollinearity in the data.  
4.6.5 Testing for Endogeneity in the Data 
Most of the estimation techniques used in the early corporate governance literature have been 
disapproved for assuming that a firm’s governance standards are exogenous factors to firm 
value and performance (Mehran, 1995; Klein, 1998). However, several authors, such as 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), Denis and Kruse (2000), and Wintoki et al. (2010) argue that 
firm performance and corporate governance data are prone to the problem of endogeneity as 
the relationship is simultaneously determined by unobservable firm-specific factors and that 
governance changes are determined by past, present and/or in future expected characteristics 
of the firm. Moreover, Wintoki et al. (2010) classifies three potential sources of endogeneity, 
namely unobserved heterogeneity, simultaneity and dynamic endogeneity. Indeed, there is 
enough evidence suggests that all three exist in the governance–performance relationships 
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(Lilling, 2006; Hartzell et al., 2006). Therefore, the results of studies ignoring these 
estimation issues should be interpreted with great caution.  
However, Yermack (1996) and Himmelberg et al. (1999) are of the view that the problem of 
endogeneity can be overcome through using panel estimation techniques. Such an assumption 
is plausible within a panel dataset exhibiting a small time series and large cross section, as 
unobservable firm attributes are improbable to vary significantly over a small period of time. 
Therefore, this study, as discussed in section 4.5 above is implementing a random effects 
panel specification in an attempt to overcome estimation issues associated with endogeneity. 
These estimates are also robust to dynamic endogeneity, firm random effects, endogenous 
regressors, heteroskedasticity and serial correlation in the management of firm performance.  
4.7 Mediation Models for the Panel Data 
There could me many reasons for which panel data are to be preferred for the testing of 
mediation hypotheses in social sciences research but the most important of these reasons 
relates to the quality of the results from a mediation model using panel data are more reliable 
than using cross sectional data and in fact this is valid in testing mediation in any field. The 
application of conventional mediation models to cross section data is plagued by many 
problems. Three such problems are described by Gollob and Reichardt (1987). First, the 
causal relationships inferred by the paths in the mediation model take time to unfurl, but, the 
use of cross-sectional data indicates that the effects are immediate. Obviously such an 
assumption is challenging on logical basis. Second, it is well known fact that results drawn on 
a causal model that omits a key predictor can be seriously biased, but a model based on cross 
sectional data excludes several key variables which were measured at previous times. When 
the researcher doesn’t control for the previous levels of the variables, the paths in the 
mediation model may be over- or underestimated as compared to their true values. Third, 
effects unfold over time, and it is not expected that the volume of a causal effect will remain 
the same for all possible time intervals. The most important drawback of using the mediation 
model to cross-sectional data assumes that not only the causes are instantaneous, but also the 
magnitude of the effect is independent of the length of time that intervenes between the 
measurements of the variables. First Cole and Maxwell (2003) and then Maxwell and Cole 
(2007) elaborate on the drawbacks of using cross-sectional data to mediation models, 
showing that severe bias is highly likely in this situation. Another very important advantage 
of using panel data estimation technique is to avoid dynamic endogeneity (Wintoki et al., 
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2010) which is commonly found in governance performance studies. The endogeneity has 
been discussed in detail in the section 4.6.5. As discussed earlier, our study uses the model to 
identify the relationship between board structural characteristics, board roles, and firm 
performance before and after the implementation of SECP code and to analyse the predicted 
hypotheses developed from existing literature. 
Mediation models for panel data have much to offer for improving statistical inference by 
allowing the examination of inter-firm variation. However, the choice to use panel data adds 
considerable complexity to the mediation model. A major part of the complexity is inherent 
in using panel data in the analysis irrespective of fact that which type of model is used. For 
example, two of the issues are common to any panel data model but the third is specific to 
panel mediation models. The foremost issue relates to the “theory of change” (Collins, 2006), 
which describes whether the variables in the model would change or not and if they get 
changed then in what aspect the change will occur (Ram and Gerstorf, 2009). In our case, the 
change in the model may be because of implementation of SECP code. The second important 
factor is the role of time in any model. This applies to choosing the duration of researchers’ 
interest in the life of the participants; choosing the length of time for which the participants 
will be followed. In this study, the researcher is using a time span of 6 years divided equally 
in two panels of data of three years each to catch the effect of change by comparing the pre 
and post implementation eras (Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). The third issue is related with 
multiple natures of indirect effects possible when using panel data estimation. Dissimilar to 
the three-variable mediation models for cross-sectional data where only single indirect effect 
is examined, mediation models for panel data often provide with multiple and different types 
of indirect effects.  
Therefore, mediational models are concerned with elucidating the mechanism by which an 
independent variable exerts its impact on a dependent variable through a mediating variable. 
Four conditions are necessary for the presence of a mediation effect (Baron and Kenny, 
1986). First, the independent and dependent variable(s) has to be correlated. Second, the 
independent and mediator variable(s) must be correlated. Third, the mediator and dependent 
variable(s) must also be correlated. Fourth, the effect of the independent variables on the 
dependent variable must change when controlling for the mediating variables. Some of our 
results provide partial support for the conditions necessary for mediation in both steps of the 
model.  
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By looking at table 5.5, it is clear that the moderating impact of SECP variable, which toggles 
between pre- and post-implementation era of corporate governance reforms, is significant. It 
suggests that after the implementation of SECP code the effects of board structural 
characteristics like percentage of non-executive directors on the board and diligence of audit 
committee are stronger and the effect of combining the role of CEO/Chairperson of the board 
is weaker. The results also reveal that frequency of board meetings partially mediates the 
relationship between board structural characteristics of percentage of non-executive directors, 
role duality as CEO also the Chairman board, diligence and independence of audit committee 
and Tobin Q as firm financial performance measure. Similarly, looking at table 6.6 it is 
revealed that SECP code implementation influences positively the board resource provision 
role (board size) which partially mediates the relationship between percentage of non-
executive directors, role duality, and audit committee independence and Tobin Q as firm 
financial performance. However, the board roles (control and resource provision) don’t 
mediate the same relationship when the firm financial performance is measured in terms of 
accounting returns as ROA. 
To further explore the nature of the mediation, the researcher also used the Sobel test 
(Preacher and Kelley, 2011; Sobel, 1982). Given that the model used in the study has a two-
step mediation process, the researcher ran multiple Sobel tests on the actual mediation effects 
of all relationships. There is no significant mediating effect if the Sobel test z-value is not 
significant such as less than 1.96, the mediation relationship is partial if the Sobel test z-value 
is significant such as more than 1.96 and the full mediation relationship exist if the Sobel test 
z-value is significant (> 1.96) and the effect ratio is greater than 0.8 (Jose, 2008). The tests 
support the somewhat partial mediating role for the above-mentioned mediator variables for 
the post SECP era by using Tobin Q as a measure of firm financial performance as discussed 
in the above paragraph. 
Therefore, as discussed previously in this chapter, to achieve its objectives, this research goes 
a step ahead to identify the relationship between board structural characteristics, board roles, 
and firm performance before and after the implementation of SECP code by using a model 
which employs the moderation and mediation techniques simultaneously by using panels of 
data from a different perspective than USA and UK. 
 
 
87 
 
4.8 Analysing Moderation and Mediation  
Moderation takes place when the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable 
varies according to the level of a third variable, called a moderator variable, which interacts 
with the independent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986; Cohen, 1978; James and Brett, 
1984). Moderation is involved in research on individual differences or situational conditions 
that influence the strength of the relationship between an independent and dependent variable 
(Edwards and Lambert, 2007; Taylor and Aspinwall, 1996). To grasp the influence of change 
as a result of implementation of SECP code, this study follows the approach of Brick and 
Chidambaran (2010), by introducing a dummy variable which has value 0 in the pre-
implementation time period and 1 for post implementation time period.  
Currently, researchers use various methods to combine moderation and mediation process 
techniques. In some cases, moderation and mediation are analyzed separately, and results 
from these analyses are unravelled together to illustrate the combined effects of moderation 
and mediation. In other cases, the sample is broken up into subgroups that represent different 
levels of the moderator variable, and then mediation is examined within each subgroup 
afterwards (Edwards and Lambert, 2007). The last but not the least is the causal steps 
procedure which is used for assessing whether the mediation is adapted to incorporate 
moderator variables or not, this actually helps in testing whether a previously significant 
moderator effect is no longer significant after controlling for a mediator variable (Baron and 
Kenny, 1986).  
These procedures discussed above are for mediated models that exclude moderation 
(MacKinnon et al., 2002; Shrout and Bolger, 2002; Sobel, 1982) but have not been addressed 
for the models that combine moderation and mediation and work simultaneously. This study 
uses model that expresses relationships among variables by using regression equations, and 
incorporating moderation by supplementing these equations with the moderator variable and 
its product with the independent variable and the mediator variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986; 
James and Brett, 1984). The researcher has shown that how these equations can be integrated 
to represent moderation of the direct, indirect, and total effects of the model (Edward and 
Lambert, 2007). Therefore, this study goes a step ahead and uses moderation and mediation 
simultaneously in its framework and uses a model which is novel in its way to use an 
integrated framework moderated regression analysis; expresses mediation in terms of direct, 
indirect, and total effects; and shows how paths that constitute these effects vary across levels 
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of the moderator variable. The effect of SECP code before and after the implementation of 
the code has been captured by using the moderator dummy to distinguish between the board 
structural characteristics. The next section elaborates the detailed discussion about using 
mediation models in the corporate governance research with a special case of panel data. 
4.9 Measurements of Variables 
In this model the researcher has used the board structural characteristics as proportion of non-
executive directors, presence of role duality if CEO is also chairperson board and structure of 
audit committee by discussing diligence of audit committee and independence of audit 
committee as provided in SECP code. As discussed in section 3.4 of chapter III, the presence 
of non-executive directors, which are considered independent, on the board makes the 
disclosed information reliable for the outside investors and shareholders. Similarly, board 
leadership structure with respect to the separation of chair of the board from CEO is also very 
important. Boards are legally bound to be fully informed about critical corporation conditions 
and financial reporting. Audit committees are required to show due diligence to ensure that 
the company has an adequate system of internal controls, duly monitors potential problems, 
and preserves the integrity of financial reports. They are to oversee the financial reporting 
process and confirm the appointment of the independent auditing firm. Additionally, they are 
responsible for discharging independent auditors when appropriate. Similarly, the model 
adopts control and resource dependence roles as mediating variables and dependent variable 
is financial performance of the firm. All these constructs have been operationalized by the 
following measures.  
4.9.1 The Dependent Variable: Firm Financial Performance  
This study uses the financial performance as dependent variable. The study adopts the two 
distinctive measurements of the financial performance based upon the prior literature such as 
Gompers et al. (2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), and Guest 
(2009), these two measurements are return on assets (ROA) and Tobin’s Q which represent 
the accounting and market based measures of financial performance, respectively. The 
decision to use the two different measures of financial performance is motivated by two main 
reasons. Firstly, prior literature suggests that management or insiders and investors or 
outsiders value corporate governance differently (Black et al., 2006). This is because, the 
accounting based measure of performance (ROA) endeavours to encapsulate the wealth 
effects of corporate governance mechanisms from the perspective of company management 
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(insiders), while the market based measure (Tobin’s Q) epitomizes financial valuation of 
corporate governance structures by investors (outsiders). Secondly, and as it will be 
elaborated further below, each measure has its own pros and cons and there is no consensus 
within the literature on a particular measure as being the ‘best’ proxy for financial 
performance (Haniffa and Hudaib 2006). Therefore, making use of the two measures signifies 
an attempt to investigate the robustness of the results against both accounting and market 
based measures of financial performance. 
ROA or return on assets is defined in this study as the book value of operating profit at the 
end of a financial year divided by the book value of total assets at the end of a financial year 
(Guest, 2009; Beiner et al., 2006). It gauges that how efficiently and effectively a firm 
manages its operations and uses its assets to generate rents (Ross et al., 1998). On the 
average, higher ROA suggests effective and efficient use of a firm’s assets in maximising the 
wealth of its shareholders’ by management.  
However, there is no dearth of studies that has been apprehensive of the use of ROA as 
measure for accounting return due to various reasons. Firstly, they are if the view that ROA is 
a historical measure and represents only the past profits, but past profits can be a poor 
reflection of true future profitability (Ross et al., 2002). A closely related drawback of this 
measure is that ROA is based on historical cost accounting; it is unable to directly reflect 
current changes in valuation by the equity markets (Krivogorsky, 2006). Secondly, the ROA 
is an accounting-based measure of profitability and therefore it ignores risk, but it may not be 
the case as it is possible that two firms with same level of current profits are exposed to 
different levels of risks (Ross et al., 2002). Finally, through continuous changes in accounting 
policies and standards, methods and techniques, ROA is suggested to be vulnerable to all 
kinds of managerial manipulations like earnings management (Alexander et al., 2007). The 
ROA is also criticized because it is unable to distinguish between different types of risks 
involved for different industries and different environments. Nevertheless, the researcher has 
tried to diminish the potential weaknesses of this measure by controlling for industry type, 
firm size, and leverage in this study.  
Tobin Q being the second measure of financial performance is defined in this study as the 
market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity 
divided by the book value of total assets (Beiner et al., 2006; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). 
Tobin Q is the alternative measure of financial performance that is used, as a proxy for the 
90 
 
markets’ valuation of the quality of a firm’s corporate governance structures. It is normally 
referred to as the ratio of the market value of the liabilities to the market value of the assets 
needed to replace these claims (Lewellen and Bradrinath, 1997). In this study, the researcher 
has used book value of assets as a proxy for current replacement cost of company assets due 
to data limitations. Usually, the Tobin Q measures the efficacy of a firm to use its assets to 
generate value for shareholders. Like ROA, a higher value for Tobin Q will suggest greater 
efficiency of a firm’s corporate governance structures, as well as a better perception of a 
company’s financial performance by the market (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). 
The Tobin Q has been widely used by various researchers as a proxy for financial 
performance in the corporate governance literature (Yermack, 1996; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Brick and Chidambaran, 2010). The Tobin Q has enormous appeal for practical relevance in 
corporate governance (Henry, 2008). However, despite its immense advantage in the 
empirical literature in corporate governance, it is not free of criticism as well.  
The most widely levelled charge against market based measure of performance is because of 
the magnitude of effort needed to calculate it as it is very cumbersome and tedious to 
compute as well as need a lot of data from different sources (Chung and Pruitt, 1994). The 
data needed to calculate it has been discussed in the definition mentioned in the above 
paragraph. Nevertheless, this ratio has also some drawbacks based upon the data provided 
however, gradually the accounting standard are getting stringent and the data reporting is 
getting more and more reliable (Alexander et al., 2007), therefore, Tobin Q is increasingly 
getting easier to compute in the presence of latest information technology tools as well as 
getting more reliable in the backdrop of recent changes in the accounting standards. Still 
another denigration on Tobin Q is that it may not be a true measure of the management 
quality for a firm’s corporate governance as there may be some intangibles as well that might 
not have been captured in their true letter and spirit because no measure can grasp the quality 
of accounting  (Beattie and Thomson, 2007). Some of the critics of Tobin Q are of the view 
that it doesn’t reflect the accounting or economic essentials of a firm rather it may be 
motivated by the investors’ emotions, overall economic conditions of the country like high 
inflation, and rumours spread in the market like market bubbles (Henwood, 1997). Therefore, 
the researcher has used both the accounting and marketing measures for firm performance 
with an extensive list of control variables to capitalise on the positive aspects of both of these 
measures to complement each other.  
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4.9.2 The Control Variables 
 
The use of control or omitted variables is very important in any study because omitting an 
important variable may bring biased results in relationship of corporate governance and firm 
performance (Black et al., 2006). Therefore, a number of control variables, including capital 
expenditure or innovative potential (Capex), Leverage (Leverage), firm size (firm_size), 
director shareholdings (Dir_holdings), and industry  dummies are included in the regression 
in addition to the main variable of importance in this model. The logic for including these 
variables as controlling has been discussed individually with every variable. Therefore, the 
researcher attributes the non-exhaustive list of control or omitted variables because of 
unavailability of the data with respect to this model (Chenhall and Moers, 2007). 
 
Research and Development Ratio (Capex) 
 
Theoretically, the firms making more investments in the field of innovation and 
entrepreneurship through enhanced products and services should gain competitive advantage 
over their competitors (Brown et al., 2009) to generate higher rents and gain premium prices 
for shares in the market to maximise the wealth of stockholders (Jermias, 2007). However, 
this investment in innovation is more capital intensive affecting negatively the current 
financial performance by reducing the residual profits but may have more future profits (Weir 
et al., 2002). But at the same time, higher investments in the field of innovation and 
technology requires stringent governance measures as the soft assets like patents are easier to 
be copied and replicated (Durnev and Kim, 2005). Therefore, the researcher has proxied the 
research and development ratio by dividing capital expenditure to total sales (Capex) by 
following the prior literature (Brown et al., 2009). 
 
Leverage (Leverage) 
  
The leverage has a deeper impact on the profitability of the firm and the conventional 
approach is that higher leveraged firms will be more profitable as Interest payments are tax 
deductible (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). But at the same time, the firms with higher leverage 
ratio will be exposed to higher credit and bankruptcy risks (Myers, 1977). This will also 
reduce the agency conflicts as higher leverage ratios will cause more free cash flows as well 
as the lenders will be demanding a direct role in the board by increasing the level of 
monitoring (Agrawal and Knoeber, 1996). The leverage is used as a proxy for the ratio of 
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total debt to total assets and it is also in line with the previous literature (Klapper and Love, 
2004; Bhagat and Bolton, 2008) of corporate governance. 
 
Firm Size (firm_size) 
 
Firm size has widely been used in host of literature in various fields as a proxy for 
complexity of operations or formalization of rules and regulations because of pressure of 
external regulators and is found to be positively associated with subject to better and strict 
regime of corporate governance (Beiner et al., 2006). Therefore, larger firms may afford to 
disclose more information and enjoy higher market valuations (Botosan, 1997).  
On the contrary, Klapper and Love (2004) suggest that larger firms may not be as innovative 
as smaller firms because small firms tend to have better growth opportunities, and as such 
they will need higher external financing. Therefore, smaller firms are also subject to stringent 
control measures for corporate governance for sustainability. The firm size is calculated as a 
natural log of total assets of a firm to further smoothing of data.  
 
Director share ownership (Dir_Holdings)  
 
It is calculated as ratio of the total number of ordinary shares held by all directors divided to 
the total number of outstanding ordinary shares in the market. The entrenchment hypothesis 
proposes that if the directors have higher holdings of shares they will tend to pursue their 
personal agendas without pursuing the value maximization for the shareholders at large and 
on the contrary, lower holdings will adjust automatically for alternative measures to align 
with the market forces (Bontis et al., 2000).  
 
Industry Dummies  
 
The corporate governance practices are different from one organization to other organization 
keeping in view the ownership levels, business lines, and complexity of operations (Lim et 
al., 2007). The external environment also affect differently on different industries. The prior 
literature on corporate governance (Beiner et al., 2006; Black et al., 2006) proposes that 
industry dummies may be used to control for the industry specific effects like Textile Goods 
(Textiles), consumer goods (Cons.Goods), chemicals and pharmaceuticals (Chemicals), and 
industrials and technology (Industrials), are included as controls for these four major 
industries. To avoid the dummy-variable trap, only three industry dummies are included in 
estimating any single equation. 
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4.9.3 The Independent Variables 
 
The independent or explanatory variables in this model consist of various board structural 
characteristics as a mechanism of corporate governance. It also defines each variable and 
shows how they were measured. These include: the proportion of non-executive directors 
(%_NED); role or CEO duality (CEOdual); the diligence of audit committee (ACM), and 
independence of audit committee (Ind_AC). 
These corporate board structure and ownership variables are measured in accordance with 
prior research. The proportion of non-executive directors (%_NEDs) is discussed in detail in 
section 3.4.2 is measured as the total number of non-executive directors divided by the total 
number of directors on the board (Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). Role or CEO duality 
(CEOdual) as discussed in detail in section 3.4.2 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
“1” if the positions of company chairman and CEO are combined, otherwise “0” (Brick and 
Chidambaran, 2010; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). Also discussed in depth in section 3.4.3, the 
diligence of audit committee (ACM) is measured as the number of total audit committee 
meetings in held in an accounting year (Vafeas, 1999; Al-Najjar 2012). Similarly, the 
independence of audit committee (Ind_AC) as discussed in section 3.4.4 is also a binary 
variable which takes the value of “1” if a company’s audit committee is headed by non-
executive director, otherwise zero (Laing and Weir, 1999; Henry, 2008).  
 
4.9.4 Moderating Variable (SECP) 
 
We have used the SECP variable as a moderating variable and it has been discussed in detail 
in section 4.6 of this chapter. This is a unitary variable which assumes the value “0” for the 
time period prior to the implementation of SECP code and value “1” after the implementation 
of SECP code. The pre SECP time period is three years from 1999-2001 and post SECP 
period is also three years from 2003-2005 whereas our data straddles for the year 2002 
assuming it the transitional time period in which the SECP code was promulgated. It interacts 
with all the structural characteristics variables used in our model and the proportion of non-
executive directors (%_NED) becomes (%_NED_SEC) for the post SECP period. The Role 
or CEO duality (CEOdual) becomes (CEO_Dual_SEC) for the post SECP time period. The 
diligence of audit committee (ACM) becomes (ACM_SEC) and independence of audit 
committee becomes (Ind_AC_SEC).  
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4.9.5 Mediating Variables 
   
There are two mediating variables, board monitoring role and resource dependence role. The 
board control role is measured as the frequency of board meetings (FOBM) which has been 
discussed in detail in section 3.4.1 whereas, the board resource dependence role is measured 
by Board size (board_ size) is measured as the total number of directors serving on a 
company’s board at the end of the financial year which has been discussed in detail in section 
3.4.2. 
 
4.10 Summary  
 
This chapter first explored the philosophical foundations of the study and identified the 
appropriate research design and methodology for this particular research. Due to its 
quantitative nature, this research is based on existing theories of corporate governance and 
board roles research. To test research hypotheses, a conceptual model was employed and 
annual reports were used to collect quantitative data to be subsequently analysed using 
STATA. The panel data was tested by various statistical techniques to analyse the presence of 
random or fixed effects. This chapter reported the process of research design, sampling 
techniques, and data analysis techniques used to examine the panel data. The chapter further 
went on to discuss the process of examining mediation and moderation techniques used to 
analyse and operationalise the model. 
In summary, various techniques were described in this chapter to analyse the panel data to 
test for the relationships between the variables as hypothesised in Chapter 3. The next chapter 
will present the findings of the regression analysis to test these hypotheses.   
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Chapter 5 
Analysis and Results 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the panel data estimation, descriptive statistics, correlations, Hausman 
test, and regression results with random effects.  It presents not only detailed descriptive 
statistics of the dependent (Financial Performance) and independent (corporate governance) 
variables but also the results regarding correlations and regression analysis using random 
effects.  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 reports detailed 
descriptive statistics for the dependent and the independent variables. Section 5.3 tests the 
correlation results and finally section 5.4 describes the regression results on the panel data 
using random effects.  
5.2 Summary Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides descriptive statistics relating to the proxies for the dependent (Financial 
Performance), independent (Board Structural Characteristics), and the control variables. 
Table 5.1: Summary Descriptive Statistics  
 N Mean Stand. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Tobin Q 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
1.24 
1.72 
1.48 
 
1.35 
1.61 
1.09 
 
.163 
.301 
.163 
 
2.96 
5.52 
5.52 
Return on Assets (%) 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
6.36 
6.68 
6.52 
 
11.22 
11.61 
11.43 
 
-16.42 
-17.42 
-17.42 
 
.56 
1.0 
1.0 
Frequency of Board Meetings 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
3.85 
5.80 
4.82 
 
2.13 
3.38 
2.99 
 
0 
3.0 
0 
 
15 
33 
33 
Non-Executive Directors (%) 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
.34 
.53 
.44 
 
19.3 
22.5 
23.0 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
68.0 
80.0 
80.0 
CEO-Chairman-Duality 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
.654 
.484 
.550 
 
.479 
.499 
.486 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
No. of AC Meetings 1200     
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Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
.036 
4.77 
2.40 
.362 
1.23 
2.53 
0 
0 
0 
05.0 
10.0 
10.0 
Independence of AC 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
.011 
.878 
.494 
 
.103 
.125 
.400 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
1 
1 
1 
Board Size 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
7.76 
10.22 
9.00 
 
1.27 
1.15 
1.22 
 
6 
6 
6 
 
14.0 
14.0 
14.0 
Leverage (%) 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
26.96 
22.27 
24.61 
 
16.18 
17.01 
16.84 
 
-1.70 
.01 
-1.70 
 
14.62 
15.21 
15.21 
Directors’ Share (%) 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
24.47 
23.84 
24.66 
 
19.83 
19.53 
19.81 
 
0 
0 
0 
 
.81 
.61 
.81 
Capital Expenditure (%) 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
4.10 
4.30 
4.20 
 
4.18 
3.90 
4.01 
 
.24 
.37 
.24 
 
7.42 
10.69 
10.69 
Firm Size 
Pre 2002 
Post 2002 
Overall 
1200  
13.28 
13.54 
13.40 
 
1.08 
1.21 
1.160 
 
6.93 
6.86 
6.89 
 
15.77 
16.10 
16.10 
 
 
As shown in the Table 5.1, we start with the dependent variables of our research and discuss 
the marketing and accounting performance of the sampled firms. We have used Tobin Q as 
firm value. We calculate the firm’s Tobin Q as the ratio of the total market value of the firm, 
defined as the market value of the equity plus the book value of the total debt to the book 
value of the firm’s total assets. We have also included an alternative performance measure as 
return on assets which is defines as the ratio of earnings before interest, depreciation and 
amortization to the book value of total assets The results show that Tobin Q and Return on 
Assets were higher in the post 2002 era as compared to the performance in the pre-2002 era 
having mean value for Tobin Q as 1.72 in the post SECP Code implementation era and 1.24 
in the pre SECP Code implementation era with an average Tobin Q of 1.48 for all these years 
starting from 1999 to 2005. Similarly for Return on Assets (RoA) is 6.68% in the post 2002 
era and 6.36% in the pre-2002 or before the implementation of SECP Code 2002. The 
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average of Return on Assets is 6.52% for the overall time period from 1999 to 2005 which 
posts no big difference overall.  
The results for frequency of board meetings activity ranges from 0 to 33 with mean of annual 
number of board meetings is 4.82 for the overall time period from 1999 to 2005. The results 
also show the increasing trend in board activity after the implementation of SECP Code for 
corporate governance since 2002. The statistics reveal that the mean of annual number of 
board meetings after 2002 is 5.80 as compared to 3.85 in the pre-2002 era while the mean for 
the overall time period has been 4.82. This shows a clear increase in the board activity in the 
post-SECP implementation era. The average number of board activity is 4.82 for the overall 
time period from 1999 to 2005 which is also higher than the minimum of 4 recommended by 
the SECP code.  
The percentage of independent directors has the mean as 44.0 % for the overall time period 
from 1999 to 2005. The results also show that the proportion of independent directors 
increased to 53% in the post-2002 era from 34.6% in the pre-2002 era, which shows an 
adequate increase in the independent board members proportion after the implementation of 
SECP Code of Corporate Governance since 2002 in Pakistan.  
The CEO-Duality is a dummy variable which represents the entrenched CEO and is equal to 
1 when the CEO is also the chair of the board of the directors. On the average there has been 
55.0% of the firms with same person working as CEO as well as chairperson of the board for 
an overall period from 1999 to 2005. The figures indicate that from the pre-2002 to the post-
2002 time periods CEO-Duality went down from 65.4% to 48.4%, following the 
implementation of SECP Code of Corporate Governance since 2002 in Pakistan. This shows 
a trend of decreasing trend of entrenchment after the implementation of Corporate 
Governance laws.  
The mean value for the frequency of audit committee meetings or the diligence of audit 
committee for the overall time period of 1999 to 2005 is 2.40. The value for the pre 2002 
period is .036 which shows that there were very few number of meetings before the 
implementation of SECP Code of Corporate Governance while the frequency increased 
substantially to 4.77 in the post 2002 era which is also in line with the Corporate Governance 
guideline of 2002 which say that there should be at least 1.0 meeting of audit committee in 
every quarter of the year. The situation also gets clear by looking at the number of firms 
having audit committees before 2002.  
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The Ind_AC is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 when the audit committee is headed by 
a non-executive director in an organization. The mean value for the overall time period of 
1999 to 2005 for the independence of audit Committee is 49.4%. While looking at the figures 
in more detail, it is revealed that only 1.1% of the sampled firms had Audit Committees 
headed by non-executive directors before the implementation of SECP code while there is a 
contrasting difference by looking into the figures in the post implementation phase of our 
study from 2003 to 2005. It shows that there have been 87.8% firms having independent 
Audit Committee as part of their organizational setup after SECP code.   
The size of the board of directors indicates the number of directors as board members. The 
mean value of the size of Board is 9.00 for an overall time period of 1999 to 2005. But 
looking in to the board size of our sampled firms with respect to the before and after the 
implementation of SECP code reveals that there is a visible difference of board size in both 
the time periods. The board size before 2002 has been 7.76 and after 2002 have been 10.22.  
R&D or Capital Expenditure ratio is the level of annual capital expenses scaled by total sales 
of the firm (capex). The mean value for capex ratio is 4.20% for an overall time period 
ranging from 1999 to 2005.  While the mean value for the pre and post 2002 period is 4.10% 
and 4.30% respectively. The figures tell us that there is no noticeable change in the ratio 
before and after the implementation of SECP code.  
The firm’s long term debt divided by total assets has been used as a measure of firms’ 
leverage. In our sampled firms the mean value for the proportion of Leverage is 24.61% for 
an overall time period ranging from 1999 to 2005. The figures also reveal that there is no 
substantial difference in the ratio between before and after SECP Corporate Governance 
Regulations of 2002.  
Directors’ share shows the percentage of shares held by the directors of the organization and 
the mean for this is 24.66% for the overall time span of the research ranging from 1999 to 
2005. The results also prove that there is no noticeable difference between the pre- and post-
2002 eras. The mean value for the Directors’ shares for before and after the implementation 
of corporate governance regulations of 2002 are 24.27% and 23.84% respectively. 
Firm size is the log of total assets of the firm. The statistics reveal that average size of the 
firm is not much different ranging over the period of 6 years from 1999 to 2005. The figures 
tell us that the mean firm size for an overall time period under the lens of the research is 
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13.40 which stands at 13.28 and 13.54 respectively for the pre and post 2002 era which marks 
the implementation of SECP Corporate Governance Regulations.   
5.3 Correlation Analysis 
Table 5.2 reports the intercorrelations for this study’s key variables: Tobin Q; ROA; 
Frequency of board meetings; Proportion of Non-Executive Directors; Directors’ 
Entrenchment; Frequency of audit committee meetings; Presence of audit committee; Board 
size; Leverage; Directors’ share; capex ratio and Firm Size on the basis of total assets of the 
firm. 
There is a significant positive correlation (r = .170, p<.01) between Tobin Q and Return on 
Assets. As expected, there is also a significant positive correlation (r = .217, p<.05) between 
frequency of board meetings and Tobin Q as well as between frequency of board meetings 
and return on assets (r = .138, p<.05). So, there is a higher magnitude of correlation with 
Tobin Q. The intercorrelations is also positive (r = .208, p<.01) between proportion of non-
executive directors and Tobin Q as well as between proportion of non-executive directors and 
return on assets (r = .064, p<.05). However, the relationship is stronger and more significant 
in case of Tobin Q. The same positive relationship exists between proportion of non-
executive directors and frequency of board meetings (r = .208, p<.01).  
There is a significant negative relationship between dual role of CEO/Chairman Board and 
Tobin Q (r = -.222, p<.01) similarly, the significant negative relationship also exists between 
dual role of CEO/Chairman Board and return on assets (r = -.153, p<.01). The figures (r = -
.121, p<.01) also shows that there is a significant negative relationship between holding dual 
role by CEO/Chairman Board and frequency of board meetings. 
The correlation is positive and significant between frequency of audit committee meetings 
and Tobin Q (r = .218, p<.01) as well as between frequency of audit committee meetings and 
return on assets (r = .110, p<.05). The figures also show the positive significant association 
between frequency of audit committee meetings and frequency of board meetings (r = .323, 
p<.01) and between frequency of audit committee meetings and proportion of NEDs on the 
Board (r = .374, p<.01). While looking at the relationship between independence of audit 
committee and Tobin Q, the figures disclose a positive significant relationship (r = .138, 
p<.01). We also find a significant positive correlation between independence of audit 
committee and Return on Assets (r = .104, p<.05), though the coefficient is weaker than 
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relationship between presence of audit committee and Tobin Q. The nature of relationship 
reported between independence of audit committee and frequency of board meetings is also 
positive and significant (r = .221, p<.01). The same degree of positive relationship exists 
between independence of audit committee in an organization and proportion of non-executive 
directors (r = .112, p<.01). There is also a positive significant relationship between 
independence of audit committee and number of its meetings (r = .531, p<.01). 
Now we describe the relationship between size of the board and other important variables. 
There is a significant positive relationship between Board size and Tobin Q (r = .186, p<.01). 
Similarly, there is a positive significant relationship between Board size and return on assets 
(r = .029, p<.01) and there is a significant relationship between board size and frequency of 
board meetings (r= .12, p<.05) similarly there is a significant relationship between board size 
and NEDs and diligence and independence of audit committees respectively (r= .33, p<.05; 
r= .39, p<.05; and r= .36, p<.05). However the relationship between board size and CEO 
duality is negative (r = -.082 p<.01).  
In regard to the relationship of leverage, which is elaborated as ratio of debt in the total assets 
of the firm, with the other variables, we find that there is a positive significant relationship 
between leverage and Tobin Q (r = .241, p<.01) but there is negative significant relationship 
between leverage and return on assets (r = -.376, p<.05). It is also clear from the figures that 
there is a positive significant relationship between leverage and frequency of board meetings 
(r = .026, p<.05) as well as between leverage and proportion of non-executive board members 
(r = .069, p<.05). The relationship is also significant and positive between leverage and 
leverage and dual role of CEO/Chairman Board (r = .206, p<.01). 
There is a negative significant correlation between number of share held by the directors and 
dependent variables Tobin Q and Return on Assets respectively (r = -.024, p<.05 and r = -
.068, p<.05). There is also a negative significant relationship between number of share held 
by the directors and frequency of board meetings (r = -.258, p<.01) as well as there is 
negative significant correlation reported by the data between number of share held by the 
directors and proportion of non-executive directors on the board (r = -.196, p<.01). However, 
there is a positive significant relationship between number of share held by the directors and 
dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board (r = .164, p<.01), but negative significant 
relationship between number of share held by the directors and frequency of audit committee 
meetings held in a year (r = -.253, p<.01). 
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The negative significant correlation is reported by the figures between number of share held 
by the directors and independence of audit committee in an organization, but there is a 
positive significant intercorrelations existing between number of share held by the directors 
and leverage. The relationship of capex ratio is insignificant with a majority of the variables 
used in the study except size of the board of directors, which reveals that there is a negative 
significant relationship between capex ratio and board size (r = -.111, p<.01). 
Finally we will examine the inter-correlations of the size of the firm which is depicted as total 
assets of the firm with other variables of the study. It is found that there is a positive 
significant relationship between Firm Size and the Tobin Q (r = .260, p<.01) as well as 
between Firm size and return on assets (r = .204, p<.05). The relationship of Firm size and 
frequency of the meetings of board of directors and proportion of non-executive directors in 
the firm is significant as well meaning that bigger firms may have more independent directors 
(r= .126, p<.05), there is a negative significant relationship between Firm size and dual role 
of CEO/Chairman of board of directors (r = -.149, p<.01). However, a positive significant 
correlation relationship exists between Firm size and frequency of audit committee meetings 
(r = .111, p<.01) also there is a positive significant inter-correlations between firm size and 
the independence of audit committee in an organization (r = .125, p<.01). The figures also 
reveal a positive significant relationship between Firm Size and Board Size (r =.185, p<.01). 
A highly positive and significant inter-correlations relationship is found between Firm Size 
and leverage (r = .442 p<.01) depicting that bigger firms are more leveraged as well as 
between Size of the firm and capex ratio of the firm which is reported as (r = .094, p<.01), 
though there is a negative but insignificant relationship reported between Firm size and 
number of share held by the directors. The correlation analysis in table 5.2 shows significant 
correlations and this result may be of concern due to potential muticollinearity between the 
variables. However, in the regression analysis, VIF statistics are were all below 5, thus 
suggesting there was no muticollinearity problem (Burns and Burns, 2008). 
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Table 5.2: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Financial Performance and Corporate Governance Variables   
 
Variables  1  2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Tobin Q  1 
2. ROA   .170**  1 
3. FOBM  .217*  .138*  1 
4. NEDs  .208**  .064*  .208**  1 
5. CEOdual       -.222*  -.153*  -.121** -.041  1 
6. ACM               .218** .110*  .323**  .374**  -.037  1 
7. Ind_AC  .138**  .104*  .221**  .112**  -.068  .531**  1 
8. Board Size  .186**  .029*  . 12*  .33*  -.082** .39*  .36* 1 
9. Leverage  .241**  -.376*  .026*  .069*  .206**  .012  -.014 -.034 1 
10. Director-Share -.024*  -.068*  -.258** -.196** .164**  -.253** -.170**-.033 .069* 1 
11. Capex Ratio .016  -.049  .023  .003  -.031  -.006  .003 -.111* .046 -.012 1 
12. Firm Size  .260*  .204*  .043†  .126*  -.149** .111**  .125** .185** .442** -.026 .094* 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). † Correlation is significant at the 0.1 level (2-tailed)
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5.4 Regression Analysis for Panel Data  
 
The relationship between board structural characteristics, Board roles and firm Performance 
measures suggested by correlation measures was further investigated through regression 
analysis by using panel data, and controlling for Leverage, Directors’ shares, R&D ratio and 
the Firm Size. The brief introduction about panel data estimation is given in the next section.  
As discussed in detail in section 4.4.4, a panel is a cross-section or group of entities whose 
information is periodically collected over a given time span but a panel data regression differs 
from a regular time series or cross-section regression in its nature as it has not only time 
effect but also the entity effect. The panel data facilitates for better analysis and 
understanding for variables whose impact change over time but not across entities (i.e. 
national policies, federal regulations, international agreements, etc.). Panel data analysis 
endows regression analysis with both a spatial and temporal dimension. The spatial 
dimension pertains to a set of cross-sectional units of observation. These could be countries, 
states, counties, firms, commodities, groups of people, or even individuals. The temporal 
dimension pertains to periodic observations of a set of variables characterizing these cross-
sectional units over a particular time span. In balanced panels, there are full observations for 
each case at every time point, whereas unbalanced panels may contain missing information 
for some individuals at time points. Our study use balanced panel of listed firms on KSE for a 
period of 1999-2001 and 2003-2005 to compare their governance, board roles, and firm 
performance for two balanced panels. Panel data models examine cross sectional (group) 
and/or time series (time) effects. These effects may be fixed or random. The selection of one 
specific model is real challenge. Therefore, Hausman test is used to judge these effects as 
elaborated in the next section. 
 
5.4.1 The Quandary between Fixed and Random Effects: Hausman Test  
 
Panel data models examine fixed or random effects of entity (individual or firms) or time. 
The core difference between fixed and random effect models lies in the role of the dummy 
variables that reflect the entity-specific effects. If dummies are considered as a part of the 
intercept, this is a fixed effect model. In a random effect model, the dummies are subsumed 
in the error term. The Hausman specification test is the classical test of whether the fixed or 
random effects model should be used. The research question will be whether there is 
significant correlation between the unobserved person-specific random effects and the 
regressors (Green, 2008). If there is no such correlation, then the random effects model may 
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be more powerful and parsimonious. If there is such a correlation, the random effects model 
would be inconsistently estimated and the fixed effects model would be the model of choice.    
 Hausman test is run to decide between fixed or random effects. It compares the coefficients 
from fixed and random effects models. It assumes that if the null hypothesis that the 
individual effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors in the model is not rejected, a 
random effect model is better than its fixed counterpart. The test is done by using STATA. 
The results are provided in the Tables 5.3 and 5.4 for Tobin Q and ROA respectively.    
 
Table 5.3: Hausman Test Results for Tobin Q 
 
Variables FE (b) RE (B) b-B S.E. 
%_ NED .148 .124 .024 .050 
%_ NED_SEC .275 .341 -.066 .151 
CEOdual -.151 -.342 .190 .313 
CEOdual_SEC -.738 -.748 .010 .033 
ACM -.600 -.688 .087 .112 
ACM_SEC .546 .630 -.084 .110 
Ind_ AC 1.50 1.74 -.024 .560 
Ind_ AC_SEC .884 1.06 -.184 .575 
 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho;  
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = = 4.67   Prob>chi8 = 0.8453 
 
Table 5.4: Hausman Test Results for ROA 
 
Variables FE (b) RE (B) b-B S.E. 
%_ NED .015 .012 .003 .005 
%_ NED_SEC .252 .255 .003 .015 
CEODual -.317 -.318 .001 .039 
CEODual_SEC -.078 -.080 .002 .003 
ACM .236 .233 .003 .010 
ACM_SEC .260 .259 .001 .010 
Ind_ AC .451 .454 -.004 .054 
Ind_ AC_SEC .423 .436 -.012 .055 
 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho;  
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(8) = = 4.45 
Prob>chi8 = 0.8148 
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The Hausman test reveals that the null hypothesis can’t be rejected, neither in case of Tobin 
Q (representing the market based outcome of the financial performance measure) nor in case 
of ROA (representing the accounting based outcome of the financial performance measure) 
as null hypothesis is of no difference between the two sets of coefficients and cannot be 
rejected at the 5% level as per the results shown in the above given table 5.3 and table 5.4. 
Therefore a random effect model is suggested by the test results.  Also, it can be argued that 
there are no unobserved fixed characteristics that do not vary over time and that, if not 
accounted for, would lead to correlation between predictors and errors (a major assumption 
for the unbiasedness of regression estimation).  
 
5.4.2 Testing for Serial Correlation in the Data 
 
According to Baltagi (2001), there is no first order autocorrelation for micro panels; however, 
the Wooldridge test for autocorrelation was conducted using STATA. This test is used for the 
data having random effect panel estimation. It was found that there is no first order 
autocorrelation therefore; the null hypothesis can’t be rejected as shown hereunder.  
 
Wooldridge test for auto correlation in the data 
H0: No first order correlation 
F(1, 200) = 0.214 
Prob>F=0.6603 
 
The above results show that Ho holds and we can’t reject the null hypothesis and hence it can 
be inferred that our data is not plagued by serial correlation.  
 
5.5 Random Effects Regression: Board Structural Characteristics, Boards’ Monitoring 
Role and Firm Performance (Tobin Q)  
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) with Random Effects by using STATA has been used as the 
regression tool in this study. The results obtained from regression analysis by testing the 
relationships between Governance variables, Board Monitoring role and Performance 
measure are presented in Table 5. In Model M0 in Table 5.5, the controlled variables have 
been regressed against the performance measure of Tobin Q. The regression relationship has 
been controlled by Consumer Goods, Chemicals, Industrials, Firm size, Leverage, R&D ratio 
to Sales and Directors’ shareholdings. The figures reveal that there is no significant 
relationship of these variables with Tobin Q except Chemicals sector which is negatively 
significant with β = -.397, p<.1 and fit statistics for M0 are R² = .093, χ² = 106.89 (7df, p< 
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.001) when a restricted model is run by regressing only the controls against Tobin Q. This 
also implies that the model run by only controls does not have significant effect on the model. 
The overall model explains only 9.3% variance.  
In the next step, independent variables have been added to the model with the interaction 
term SECP in the next model, M1. The SECP coefficient represents the overall difference in 
company performance between the pre and post 2002 periods. In M1 this effect is .516 and is 
marginally significant. This means that compared to pre-2002 the post-2002 Tobin’s Q is 
higher for the total sample. The descriptive statistics From Table 5.1 show that Tobin’s Q is 
1.24 and 1.72 in the pre and post-2002 periods respectively. This higher difference of .48 in 
the model is explained by the fact that all the other factors included in the model are 
controlled.  The results in M1 show marginally significant positive relationship for proportion 
of non-executive directors on the board ( β = .68, p<.1) and negative relationship for the dual 
role of CEO/Chairman of the board respectively (β = -.79, p<.1) and independence of audit 
committee (β = 1.34, p<.1). The fit statistics for M1 are R² = .108, χ² = 126.15 (12df, p< 
.001), which are relatively higher than M0. As M1 also reveals that results are either 
insignificant or marginally significant which may mean that pooling together pre-2202 and 
post-2002 data masks important differences across these time periods. This clearly shows that 
when interaction terms are not included or when the moderation effect is not accounted for, 
the coefficients for all the independent variables represent the effects of these variables across 
the full time range from 1999 to 2005, without separating the pre-2002 and post-2002 
periods. Therefore, accounting for moderation effect is important as it teases out the different 
effects between the pre-2202 and post-2002 periods.  
Moderating Effect: 
Moderation occurs when the effect of an independent variable on a dependent variable varies 
according to the level of a third variable, termed a moderator variable, which interacts with 
the independent variable (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Moderation is involved in research on 
individual differences or situational conditions that influence the strength of the relationship 
between a predictor and an outcome. In the next model, M2, the moderating effects of SECP 
on the independent variables have been introduced to judge the effect of moderating variable 
on the governance variables. The moderator SECP is a binary variable which assumes the 
value of “0” for the time period before the implementation of Securities and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) corporate governance code of 2002 and assumes the value 
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of “1” for the period after the implementation of Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP) corporate governance code of 2002. Its moderation effects are formed by 
computing its interaction terms (product) with the independent variables of interest, which 
show their incremental effects after the SECP implementation compared to the period before 
SECP.   The results are then compared to M1 in order to judge the effect of implementation 
of Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) corporate governance code of 
2002.   
The effect of %_NED on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period. The 
coefficient of %_NED_SEC shows the difference between the post-2002 and pre-2002 
effects of %_NED on performance. In this case it is .916 and is significant. This means that 
after 2002 the addition of NEDs has a much higher impact on performance. Looking again at 
Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which increases the 
Tobin’s Q by roughly .17 = (0.19 X .916). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on firm 
performance after 2002 is the sum of the coefficients for %_NED and %_NED_SEC. 
Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is 0.118 and post-2002 effect of 
%_NED on performance is 1.034 which dishes out the difference of 0.916 between these two 
time periods. Therefore, results in M2 reveal that the organizations having higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the boards have performed significantly better after the 
implementation of SECP.  
The effect of CEOdual on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period. The 
coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is -1.00 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the dual 
role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on companies’ performance. The 
descriptive statistics from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to 
.484 which decreases the performance by -.017 = (0.17 X -1.00). Thus the actual effect of 
CEOdual on firm performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.198 and -1.198 respectively. 
Therefore, interaction effect of SECP with the dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is 
negative and significant (β = -.1.00, p<.01) which implies that firms that continue to employ 
dual role of CEO/Chairman after the implementation of SECP have significantly lower 
performance.  
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Table 5.5: Regression Results by using Random Effects with Monitoring Role of the Board and the Performance Measure as Tobin Q 
 
N=200, Control Variables: Consumer Goods, chemicals, Industrials, Firm Size, Leverage, Capex, Directors’ Ownership with textiles taken as base variable.   
Independent Variables (IV):  %age of Non-Executive Directors, Dual Leadership, Audit Committee Meetings, Independence of Audit Committee 
Dependent Variable (DV): Tobin Q;  
Mediating Variable (MV): Frequency of Board Meetings;  
Moderating Variable: SECP;  
†p<.1, *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 
 
 
Variables 
 
 
Tobin Q with FOBM  
M0 
Controls 
 
M1 (XY) 
Cont+IV 
M2(X,XZY) 
Cont+IV+Mod 
M3 (XM) M4 (X,XZM) 
 
M5(X,MY) M6(X,XZ,MY) M7 (MY) 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. So
b
el test 
B S.E. So
b
el test 
B S.E. 
Cons. Goods .094 (.211) .129 (.214) .107 (.213) .057 (.043) .048 (.042) .067 (.208) .065 (.207) .084   (.211)  
Chemicals -.397† (.240) -.199 (.246) -.138 (.246) .062 (.055) .05† (.034) -.254 (.241) -.171 (.240) .397†   (.240) 
Industrials .188 (.258) .352 (.260) .379 (.258) .030* (.016) .030* (.015) .313 (.256) .337 (.255) .179   (.258) 
Firm Size .121 (.081) .193* (.082) .218* (.082) .008† (.005) .006 (.005) .182 (.082) .203* (.081) .138†   (.081) 
Leverage -.024 (.441) .050 (.449) .054 (.449) .013* (.005) .010* (.005) .067 (.449) .063 (.444) -.075 (.445) 
Capex .267            (.519) .168 (.515) .283 (.513) .039 (.031) .043 (.030) .212 (.510) .284 (.508) .266   (.519) 
Dir_ Holdings -.648 (.414) .598 (.505) .956† (.516) -.060* (.030) -.016 (.030) .534 (.505) .939† (.512) -.228   (.472) 
SECP   .516† (.263) .547* (.293) .12*** (.029) .19*** (.038) .665 (.507) .506* (.243)   
%_ NED   .68† (.403) .118 (.469) .248* (.124) .17† (.096) .146 (.511) 0.94 .130 (.511) 1.33   
%_ NED_SEC     .916* (.492)   .28*** (.038)    .197* (.097) 1.96*   
CEOdual   -.79† (.472) -.198 (.234) -.267* (.123) -.170† (.094) -.256 (.168) -1.04 -.140 (.226) -1.28   
CEOdual_SEC     -1.00** (.329)   -.261* (.129)    -.219* (.202) -1.70†   
ACM   .852 (.488) .57 (.366) .118 (.120) .175 (.366) .212† (.147) 0.59 .116 (.121) 0.71   
ACM_SEC     .926* (.355)   .737* (.352)    .248** (.121) 1.65†   
Ind_ AC   1.34† (.836) 0.98 (0.69) .114 (.234) 0.44            (.310) .521 (.354) 0.98 .341 (.243) 1.38   
Ind_ AC_SEC     1.56 *     (0.74)   0.68*          (.286)    .390* (.188) 1.97*   
FOBM           .646 (.526)  1.043* (.513)  .047* (.024) 
R² .093 .108 .121 .306 .348 .112 .128 .101 
χ² 106.89  (7 df,  
p<.001) 
126.15  (12 df,  
p<.001) 
144.19  (16 df,  
p<.001) 
334.83 (12 df,  
p<.001) 
358.43 (16 df,  
p<.001) 
135.83 (13 df,  p<.001) 143.83 (17 df,  p<.001) 117.05  (8 df,  
p<.001) 
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The effect of ACM on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period but the 
coefficient of ACM_SEC is .926 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in 
diligence of ACM has a much higher impact on performance. Looking again at Table 5.1 it 
shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by 
roughly 3.98 = (4.3 X .926). Thus the actual effect of ACM on firm performance for pre- and 
post-2002 time periods is .57 and 1.49 respectively. Therefore, the interaction effect of SECP 
with the diligence of audit committee is positively and significant (β = .926, p<.05) which 
indicates that the effect of the number of audit committee meetings on, the financial 
performance of the firm becomes much stronger after the implementation of the SECP. The 
effect of Ind_AC on performance is significant irrespective of the time periods, however, it 
gets stronger after 2002 . This means that after 2002 the increase in independence of audit 
committee has a much higher impact on performance. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows 
that there is increase of Ind_AC from .011 to .494  which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly 
0.753 = (0.483 X .1.56) after 2002 and 0.13 = (.011X1.34) for the overall time period. Thus 
the actual effect of Ind_AC on firm performance for pre- and post-2002 time periods is .98 
and 2.54 respectively. Therefore, the interaction effect of SECP with the diligence of audit 
committee is positively and significant (β = 1.56, p<.05) which indicates that the effect of the 
independence of audit committee meetings on, the financial performance of the firm becomes 
much stronger after the implementation of the SECP Overall, these results are in line with our 
hypotheses H3c, H4c, H5c, H6a1, H6c which state that after the implementation of SECP 
Code, the governance indicators become significant. The overall model M2 has value of R² = 
.121 which shows that it accounts for 12.1% of variance in the model (χ² = 144.19 (16df, p< 
.001)), slightly higher than the variance explained by M1.    
Mediation Analysis: Governance Indicators, Boards’ Monitoring Role and Tobin Q as 
Firm Performance 
The mediation hypotheses predicted that board roles mediate the relationship between 
Governance indicators and firm performance. Ordinary least square with random effects 
method for regression was used to predict the mediating role of board roles. The models M3 
to M7 in table 5.5 provide the results obtained from regression analysis of Governance 
indicators, Boards’ Monitoring role and firm financial performance. The three steps method 
recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986) was adapted to assess the mediating role of board 
roles. Baron and Kenny (1986) suggested three steps for assessing mediation among 
independent, mediating, and outcome variables. In order to support mediation of variable(s), 
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the following three conditions of mediation presented in figure 6.1 are essential to be met in 
regression analysis. 
 
Figure 5.1 Mediation Process 
 
 
 a b 
 
 
 
c
/
 
 c  
Equation 1: Y = b02 + bX2X + eY2.    (Performance = Constant + coefficients of Governance 
Indicators+ error term) 
Equation 2: M = a03 + ax3X + em3    (Board Role = Constant + coefficients of Governance 
Indicators + error term) 
Equation 3: Y = b04 + bX4X + bm4M + eY4     (Performance = Constant + coefficients of 
Governance Indicators + coefficient of Board Role + error term) 
The results obtained from the regression analysis of mediation process for the relationship 
between Governance Indicators; board roles; and firm financial performance measures using 
Tobin Q and Return on Assets as presented in Table 5.5.  The results are based when the 
mediation is tested separately, typically with the causal steps procedure (Baron and Kenny, 
1986), in which the relationships among X, Y, and the mediator variable M are analysed as 
follows: (a) Y is regressed on X, (b) M is regressed on X, and (c) Y is regressed on both X and 
M. In order to ascertain mediation the essential conditions to be met according to Baron and 
Kenny, (1986) are: (a) X should relate to Y in Equation 1, such that bX2 is significant; (b) X 
should relate to M in the Equation 2, such that aX3 is significant; (c) M should relate to Y in 
Equation 3, such that bM4 is significant; and (d) the relationship between X and Y in Equation 
3 (i.e., bX4) should be non-significant or significantly smaller than the relationship between X 
and Y in Equation 1 (i.e., bX2). Assuming the first three conditions are satisfied, complete 
mediation is inferred if bX4 is not significant, whereas partial mediation is concluded if bX4 
remains significant but is significantly smaller than bX2 ( Edwards and Lambert, 2007). 
M 
Y 
 
X 
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To assess the effect of independent variables on mediating variable as the first condition of 
mediation, Tobin Q as performance measure was regressed on governance indicators. The 
first regression model provides the results of relationship between governance indicators with 
moderating effects and Tobin Q (columns M1 and M2). The results provided by M1 and M2 
as discussed on the previous page provides sufficient evidence for the first condition of 
mediation recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986).  
In M3 and M4, the second condition of mediation is assessed by regressing board monitoring 
role (Frequency of board meetings) on governance indicators. More specifically, in M3 the 
board monitoring role (Frequency of board meetings) is regressed on governance indicators 
without accounting for the moderation effect of the implementation of SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The results show that the moderating variable SECP is significant 
and positive (β = .12, p<.001). The value for the proportion of non-executive directors is also 
positive and significant (β = .248, p<.05) showing that more presence of NEDs on the board 
increases the board meeting frequency causing improved monitoring role of the board. The 
variable dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and significant (β = -.267, 
p<.05) which shows that as the dual role increases the frequency of board meetings decreases. 
The coefficients for frequency and independence of audit committee are not significant which 
shows that inclusive of both the periods, the results are masked and it is needed to be worked 
out separately for the two time periods by using the interaction term. The value of fit statistics 
is R
2
 = .306 and χ² = 334.83 (12df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 30% 
of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables.  
The model M4 explains the board monitoring role (Frequency of board meetings) is regressed 
on governance indicators and their interaction with the introduction of the SECP code. The 
figures reveal that the effect of the moderating variable SECP is larger as compared to the 
previous era before the implementation of the SECP code (β = .19, p<.001). The effect of 
%_NED on board meeting frequency is marginally significant in the pre-2002 time period but 
the coefficient of %_NED_SEC is .28 and is highly significant. This means that after 2002 
the increase in non-executive board members has a much higher impact on board meeting 
frequency. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to 
.53 which increases the frequency of board meetings by roughly .054 = (.19 X .28). Thus the 
actual effect of %_NED on board meeting frequency for pre- and post-2002 time periods is 
.17 and .45 respectively. Its interaction effect with the proportion of non-executive directors 
on the board positive and significant (β = .28, p<.001), suggesting a stronger effect on the 
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frequency of board meetings after the implementation of SECP Corporate governance code of 
2002. Similarly, the effect of  CEOdual on board meeting frequency is negative marginally 
significant in the pre-2002 time period but gets highly significant and negative after 2002. 
The coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is -.261 and is significant. This means that the dual role of 
CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on board meeting frequency. The descriptive 
statistics from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which 
increases the board meeting frequency by 0.044 = (-0.17 X -.261). Thus the actual effect of 
CEOdual on board meeting frequency for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.170 and -.261 
respectively depicting that the interaction effect with the role of CEO/Chairman of the board 
is negative and significant (β = -.261, p<.01). It is also found that the effect of ACM board 
meeting frequency is not significant in the pre-2002 time period but the coefficient of 
ACM_SEC is .737 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in diligence of 
ACM has a much higher impact on board meetings activity. By looking at Table 5.1 it shows 
that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  which increases the frequency of board 
meetings by roughly 3.16 = (4.3 X .248). Thus the actual effect of ACM on frequency of 
board meetings for pre- and post-2002 time periods is .175 and .912 respectively showing 
that  the interaction effect of SECP with the diligence of audit committee is positive and 
significant (β = .737, p<.01) while the relationship of Ind_AC with board meeting frequency 
remains significant irrespective of the time periods, however, when the data is unmasked on 
the basis of time periods, this relationship gets stronger (β = 0.68, p<.01). These results 
clearly favour the hypotheses H3a1, H4a1, H5a1, and H6a1 that governance variables get 
positive and significant after the implementation of SECP Code of 2002. These results of M3 
and M4 provide support that the second condition of mediation is also confirmed. The value 
of fit statistics is R
2
 = .348 and χ² = 358.43 (16df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates 
that almost 36% of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. The value of R
2 
is higher in case of M4 as compared to M3 which is also in line with our hypotheses that 
governance indicators are improved after the implementation of SECP Governance code of 
2002.  
To test for the final condition of mediation both governance indicators and board monitoring 
role were added in the models M5 and M6. More specifically, in M5 the Tobin Q is regressed 
on board monitoring role (Frequency of board meetings) and governance indicators without 
accounting for the moderation effect of the implementation of the SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The results show that the most of the variables are insignificant 
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except for the diligence of audit committee which is marginally significant and positive (β = 
.212, p<.1). The value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .112 and χ² = 135.83 (13df, p<.001) for this 
model which elaborates that almost 11% of the variance in the model is accounted for these 
variables. The value of frequency of board meetings which is a mediating variable is 
insignificant which violates the third and necessary condition for mediation. Thus mediation 
is not explained by the frequency of board meetings without accounting for the moderating 
effect of the implementation of SECP corporate governance code of 2002.  
The model M6 explains the Tobin Q which is regressed on board monitoring role (Frequency 
of board meetings) and governance indicators, while including the moderating effect of the 
implementation of SECP Corporate Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the 
moderating variable SECP is significant after the implementation of the governance code of 
2002 (β = .506, p<.05), same is the case for the non-executive directors on the board where 
the effect of %_NED on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period. The 
coefficient of %_NED_SEC, which shows the difference between the post-2002 and pre-
2002 effects of %_NED on performance is .197 and is significant. This means that after 2002 
the addition of NEDs has a higher impact on performance while controlling for board 
meeting frequency, a mediating variable. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is 
increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly .02 = (0.19 X 
.197). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on firm performance after 2002 is the sum of the 
coefficients for %_NED and %_NED_SEC. Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of %_NED on 
performance is 0.130 and post-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is .327 which dishes 
out the difference of 0.197 between these two time periods. The impact of dual role of 
CEO/Chairman of the board is further negative for this era (β = -.219, p<.01). The effect of 
CEOdual on performance is negative and significant in the pre-2002 time period which 
further gets weaker after 2002. The coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is -.219 and is significant. 
This means that after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on 
companies’ performance while controlling for board meeting fequecy. The descriptive 
statistics from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which 
decreases the performance by -0.03 = (0.17 X -.219). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on 
firm performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.170 and -.219 respectively.  
However, the diligence of audit committee is positive and significant for this era (β = .248, 
p<.05). This means that after 2002 the increase in diligence of ACM has a higher impact on 
performance. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 
114 
 
4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly 1.06 = (4.3 X .248). Thus the actual effect of 
ACM on firm performance for pre- and post-2002 time periods is .116 and .364 respectively.  
The effect of Ind_AC on Tobin Q after controlling for board meeting frequency is stronger  
after SECP code (β = .390, p<.01) which makes the effect on performance as 0.33 = .867 X 
.390. These results partially favour the hypotheses H3b1, H4b1, H5b1, H6b1that governance 
variables get positive and significant after the implementation of SECP Code of 2002. The 
value for the frequency of board meetings which is a mediating variable is significant and 
positive (β = 1.043, p<.05). These results of M6 provide support that board monitoring role 
(frequency of board meetings) partially mediates the relationship between governance 
indicators of proportion of non-executive board members, dual role of CEO/Chairman board 
of directors, diligence of audit committee and Tobin Q as firm performance measure.  
Sobel Test: 
The test was first proposed by Sobel in 1982 to formally test the condition of mediation, 
used.  This test is the most commonly used additional tool to ascertain the mediation 
magnitude. The mechanism to judge the effect Independent Variable exerts an indirect effect 
on the Dependent Variable through the Mediating Variable is actually known through the 
Sobel Test. Therefore, complementing the casual step approach of Baron  and Kenny (1986), 
a Sobel test was conducted in accordance with De Jong and Elfring (2010). Results of the 
Sobel test also revealed that the proportion of non-executive directors (z = 1.96, p<.05), dual 
role of CEO/Chairman board of directors (z = -1.70, p<.1), diligence of audit committee (z = 
1.65, p<.1), and independence of audit committee (z = 1.97, p<.05) as governance indicators 
and Tobin Q as firm financial performance measure are mediated by the board monitoring 
role (frequency of board meetings) as the interaction term is induced in the system. The value 
of the fit statistics is R
2
 = .128 and χ² = 143.83 (17df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates 
that almost 13% of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. The value of 
Sobel test is insignificant but positive for M5 which may be explained that role gets their 
strength after the restructuring of boards as per SECP code.  The value of R
2 
is higher in case 
of M6 as compared to M5 which is also in line with our H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c, H6b1 are 
partially supported while H6a1 and H1a hypotheses are supported that governance indicators 
are improved after the implementation of SECP Governance code of 2002. The value of 
board role is also positive and significant when regressed against Tobin Q (β = .047, p<.05). 
This shows that Tobin Q increases with increase in board activity in its monitoring role which 
is also in line with our hypotheses with value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .101 and χ² = 117.05 
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(8df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 10% of the variance in the model is 
accounted for the variables of this model. The same technique for moderation and mediation 
has been used in discussing other results. 
5.6 Regression Results: Governance Indicators, Boards’ Resource Provision Role and 
Tobin Q as Firm Performance 
The results obtained from regression analysis by testing the relationships between 
Governance variables, Board Resource Provision role and Performance measure of are 
presented in Table 5.6. In the Model M0 in the table 5.6, the controlled variables have been 
regressed against the performance measure of Tobin Q. The regression relationship has been 
controlled by Consumer Goods, Chemicals, Industrials, Firm size, Leverage, RD ratio to 
Sales and Directors’ shareholdings. This is a restricted model by using only control variables 
as predictors and the results reveal that there is no significant association found in this model 
with value of  fit statistics are R
2
 = .093 and χ² = 106.89 (7df, p<.001) for this model which 
elaborates that only almost 9% of the variance in the model is accounted for.  
In the next step, independent variables have been added to the model with the interaction 
term SECP in the model, M1. As mentioned in the last section, the SECP coefficient 
represents the overall difference in company performance between the pre and post 2002 
periods. In M1 this effect is .516 and is marginally significant. This means that compared to 
pre-2002 the post-2002 Tobin’s Q is higher for the total sample. The descriptive statistics 
From Table 5.1 show that Tobin’s Q is 1.24 and 1.72 in the pre and post-2002 periods 
respectively. This higher difference of .48 in the model is explained by the fact that all the 
other factors included in the model are controlled.  The results in M1 show marginally 
significant positive relationship for proportion of non-executive directors on the board ( β = 
.68, p<.1) and marginally significant negative relationship for the dual role of CEO/Chairman 
of the board respectively (β = -.79, p<.1). The independence of audit committee shows 
somewhat significant and positive relationship (β = 1.34, p<.1). The fit statistics for M1 are 
R² = .108, χ² = 126.15 (12df, p< .001), which are relatively higher than M0. As M1 also 
reveals that results are either insignificant or marginally significant which may mean that 
pooling together pre-2202 and post-2002 data disguises important differences across these 
time periods. This clearly shows that when interaction terms are not included or when the 
moderation effect is not accounted for, the coefficients for all the independent variables 
represent the effects of these variables across the full time range from 1999 to 2005, without 
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separating the pre-2002 and post-2002 periods. Therefore, accounting for moderation effect is 
important as it teases out the different effects between the pre-2202 and post-2002 periods. 
Moderating Effect: 
In the next model, M2, the moderating effects of SECP on the independent variables have 
been introduced to judge the effect of moderating variable on the governance variables. The 
results are then compared to M1 in order to judge the effect of implementation of SECP code. 
The effect of %_NED on performance is positive but not significant in the pre-2002 time 
period. The coefficient of %_NED_SEC shows the difference between the post-2002 and pre-
2002 effects of %_NED on performance. In this case it is .916 and is significant. This means 
that after 2002 the addition of NEDs has a much higher impact on performance. Looking 
again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which increases 
the Tobin’s Q by roughly .17 = (0.19 X .916). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on firm 
performance after 2002 is the sum of the coefficients for %_NED and %_NED_SEC. 
Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is 0.118 and post-2002 effect of 
%_NED on performance is 1.034 which dishes out the difference of 0.916 between these two 
time periods. Therefore, results in M2 reveal that the organizations having higher proportion 
of non-executive directors on the boards have performed significantly better after the 
implementation of SECP.  
The effect of CEOdual on performance is not significant but still negative in the pre-2002 
time period. The coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is -1.00 and is significant. This means that 
after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on companies’ 
performance. The descriptive statistics from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in 
CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases the performance by -.017 = (0.17 X -1.00). Thus 
the actual effect of CEOdual on firm performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.198 and -
1.198 respectively. Therefore, interaction effect of SECP with the dual role of 
CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and significant (β = -.1.00, p<.01) which implies that 
firms that continue to employ dual role of CEO/Chairman after the implementation of SECP 
have significantly lower performance.  
The effect of ACM on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period but the 
coefficient of ACM_SEC is .926 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in 
diligence of ACM has a much higher impact on performance. Looking again at Table 5.1 it 
shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by 
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roughly 3.98 = (4.3 X .926). Thus the actual effect of ACM on firm performance for pre- and 
post-2002 time periods is .57 and 1.49 respectively. Therefore, the interaction effect of SECP 
with the diligence of audit committee is positively and significant (β = .926, p<.05) which 
indicates that the effect of the number of audit committee meetings on, the financial 
performance of the firm becomes much stronger after the implementation of the SECP.  
The effect of Ind_AC on performance is not only significant in the pre-2002 time period but 
also significant in the post 2002 data. The beta value for Ind_AC is 1.34 with p<.1 which 
shows that the value is somewhat significant. However, the coefficient of Ind_AC_SEC 
increases in magnitude and is more significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in 
independence of audit committee has a much higher impact on performance. Looking again 
at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of Ind_AC from .011 to .878  which increases the 
Tobin’s Q by roughly 1.32 = (0.867 X 1.56). Thus the actual effect of Ind_AC on firm 
performance for pre- and post-2002 time periods is 1.41 and 2.94 respectively. Therefore, the 
interaction effect of SECP with the diligence of audit committee is positively and significant 
(β = 1.56, p<.05) which indicates that the effect of the independence of audit committee 
meetings on, the financial performance of the firm becomes much stronger after the 
implementation of the SECP.  
Overall, these results are in line with our hypotheses H3c, H4c, H5c, H6c which denote that 
after the implementation of SECP Code, the governance indicators become significant. The 
overall model M2 has value of R² = .121 which shows that it accounts for 12.1% of variance 
in the model (χ² = 144.19 (16df, p< .001)), slightly higher than the variance explained by M1, 
on the other side the value for the fit statistics of M0 are R
2
 = .108 and χ² = 126.15 (12df, 
p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 11% of the variance in the model is 
accounted for these variables.  
Mediating effect: 
In M3 and M4 of table 5.6, the second condition of mediation is assessed by regressing board 
resource dependence role (Board Size) on governance indicators. More specifically, in M3 
the board resource provision role (Board Size) is regressed on governance indicators without 
accounting for the moderation effect of the implementation of SECP Corporate Governance 
code of 2002. The results show that the moderating variable SECP is somewhat significant 
and positive (β = .368, p<.1). The presence of non-executive directors is not found significant 
in this relationship. However, the variable dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is 
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negative and significant (β = -.226, p<.05) which shows that as the dual role increases the 
frequency of board meetings decreases. The study finds that the effect of ACM on board size 
is not significant. However, the relationship between Ind_AC and board size is found 
somewhat significant (β = 1.24, p<.1) even without accounting for the interaction effect and it 
strengthens in magnitude and gets more significant by introducing the interaction effect in the 
model. By looking at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .011 to .878  
which increases the board size by roughly 1.32 = (.867 X 1.53). Thus the actual effect of 
Ind_AC on board size for pre- and post-2002 time periods is 1.41 and 2.94 respectively 
showing that    the interaction effect of SECP with the independence of audit committee is 
positive and significant (β = 1.532, p<.01). These results clearly favour the hypotheses H3a1, 
H4a1, H6a1 that governance variables get positive and significant after the implementation of 
SECP Code. These results of M3 and M4 provide support that the second condition of 
mediation is also confirmed. The value of R
2 
is higher in case of M4 as compared to M3 
which is also in line with our hypotheses that governance indicators are improved after the 
implementation of SECP code. The value of fit statistics are R
2
 = .126 and χ² = 72.64 (12df, 
p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 13% of the variance in the model is 
accounted for these variables.  
The model M4 explains the board resource dependence role (Board Size) is regressed on 
governance indicators and their interaction with the introduction of the SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the effect of the moderating variable SECP 
is larger as compared to the previous era before the implementation of the governance code 
of 2002 (β = .404, p<.1). The effect of %_NED on board meeting frequency is insignificant 
in the pre-2002 time period but the coefficient of %_NED_SEC is .809 and is highly 
significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in non-executive board members has a 
much higher impact on board size (Board Resource Dependence Role). Looking at Table 5.1 
it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53which increases the board size by 
roughly .16 = (.19 X .809). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on board size for pre- and post-
2002 time periods is .261 and 1.069 respectively. Its interaction effect with the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board positive and significant (β = .809, p<.01), suggesting a 
stronger effect on the board size after the implementation of SECP Corporate governance 
code of 2002. Similarly, the effect of CEOdual on board size is negative and insignificant in 
the pre-2002 time period but gets highly significant and negative after 2002. The coefficient 
of CEOdual_SEC is -0.328 at p<.001. This means that the dual role of CEO as chairperson 
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board has negative impact on board size. The descriptive statistics from table 5.1 shows that 
there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which increases the board size by 0.205 = (-
0.17 X -.328).  
This shows that as the dual role decreases the board size improves. Thus duality tends to have 
smaller boards. It is also found that diligence of audit committee is insignificant for this era. 
The independence of audit committee with board size has positive and significant relationship 
for an overall time period from 1999-2005. But the relationship gets stronger as the 
interaction effect is introduced in the model as the total effect is 1.552 as compared to 
unaccounted effect of 0.867 .These results clearly favour the hypotheses H2a, H3a2, H4a2, 
H6a2 that governance variables get stronger after the implementation of SECP Code. These 
results of M3 and M4 provide support that the second condition of mediation is also 
confirmed. The value of fit statistics are R
2
 = .141 and χ² = 103.79 (16df, p<.001) for this 
model which elaborates that almost 14% of the variance in the model is accounted for these 
variables. The value of R
2 
is higher in case of M4 as compared to M3 which is also in line 
with our hypotheses that governance indicators are improved after the implementation of 
SECP Governance code of 2002.  
To test for the final condition of mediation both governance indicators and board resource 
provision role were added in the models M5 and M6. More specifically in M5 the Tobin Q is 
regressed on board resource provision role (board size) and governance indicators before the 
implementation of SECP Corporate Governance code of 2002. The results show that the 
proportion of non-executive directors and independence of audit committee are somewhat 
significant and positive (β = .183, p<.1) and (β = .42, p<.1) respectively as well as the value 
of mediating variable board size is also positive and significant (β = .16, p<.01). 
There is partial mediation existing by board size for the proportion of non-executive directors 
and independence of audit committee even without accounting for the mediation effect of the 
implementation of SECP code of 2002. This implies that board size has been mediating the 
relationship between proportion of non-executive directors and Tobin Q which shows that if 
the proportions of NEDs have been higher, the larger will be board size or improved board 
resource dependence role eventually leading towards better performance (Tobin Q) as well as 
the independence of audit committee will also lead to same results for the board size. The 
value for the Sobel test ( z = 1.59, p<.1) and ( z = 1.52, p<.1) respectively for proportion of 
NEDs and independence of audit committee also support this result for mediation. The value 
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of fit statistics is R
2
 = .119 and χ² = 127.64 (13df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates 
that almost 12% of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. This also 
supports the hypotheses H3b1, H6b1, H3c and H6c. 
The model M6 explains that the Tobin Q is regressed on board resource provision role (board 
size) and governance indicators for the era after the implementation of SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the moderating variable SECP is significant 
after the implementation of the governance code of 2002 (β = .470, p<.05), same is the case 
for the non-executive directors on the board where the effect of %_NED on performance is 
not significant in the pre-2002 time period. The coefficient of %_NED_SEC, which shows 
the difference between the post-2002 and pre-2002 effects of %_NED on performance is .792 
and is significant. This means that after 2002 the addition of NEDs has a higher impact on 
performance while controlling for board size, a mediating variable. 
Looking back at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which 
increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly 0.15 = (0.19 X .792). Thus the actual effect of %_NED 
on firm performance after 2002 is the sum of the coefficients for %_NED and %_NED_SEC. 
Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is 0.029 and post-2002 effect of 
%_NED on performance is .827 which dishes out the difference of .792 between these two 
time periods. While, the impact of dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is insignificant 
for the pre-2002 era while it gets further negative for post-2002 era (β = -.313, p<.01). This 
means that after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on 
companies’ performance while controlling for board size. The descriptive statistics from table 
5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases the 
performance by -0.05 = (0.17 X -.313). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on firm 
performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.179 and -0.492 respectively. 
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Table 5.6:  Regression Results with Random Effects with Resource Dependence Role of the Board and the Performance Measure as Tobin Q 
 
N=200, Control Variables: Consumer Goods, chemicals, Industrials, Firm Size, Leverage, Capex, Directors’ Ownership with textiles taken as base variable.   
Independent Variables (IV):  %age of Non Executive Directors, Dual Leadership, Audit Committee Meetings, Independence of Audit Committee 
Dependent Variables (DV): Tobin Q;  
Mediating Variable (MV): Board Size;  
Moderating Variable: SECP;  
†p<.1,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001
Variables 
 
 
Tobin Q with Board Size  
M0 
Controls 
 
M1 (XY) 
Cont+IV 
M2(X,XZY) 
Cont+IV+Mod 
M3(XM) M4 (X,XZM) 
 
M5(X,MY) M6(X,XZ,MY) M7 (MY) 
B S.E. B S.E
. 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. 
Cons. Goods .094 (.211) .129 (.214) .107 (.213) .315 (.290) .382 (.220) .105 (.209) .099 (.221) .182 (.211) 
Chemicals -.397† (.240) -.199 (.246) -.138 (.246) .174 (.204) .249* (.284) -.191 (.240) -.111 (.234) -.345 (.240) 
Industrials .188 (.258) .352 (.260) .379 (.258) .381 (.211) .460* (.220) .469† (.259) .300 (.258) .348 (.261) 
Firm Size .121 (.081) .193* (.082) .218* (.082) .242† (.135) .321* (.145) .158* (.082) .191* (.078) .176* (.082 
Leverage -.024 (.441) .050 (.449) .054 (.449) .212* (.111) .34* (.136) .29** (.084) .32** (.092) .37*** (.094) 
Capex .267            (.519) .168 (.515) .283 (.513) -.314 (.242) -.613* (.220) .075 (.511) .137 (.507) .108 (.519) 
Dir_ Holdings -.648 (.414) .598 (.505) .956† (.516) -.001 (.217) .150 (.222) .534 (.499) .875† (.449) -.690† (.412) 
SECP   .516† (.263) .547* (.293) .368† (.214) .404† (.234) .410 (.265) .470† (.251)   
%_ NED   .683† (.403) .118 (.464) .204 (.171) .261 (.242) .183† (.122) 1.59† .029 (.536) 1.04   
%_ NED_SEC     .916* (.492)   .809** (.277)    .792* (.401) 2.34*   
CEOdual   -.79† (.472) -.198 (.234) -.226* (.115) -.224 (.160) -.194 (.169) -1.75† -.179 (.226) -0.86   
CEOdual_SEC     -1.00** (.329)   -.328*** (.098)    -.313** (.120) -2.54*   
ACM   .852 (.488) .570 (.366) .228 (.140) .267 (.153) .11 (.157) 1.24 .178 (.272) 1.11   
ACM_SEC     .926* (.355)   .271 (.155)    .286 (.245) 1.21   
Ind_ AC   1.34† (.836) 0.98 (0.69) 1.24† (.710) .976 (.752) .42† (.255) 1.52† 1.415* (0.73) 2.23*   
Ind_ AC_SEC     1.56*      (0.74)   1.552* (.758)    1.532* (0.74) 2.72*   
Board Size           .16** (.052)  .27*** (.069)  .238** (.080) 
R² .093 .108 .121 .126 .141 .119  .124  .097 
χ² 106.89  (7 df,  
p<.001) 
126.15  (12 df,  
p<.001) 
144.19  (16 df,  
p<.001) 
72.64 (12 df,  
p<.001) 
103.79 (16 df,  
p<.001) 
127.64 (13 df,  p<.001) 142.64 (17 df,  p<.001) 109.64 (9 df,  
p<.001) 
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However, the diligence of audit committee has no significant relationship when controlling 
for board size but independence of audit committee is positive and significant (β = 1.415, 
p<.05) and (β = 1.532, p<.05) for both the eras respectively which gives the effect when we 
look back at the descriptive from table 5.1 as 1.22 = 0.867 X 1.415 and 2.54 respectively 
which posts a stronger increase in strength. These results partially favour the hypotheses 
H3b1, H4b1, H6b1, H6b1that governance variables get positive and significant after the 
implementation of SECP Code of 2002. The value for the board size which is a mediating 
variable is highly significant and positive (β = .27, p<.001). These results of M6 provide 
support that board resource dependence  role (Board Size) partially mediates the relationship 
between governance indicators of proportion of non-executive board members, dual role of 
CEO/Chairman board of directors, diligence of audit committee and Tobin Q as firm 
performance measure.  
Sobel Test: 
To further test the condition of mediation, additional tool of Sobel test was used. Results of 
the Sobel test also revealed that the proportion of non-executive directors (z = 2.34, p<.05), 
dual role of CEO/Chairman board of directors (z = -2.54.70, p<.05), independence of audit 
committee (z = 2.72, p<.05) and Tobin Q as firm financial performance measure are mediated 
by the board resource provision role (board size) after the implementation of SECP Corporate 
Governance Code of 2002. The value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .124 and χ² = 142.64 (17df, 
p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 18% of the variance in the model is 
accounted for these variables.  The value of R
2 
is higher in case of M6 as compared to M5 
which is also in line with our hypotheses H2a, H3c, H4c, and H5c, H6c that governance 
indicators are improved after the implementation of SECP Governance code of 2002. The 
value of board role is also positive and significant when regressed against Tobin Q (β = .238, 
p<.01). This shows that Tobin Q increases with increase in board size in its resource 
provision role and the value fit statistics is R
2
 = .097 and χ² = 109.64 (8df, p<.001) for this 
model which elaborates that almost 10% of the variance in the model is accounted for the 
variables of this model. 
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5.7 Regression Results: Governance Indicators, Boards’ Monitoring Role and Return 
on Assets as Firm Performance 
The results obtained from regression analysis by testing the relationships between 
Governance variables, Board monitoring role and performance measure of return on assets 
(ROA) are presented in Table 5.7. In the Model M0 in the Table 5.7, the controlled variables 
have been regressed against the performance measure of ROA. The regression relationship 
has been controlled by Consumer Goods, Chemicals, Industrials, Firm size, Leverage, RandD 
ratio to Sales and Directors’ shareholdings. This is a restricted model by using only control 
variables as predictors and the results reveal that there is no significant association found in 
this model with value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .185 and χ² = 115.11 (7df, p<.001) for this model 
which elaborates that only almost 18% of the variance in the model is accounted for.  
In the next step, independent variables have been added to the model with the interaction 
term SECP in the model, M1. The SECP coefficient is insignificant here with other variables 
like proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee diligence and independence 
however, the results reveal that there is a negative and significant relationship between dual 
role of CEO/Chairman board of directors and ROA (β = -.088, p<.01) represents the overall 
value for company performance for both the periods. In M1 this effect is -.088 and is 
significant. This means that compared to pre-2002 the post-2002 ROA is higher for the total 
sample. The descriptive statistics From Table 5.1 show that ROA is 6.36 and 6.68 in the pre 
and post-2002 periods respectively which shows no substantial change. The results in M1 
show negative and significant relationship for the dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board 
respectively (β = -.088, p<.1). This implies that it is needed to distil the data on the basis of 
time periods by using the interaction term with the governance indicators to get insight about 
the exact relationship. As well as M1 also reveals that results are either insignificant or 
marginally significant which may mean that pooling together pre-2002 and post-2002 data 
masks important differences across these time periods. This clearly shows that when 
interaction terms are not included or when the moderation effect is not accounted for, the 
coefficients for all the independent variables represent the effects of these variables across the 
full time range from 1999 to 2005, without separating the pre-2002 and post-2002 periods. 
Therefore, accounting for moderation effect is important as it teases out the different effects 
between the pre-2202 and post-2002 periods. 
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Moderating effect: 
In the model M2 in table 5.7, the moderated independent variables have also been added to 
judge the effect of implementation of SECP code as well as to judge the first condition of 
mediation. The results of M2 reveal that proportion of non-executive directors on the board is 
somewhat significant (β = .209, p<.1). The effect of %_NED on performance is not 
significant in the pre-2002 time period. The coefficient of %_NED_SEC shows the difference 
between the post-2002 and pre-2002 effects of %_NED on performance is .209 and is 
marginally significant. This means that after 2002 the addition of NEDs has a slightly more 
impact on performance. Looking back at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED 
from .34 to .44 which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly .02 = (0.10 X .209). Thus the actual 
effect of %_NED on firm performance (ROA) after 2002 is the sum of the coefficients for 
%_NED and %_NED_SEC. Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is 
0.153 and post-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is .362 which dishes out the 
difference of 0.209 between these two time periods. Therefore, results in M2 reveal that the 
organizations having higher proportion of non-executive directors on the boards have 
performed significantly better after the implementation of SECP.  
The effect of CEOdual on performance is negative and significant in the pre-2002 time period 
as well as for the time period post-2002. The coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is further weaker 
in the post-2002 is -.185. This means that after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson 
board has more negative impact on companies’ performance. The descriptive statistics from 
table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases the 
performance by .03 = (-0.17 X -.185). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on firm 
performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.118 and -.303 respectively. Therefore, 
interaction effect of SECP with the dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and 
significant which implies that firms that continue to employ dual role of CEO/Chairman after 
the implementation of SECP have significantly lower firm performance (ROA). 
The effect of ACM on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period but the 
coefficient of ACM_SEC is .26 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in 
diligence of ACM has a much higher impact on performance (ROA). Looking back at Table 
5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by 
roughly 1.118 = (4.3 X .26). Thus the actual effect of ACM on firm performance for pre- and 
post-2002 time periods is .112 and .37 respectively. Therefore, the interaction effect of SECP 
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with the diligence of audit committee is positively and significant (β = .26, p<.01) which 
indicates that the effect of the number of audit committee meetings on, the financial 
performance (ROA) of the firm becomes much stronger after the implementation of the 
SECP. The interaction effect of SECP with the independence of the audit committee is not 
significant, suggesting no change in the effect of the independent of the audit committee after 
the implementation of the SECP. Overall, these results are in line with our hypotheses H3a2, 
H4a2, H5a2. This also confirms the first condition of mediation. The value of fit statistics is 
R
2
 = .217 and χ² = 119.69 (12df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 12% of 
the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. 
Mediating Effect: 
In M3 and M4 of table 7, the second condition of mediation is assessed by regressing the 
mediating variable which is board monitoring role (frequency of board meetings) on 
governance indicators. More specifically, in M3 the board monitoring role (Frequency of 
board meetings) is regressed on governance indicators without accounting for the moderation 
effect of the implementation of SECP Corporate Governance code of 2002. The results show 
that the moderating variable SECP is highly significant and positive (β = .12, p<.001). The 
value for the proportion of non-executive directors is also positive and significant (β = .248, 
p<.05) showing that more presence of NEDs on the board increases the board meeting 
frequency causing improved monitoring role of the board. The variable dual role of 
CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and significant (β = -.267, p<.05) which shows that 
as the dual role increases the frequency of board meetings decreases. The coefficients for 
ACM and Ind_AC are not significant which shows that inclusive of both the periods, the 
results may be masked therefore it is needed to be worked out separately for the two time 
periods by using the interaction term. The value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .306 and χ² = 334.83 
(12df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 30% of the variance in the model 
is accounted for these variables. 
The model M4 explains the board monitoring role (Frequency of board meetings) is regressed 
on governance indicators and their interaction with the introduction of the SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the effect of the moderating variable SECP 
is larger as compared to the previous era before the implementation of the governance code 
of 2002 (β = .19, p<.001). The effect of %_NED on board meeting frequency is marginally 
significant in the pre-2002 time period and the coefficient of %_NED_SEC is .28 and is 
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highly significant for the post-2002 period. This means that after 2002 the increase in non-
executive board members has a much higher impact on board meeting frequency. Looking 
again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .44 which increases 
the Tobin’s Q by roughly .028 = (.10 X .28). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on board 
meeting frequency for pre- and post-2002 time periods is .17 and .45 respectively. Its 
interaction effect with the proportion of non-executive directors on the board positive and 
significant (β = .28, p<.001), suggesting a stronger effect on the frequency of board meetings 
after the implementation of SECP Corporate governance code of 2002. Similarly, the effect 
of  CEOdual on board meeting frequency is negative and just marginally significant in the 
pre-2002 time period but gets highly significant and negative after 2002. The coefficient of 
CEOdual_SEC is -.261 and is significant. This means that the dual role of CEO as 
chairperson board has negative impact on board meeting frequency. The descriptive statistics 
from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases 
the performance by -0.044 = (0.17 X -.261). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on board 
meeting frequency for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.170 and -.43 respectively depicting that 
the interaction effect with the role of CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and significant 
(β = -.43, p<.01). 
It is also found that the effect of ACM board meeting frequency is not significant in the pre-
2002 time period but the coefficient of ACM_SEC is .737 and is significant. This means that 
after 2002 the increase in diligence of ACM has a much higher impact on frequency of board 
meetings. By looking at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  
which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly 3.1 = (4.3 X .737). Thus the actual effect of ACM 
on frequency of board meetings for pre- and post-2002 time periods is .175 and .912 
respectively showing that    the interaction effect of SECP with the diligence of audit 
committee is positive and significant (β = .737, p<.01) while the relationship of Ind_AC with 
board meeting frequency remains insignificant  for the pre 2002 time period but gets 
significant after the interaction effect (β = .68, p<.05) and therefore its effect can be 
quantified as 0.59 and 1.11 for the pre and post SECP code periods. 
These results clearly favour the hypotheses H3a1, H4a1, H5a1 that governance variables get 
positive and significant after the implementation of SECP Code of 2002. These results of M3 
and M4 provide support that the second condition of mediation is also confirmed. The value 
of fit statistics is R
2
 = .348 and χ² = 358.43 (16df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates 
that almost 36% of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. The value of R
2 
127 
 
is higher in case of M4 as compared to M3 which is also in line with our hypotheses that 
governance indicators are improved after the implementation of SECP code. 
To test for the final condition of mediation both governance indicators and board monitoring 
role were added in the models M5 and M6. More specifically in M5 the Tobin Q is regressed 
on board monitoring role (frequency of board meetings) and governance indicators before the 
implementation of SECP Corporate Governance code of 2002. The results show that the most 
of the variables are insignificant except dual role of CEO/chairman of the board which is 
somewhat slightly negative and significant (β = -.085, p<.1), the value of fit statistics is R2 = 
.218 and χ² = 126.17 (13df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 21% of the 
variance in the model is accounted for these variables and the value of mediating variable is 
insignificant which violates the condition of mediation. Thus no mediation is found in case of 
M5. 
The model M6 explains the ROA is regressed on board monitoring role (frequency of board 
meetings) and governance indicators after the implementation of SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the moderating variable SECP is 
marginally significant after the implementation of the governance code of 2002 (β = .113, 
p<.1). The impact of dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is further negative and 
significant. The effect of CEOdual on performance is negative and significant in the pre-2002 
time period (β = -.110, p<.05) which further gets weaker after 2002 (β = -.165, p<.01). This 
means that after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on 
companies’ performance (ROA) while controlling for board meeting frequency. The 
descriptive statistics from table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to 
.484 which decreases the performance by -0.02 = (0.17 X -.165). Thus the actual effect of 
CEOdual on firm performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.110 and -.275 respectively. 
However, the diligence of audit committee is positive and significant for both periods. The 
effect of ACM is marginally significant in pre-2002 time period (β = .116, p<.1) while the 
effect of ACM on performance post-2002 time period (ACM_SEC) is .139 and is significant. 
This means that after 2002 the increase in diligence of ACM has a higher impact on 
performance. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 
4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly .71 = (4.3 X .165). 
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Table 5.7: Regression Results with Random Effects with Monitoring Role of the Board and the Performance Measure as ROA 
 
N=200, Control Variables: Consumer Goods, chemicals, Industrials, Firm Size, Leverage, Capex, Directors’ Ownership with textiles taken as base variable.   
Independent Variables (IV):  %age of Non-Executive Directors, Dual Leadership, Audit Committee Meetings, Independence of Audit Committee 
Dependent Variables (DV): Tobin Q;  
Mediating Variable (MV): Board Size;  
Moderating Variable: SECP;  
†p<.1,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001 
Variables 
 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) with FOBM  
M0 
Controls 
 
M1 (XY) 
Cont+IV 
M2(X,XZY) 
Cont+IV+Mod 
M3(XM) M4 (X,XZM) 
 
M5(X,MY) M6(X,XZ,MY) M7 (MY) 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. 
Cons. Goods .061 .042 .061 (.042) .063 (.041) .057 (.043) .048 (.042) .064 (.043) .061 (.043) .062 (.043) 
Chemicals -.081† (.048) .069 (.049) -.034 (.048) .062 (.055) .05† (.034) -.066 (.056) -.036 (.049) -.080† (.049) 
Industrials -.025 (.051) -.023 (.052) -.032 (.051) .030* (.016) .030* (.015) -.018 (.052) -.022 (.052) -.022 (.052) 
Firm Size -1.03 (.425) -.019 (.430) -.056 (.432) .008† (.005) .006 (.005) -.064 (.435) -.094 (.437) -.125 (.43) 
Leverage -.024 (.441) .067 (.444) .073 (.444) .013* (.005) .010* (.005) .052 (.449) .050 (.449) -.075 (.445) 
Capex .012 (.103) .021 (.103) .043 (.102) .039 (.031) .043 (.030) .018 (.104) .043 (.102) .009 (.104) 
Dir_ Holdings -.060 (.082) -.064 (.101) -.039 (.102) -.060* (.030) -.016 (.030) -.059 (.102) -.038 (.103) -.074 (.086) 
SECP   .013 (.100) .019 (.131) .12*** (.029) .19*** (.038) .086 (.102) .113† (.062)   
%_ NED   .065 (.080) .153 (.118) .248* (.124) .17† (.096) .062 (.081) 0.72 .160 (.116) 0.028   
%_ NED_SEC     .209† (.136)   .28*** (.038)    .221 (.162) 0.029   
CEOdual   -.088** (.034) -.118** (.045) -.267* (.123) -.170† (.094) -.085* (.035) -0.77 -.110* (.047) -0.028   
CEOdual_SEC     -.185** (.064)   -.261* (.129)    -.165** (.055) -0.027   
ACM   .009 (.010) .112 (.080) .118 (.120) .175 (.366) .012 (.010) 0.75 .116† (.071) 0.028   
ACM_SEC     .26** (.092)   .737* (.352)    .139* (.072) 0.029   
Ind_ AC   .028 (.047) .140 (.346) .114 (.234) 0.44            (.310) .026 (.048) 0.73 .129 (.348) 0.025   
Ind_ AC_SEC     .43 (.349)   0.68*          (.286)    .168 (.351) 0.027   
FOBM           .085 (.103)  .003 (.105)  .064 (.090) 
R² .185 .217 .295 .306 .348 .218  .248  .186 
χ² 115.11 ( 7 df,  
p<.001) 
119.69 ( 12 df,  
p<.001) 
129.16 ( 16 df,  
p<.001) 
334.83 (12 df,  
p<.001) 
358.43 (16 df,  
p<.001) 
126.17 ( 13 df,  p<.001) 135.27 ( 17 df,  p<.001) 117.58 (8 df,  
p<.001) 
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Thus the actual effect of ACM on firm performance for pre- and post-2002 time periods is 
.116 and .255 respectively However, the value for the frequency of board meetings which is a 
mediating variable is insignificant here which shows that there is no mediation in M6 as the 
third condition of mediation is grossly violated.  
Sobel Test: 
The results are not different when the mediation is checked through Sobel test and figures are 
insignificant. The value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .248 and χ² = 135.27 (17df, p<.001) for this 
model which elaborates that almost 25% of the variance in the model is accounted for these 
variables. The value of board resource dependence role is insignificant when regressed 
against ROA, which is a violation of the necessary condition for mediation by using Sobel 
Test. 
 
5.8 Regression Results: Governance Indicators, Boards’ Resource Provision Role and 
ROA as Firm Performance 
The results obtained from regression analysis by testing the relationships between 
Governance variables, Board Resource Provision role and Performance measure of are 
presented in Table 5.8. In the Model M0 in Table 5.8, the controlled variables have been 
regressed against the performance measure of ROA. The regression relationship has been 
controlled by Consumer Goods, Chemicals, Industrials, Firm size, Leverage, R&D ratio to 
Sales and Directors’ shareholdings. This is a restricted model by using only control variables 
as predictors and the results reveal that there is no significant association found in this model 
with value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .185 and χ² = 115.11 (7df, p<.001) for this model which 
elaborates that only almost 18% of the variance in the model is accounted for. 
In the next step, independent variables have been added to the model with the interaction 
term SECP in the model, M1. The SECP coefficient is insignificant here with other variables 
like proportion of non-executive directors, audit committee diligence and independence 
however, the results reveal that there is a negative and significant relationship between dual 
role of CEO/Chairman board of directors and ROA (β = -.088, p<.01) represents the overall 
value for company performance for both the periods. In M1 this effect is -.088 and is 
significant and the behaviour has been explained in depth in section 5.7.  
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Moderating Effect: 
In the model M2 in table 5.7, the moderated independent variables have also been added to 
judge the effect of implementation of SECP corporate governance code of 2002 as well as to 
judge the first condition of mediation. The results of M2 reveal that proportion of non-
executive directors on the board is marginally significant (β = .209, p<.1). The effect of 
%_NED on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period. The coefficient of 
%_NED_SEC shows the difference between the post-2002 and pre-2002 effects of %_NED 
on performance is .209 and is marginally significant. This means that after 2002 the addition 
of NEDs has a slightly more impact on performance. Looking back at Table 5.1 it shows that 
there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly .04 = 
(0.19 X .209). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on firm performance (ROA) after 2002 is the 
sum of the coefficients for %_NED and %_NED_SEC. Precisely saying, pre-2002 effect of 
%_NED on performance is 0.153 and post-2002 effect of %_NED on performance is .362 
which dishes out the difference of 0.209 between these two time periods. Therefore, results in 
M2 reveal that the organizations having higher proportion of non-executive directors on the 
boards have performed significantly better after the implementation of SECP.  
The effect of CEOdual on performance is negative and significant in the pre-2002 time period 
as well as for the time period post-2002. The coefficient of CEOdual_SEC is further weaker 
in the post-2002 is -.185. This means that after 2002 the dual role of CEO as chairperson 
board has more negative impact on companies’ performance. The descriptive statistics from 
table 5.1 shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases the 
performance by -.03 = (0.17 X -.185). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on firm 
performance for pre-2002 and post-2002 is -0.118 and -.303 respectively. Therefore, 
interaction effect of SECP with the dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is negative and 
significant which implies that firms that continue to employ dual role of CEO/Chairman after 
the implementation of SECP have significantly lower performance (ROA). 
The effect of ACM on performance is not significant in the pre-2002 time period but the 
coefficient of ACM_SEC is .26 and is significant. This means that after 2002 the increase in 
diligence of ACM has a much higher impact on performance (ROA). Looking back at Table 
5.1 it shows that there is increase of ACM from .036 to 4.7  which increases the Tobin’s Q by 
roughly 1.118 = (4.3 X .26). Thus the actual effect of ACM on firm performance for pre- and 
post-2002 time periods is .112 and .37 respectively. Therefore, the interaction effect of SECP 
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with the diligence of audit committee is positively and significant (β = .26, p<.01) which 
indicates that the effect of the number of audit committee meetings on, the financial 
performance (ROA) of the firm becomes much stronger after the implementation of the 
SECP. The interaction effect of SECP with the independence of the audit committee is not 
significant, suggesting no change in the effect of the independent of the audit committee after 
the implementation of the SECP. Overall, these results are in line with our hypotheses H1b. 
H2b, H3a2 and which state that after the implementation of SECP Code, the governance 
indicators become significant. This also confirms the first condition of mediation. The value 
of fit statistics is for M2 is R
2
 = .295 and χ² = 129.16 (16df, p<.001) for this model which 
elaborates that almost 13% of the variance in the model is accounted for by this model. 
Mediation effect: 
In M3 and M4 of table 5.8, the second condition of mediation is assessed by regressing the 
mediating variable which is board resource dependence role (Board Size) on governance 
indicators. More specifically, in M3 the board resource dependence role (Board Size) is 
regressed on governance indicators without accounting for the moderation effect of the 
implementation of SECP code. The results show that the moderating variable SECP is 
marginally significant and positive (β = .368, p<.1). The value for the proportion of non-
executive directors is insignificant. The variable dual role of CEO/Chairman of the board is 
negative and significant (β = -.226, p<.05) which shows that as the dual role increases the 
board size decreases. The coefficients for ACM and Ind_AC are not significant which shows 
that inclusive of both the periods, the results are masked and it is needed to be worked out 
separately for the two time periods by using the interaction term. The value of fit statistics is 
R
2
 = .126 and χ² = 72.64 (12df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 12% of 
the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. 
The model M4 explains the board resource dependence role (Board size) is regressed on 
governance indicators and their interaction with the introduction of the SECP Corporate 
Governance code of 2002. The figures reveal that the effect of the moderating variable SECP 
has the same significance level but slightly larger in magnitude as compared to the previous 
era before the implementation of the SECP code (β = .404, p<.1). The effect of %_NED on 
board size is insignificant in the pre-2002 time period but highly significant for the post-2002 
period (β = .809, p<.001). This means that after 2002 the increase in non-executive board 
members has a much higher impact on board size. Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that 
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there is increase of %_NED from .34 to .53 which increases the Tobin’s Q by roughly .15 = 
(.19 X .809). Thus the actual effect of %_NED on board size for pre- and post-2002 time 
periods is .261 and 1.07 respectively. Its interaction effect with the proportion of non-
executive directors on the board positive and significant (β = .809, p<.001), suggesting a 
stronger effect on the board size after the implementation of SECP Corporate governance 
code of 2002. Similarly, the effect of CEOdual on board size is insignificant in the pre-2002 
time period but gets highly significant and negative after 2002 (β = -.328, p<.001). This 
means that the dual role of CEO as chairperson board has negative impact on board size and 
CEOs with dual roles have tendency to deal with smaller boards, which may be only 
consisting of close members of the family or cronies. The descriptive statistics from table 5.1 
shows that there is a decrease in CEOdual from .654 to .484 which decreases the board size 
by -0.055 = (0.17 X -.328). Thus the actual effect of CEOdual on board size for pre-2002 and 
post-2002 is -0.124 and -.452 respectively. This shows that as the dual role decreases the 
resource provision role of the board improves. However, ACM is found insignificant but the 
independence of audit committee Ind_AC is slightly significant and positive with board size 
for an overall time periods from 1999-2005. 
These results clearly favour the hypotheses H3a2, H4a2, H6a2.  These results of M3 and M4 
provide support that the second condition of mediation is also confirmed. The value of fit 
statistics for M4 is R
2
 = .141 and χ² = 103.79 (16df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates 
that almost 14% of the variance in the model is accounted for these variables. The value of R
2 
is higher in case of M4 as compared to M3 which is also in line with our hypotheses that 
governance indicators are improved after the implementation of SECP code.  
To test for the final condition of mediation both governance indicators and board monitoring 
role were added in the models M5 and M6. More specifically in M5 the ROA is regressed on 
board resource dependence role (Board Size) and governance indicators without accounting 
for the interaction effect of SECP Corporate Governance code of 2002. The results show that 
the most of the variables are insignificant except dual role of CEO/chairman of the board 
which is negative and somewhat significant (β = -.087, p<.1), the value of fit statistics is R2 = 
.221 and χ² = 121.69 (13df, p<.001) for this model which elaborates that almost 22% of the 
variance in the model is accounted for these variables and the value of mediating variable is 
insignificant which violates the condition of mediation. The model M6 explains that ROA is 
regressed on board resource provision role (board size) and governance indicators by using 
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the interaction effect for the parsimonious results regarding for the implementation of SECP 
Corporate Governance code of 2002.  
The figures reveal that the moderating variable SECP is marginally significant after the 
implementation of the SECP code (β = .225, p<.1), and the role of CEO/Chairman of the 
board which is negative and significant for this era (β = -.119, p<.01) which is somewhat 
negative and significant. It is needed to quantify next the value of interaction effect as a result 
of mediation and moderation. 
However, the role duality by CEO became negative and significant for the interaction effect 
which depicts that for those organizations having role duality had comparatively weaker 
performance (β = -.119, p<.05). Looking again at Table 5.1 it shows that there is decrease of  
CEOs having dual roles in the organizations after 2002 which was .654 and .550 respectively. 
Because of that the ROA decreases roughly by -.011= (.10 X -.119).  Thus the actual effect of 
CEO duality on firm performance (ROA) for pre- and post-2002 time periods is -.059 and -
.169 respectively.  The value for the board size which is a mediating variable is insignificant. 
These results of M6 overall doesn’t provide support for mediation and violate the conditions 
of mediation.   
Sobel Test: 
Results of the Sobel test also revealed that there is no mediation found as all the results are 
insignificant by using ROA as performance measure.  The value of fit statistics is R
2
 = .245 
and χ² = 134.16 (17df, p<.001).  
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Table 5.8: Regression Results with Random Effects with Resource Dependence Role of the Board and the Performance Measure as ROA 
 
N=200, Control Variables: Consumer Goods, chemicals, Industrials, Firm Size, Leverage, Capex, Directors’ Ownership with textiles taken as base variable.   
Independent Variables (IV):  %age of Non-Executive Directors, Dual Leadership, Audit Committee Meetings, Independence of Audit Committee 
Dependent Variable (DV): Tobin Q;  
Mediating Variable (MV): Frequency of Board Meetings;  
Moderating Variable: SECP;  
†p<.1,*p<.05,**p<.01,***p<.001 
 
Variables 
 
 
Return on Assets (ROA) with Board Size  
M0 
Controls 
 
M1 (XY) 
Cont+IV 
M2(X,XZY) 
Cont+IV+Mod 
M3(XM) M4 (X,XZM) 
 
M5(X,MY) M6(X,XZ,MY) M7 (MY) 
B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. So
b
el T
est 
B S.E. 
Cons. Goods .061 .042 .061 (.042) .063 (.041) .315 (.290) .382 (.220) .054† (.033) .074† (.042) .071† (.042) 
Chemicals -.081† (.048) .069 (.049) -.034 (.048) .174 (.204) .249* (.284) -.059 (.044) .027 (.048) .074 (.048) 
Industrials -.025 (.051) -.023 (.052) -.032 (.051) .381 (.211) .460* (.220) .006 (.052) -.004 (.052) -.006 (.052) 
Firm Size -1.03 (.425) -.019 (.430) -.056 (.432) .242† (.135) .321* (.145) .014 (.057) .017 (.049) .016 (.061) 
Leverage -.024 (.441) .067 (.444) .073 (.444) .212* (.111) .34* (.136) .057 (.087) .055 (.094) .032 (.087) 
Capex .012 (.103) .021 (.103) .043 (.102) -.314 (.242) -.613* (.220) .001 (.103) .025 (.102) .007 (.103) 
Dir_ Holdings -.060 (.082) -.064 (.101) -.039 (.102) -.001 (.217) .150 (.222) -.059 (.101) .033 (.103) .065 (.082) 
SECP   .013 (.100) .019 (.131) .368† (.214) .404† (.234) .134 (.108) .225† (.116)   
%_ NED   .065 (.080) .153 (.118) .204 (.171) .261 (.242) .057 (.079) 1.21 .264 (.218) 0.96   
%_ NED_SEC     .209† (.136)   .809*** (.277)    .342 (.239) 1.21   
CEOdual   -.088** (.034) -.118** (.045) -.226* (.115) -.124 (.140) -.087† (.054) -1.40 -.059 (.066) -0.81   
CEOdual_SEC     -.185** (.064)   -.328*** (.098)    -.119* (.086) -1.16   
ACM   .009 (.010) .112 (.080) .228 (.140) .271 (.153) .008 (.010) 1.17 .082 (.171) 1.39   
ACM_SEC     .26** (.092)   .287 (.155)    .143 (.173) 1.41   
Ind_ AC   .028 (.047) .140 (.346) 1.24† (.171) .976 (.752) .014 (.048) 1.15 .176 (.346) 1.10   
Ind_ AC_SEC     .43 (.349)   1.552* (.758)    .291 (.349) 0.68   
Board Size           .027 (.044)  .034 (.056)  .029* (.015) 
R² .185 .217 .295 .126 .141 .221 .245 .198 
χ² 115.11 ( 7 df,  
p<.001) 
119.69 ( 12 df,  
p<.001) 
129.16 ( 16 df,  
p<.001) 
72.64 (12 df,  
p<.001) 
103.79 (16 df,  
p<.001) 
121.69 ( 13 df,  p<.001) 134.16 ( 17 df,  p<.001) 117.22 ( 8 df,  
p<.001) 
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Table 5.9: Summary of Findings from Hypotheses Testing 
Hypotheses Predictors Result 
H1 (a) Frequency of board meetings is positively associated with 
Tobin Q 
Supported 
H1 (b) Frequency of board meetings is positively associated with 
ROA 
Not supported 
H2 (a) Board size is positively associated with Tobin Q Support 
H2 (b) Board size is positively associated with ROA  Support 
H3 (a1) Proportion of NEDs is positively associated with frequency of 
board meetings 
Support 
H3 (a2) Proportion of NEDs is positively associated with board size Support 
H3 (b1) The relationship between proportion of NEDs and Tobin Q is 
mediated by frequency of board meetings and  board size 
Partially 
Supported 
H3 (b2) The relationship between proportion of NEDs and ROA is 
mediated by board control role and resource dependence role 
Not supported 
H3 (c) Proportion of  NEDs, board roles and firm performance 
stronger after SECP 
Partially 
Supported 
H4 (a1) Role duality is negatively associated with frequency of board 
meetings 
Supported 
H4 (a2) There is a negative relationship between Role duality and 
board size 
Supported 
H4 (b1) The relationship between role duality and Tobin Q is 
mediated by board control role  and resource dependence role 
Supported 
H4 (b2) The relationship between role duality and ROA is mediated 
by board control role  and resource dependence role 
Not 
Supported 
H4 (c) The relationship is moderated by SCEP code such that it is 
weaker after the implementation of SECP code 
Partially 
Supported 
H5 (a1) There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
diligence and board control role 
Supported 
H5 (a2) There is a positive relationship between audit committee 
diligence and board resources role 
Not supported 
H5 (b1) The relationship between audit committee diligence and 
Tobin Q is mediated by control role and resource dependence 
role 
Partially 
supported 
H5 (b2) The relationship between audit committee diligence and ROA 
is mediated by control role and resource dependence role 
Not 
Supported 
H5 (c) The relationship is moderated by SCEP code such that it is 
stronger after the implementation of SECP code. 
Partially 
Supported 
H6 (a1) There is a positive relationship between Independence of 
Audit Committee  and Boards’ Monitoring Role 
supported 
H6 (a2) There is a positive relationship between independence of audit 
committee and board size 
Supported 
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H6 (b1) The relationship between audit committee independence and 
Tobin Q is mediated by control role and resources role 
Partially 
supported 
H6 (b2) The relationship between audit committee independence and 
ROA is mediated by control role and resources role 
Not supported 
H6 (c) The relationship is moderated by SCEP code such that it is 
stronger after the implementation of SECP code 
Partially 
supported 
 
5.9 Summary 
This chapter presents the analytical assessment of the relationship between board structural 
characteristics after the implementation of SECP Code in Pakistan, board roles and 
performance measures of the organizations. A variety of methods was used to analyse data 
obtained from a large sample of the registered organizations at Karachi Stock Exchange from 
1999 to 2005. Hausman test was used to judge the random or fixed effects in the panel data 
and the results supported Random effect ordinary least square regression method for analysis. 
The findings of the research show that proportion of non-executive directors, separation of 
CEO/Chair of the board, diligence of the audit committee, and independence of audit 
committee were significantly related with Tobin Q after the implementation of SECP Code,; 
mediated by the monitoring role of the board. Similarly, it also showed that proportion of 
non-executive directors, separation of CEO/Chair of the board, and independence of audit 
committee were also significantly related with Tobin Q after the implementation of SECP 
Code, 2002; mediated by the resource provision role of the board. The findings are also in 
line with number of studies (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; 
Chhaochharia and Grinstein, 2007; and Farquhar 2012). Although resource provision role 
was relatively stronger in the post SECP time period but it could only mediate between 
proportion of non-executive directors, separation of CEO/Chair of the board, independence of 
audit committee and Tobin Q. 
Overall the study set out to test 24 hypotheses varied by the board structural characteristics 
after the implementation of SECP Code, 2002, Board monitoring (frequency of board 
meetings) and resource provision (board size) roles and financial performance measured by 
market based measures (Tobin Q) and accounting based measures (ROA).The study outlines 
more support for the marketing measure of financial performance (Tobin Q) as compared to 
the accounting measure of the financial performance (ROA). This is also in line with 
previous studies (Shabbir and Padget, 2005; Guest, 2009). For instance, Bontis et al., (2000) 
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and Ho and Williams (2003) also report an insignificant relationship between the value added 
by a firm’s intellectual capital and ROA. The board structural indicators, except the diligence 
of audit committee, also exhibit relationship with Tobin Q mediated by board resource 
provision role, and the hypotheses regarding the mediating roles of board namely control role 
and board resource role are either fully or partially supported in most of the cases. However, 
the results show no mediation by board monitoring role of the relationship between corporate 
governance indicators and ROA. Consequently it can be said that results overall show support 
for the notion that the introduction of the SECP corporate governance code created conditions 
in which change in board structures caused strengthened board roles and enhanced firm 
performance with respect to the market based measure (Tobin Q) which might have been the 
good signal for the progress of the stock market as well. The next chapter will provide a 
discussion relating these findings to existing knowledge of board structure, board roles, and 
firm performance outcomes. 
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Chapter 6 
Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This study examines whether the changes in board structure after the corporate governance 
reforms have been helpful in strengthening the board roles to achieve the better corporate 
financial performance. Building on existing literature and multiple theoretical lenses, a model 
has been examined that relates the board structural characteristics (Proportion of non-
executive directors, CEO/Chairperson Duality, Diligence of Audit Committee, and 
independence of Audit Committee) before and after the implementation of SECP code to firm 
performance (Tobin Q and Return on Assets) through two mediating variables reflecting 
board monitoring role (Board meeting frequency) and board resource dependence role (board 
size). The study provided evidence that changed board structure after the implementation of 
SECP code had been instrumental in creating an environment to strengthening the roles of the 
boards by increased board activity and board resources to enhance firm value. The model was 
tested through a unique data set of 200 non-financial sector companies registered on Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE) in Pakistan from 1999 to 2005 by comparing the results of two time 
periods. The period of 1999-2001 is the time period before the implementation of SECP code 
and 2003-2005 is the time period after the implementation of SECP code. 
 Pakistan sought to adopt more stringent corporate governance mechanisms by adopting the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) Code, acknowledging that 
corporate governance is vital for its corporate sector. This has paid off in a way for the 
country that despite the dismal law and order situation in the country the stock market 
performance was declared second best in the south Asian region. This is the first major study 
outside UK and USA to fill the knowledge gap in the literature by proposing that board roles 
are important intervening variables in the relationship between board structural characteristics 
and firm financial performance. The findings accordingly have important implications for 
policy makers and managers, as well as contribute valuable comparisons and contrasts to the 
empirical findings and theoretical viewpoints to be found in the existing research literature.  
 The purpose of this study was to examine whether there was any change in the corporate 
board structural characteristics after the implementation of SECP code and how this 
restructuring of corporate boards eventually might influence board roles and firm financial 
performance. This was done by comparing the pre-implementation time period in the 
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Pakistani business environment. The SECP code addresses the legal requirement of board 
structure and provides an impetus to board actions and responsibilities (Rais and Saeed, 
2005). There are clear and significant civil penalties associated with boards that fail to 
comply (Ibrahim, 2005) which is in line with the studies conducted about the influence of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) environment on the board composition practices and their impact on 
corporate financial performance (Van Ness et al., 2010). In other words, although the 
relationship between board structural characteristics and firm financial performance has been 
studied at length in the past, the implementation of SECP code may have motivated a new set 
of behaviours by corporate boards and thus has introduced a new context for this relationship. 
Our study is different from others in not only in timing but also in scope. The study finds its 
motivation from the recent calls arguing that it is needed to study the board roles under 
multiple theoretic regimes instead of looking through agency lens (Hillman and Dalziel, 
2003; Roberts et al., 2005). Therefore, this study has discussed both the control/monitoring as 
well as resource dependent roles of the board and found that board roles were greater 
predictors of the relationship of board structural characteristics and firm performance after 
the implementation of SECP code. Despite of extensive literature on direct relationship of 
corporate governance and firm performance there appeared to be little research on the 
mediational dimension of board roles on this relationship. 
Depending upon the nature of data set used in the study, therefore, the near proxies were used 
to measure the board roles as data was for a particular time period in the past from 1999 to 
2005 to give a fair assessment of the model for before and after SECP code implementation 
time periods. As indicated in the literature, the proposition is that the frequency of board 
meetings measures the intensity of a board’s roles, and the quality or effectiveness of its 
monitoring (Vafeas, 1999; Conger et al., 1998). Thus, following Vafeas (1999) says that 
higher frequency of board meetings will produce a higher quality of board monitoring, and, if 
higher board activity facilitates better board monitoring, outside directors are expected to 
demand more board meetings to augment their monitoring capability. Similarly, Lehn et al., 
(2004) and Guest (2008) resolve that board composition changed by adding more lawyers 
and financial experts and fewer executives after the implementation of SOX. DE Villiers et 
al., (2011) are of the view that size of the board and background of the members are vital for 
the provision of advice, counsel, management, and policy oversight and monitoring. They are 
of the view that the firms which previously were not compliant to SOX increased their board 
sizes because they added more outside directors than the insiders removed from the board. 
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Moreover, larger boards augment the base of expertise and knowledge to seek adept business 
advice, which increases managerial capability for informed and better business decisions 
(Yawson, 2006). Therefore, in the light of this literature, frequencies of board monitoring and 
board size were used to measure the monitoring and resource dependence roles of the board 
respectively. 
 Consequently the stated aim of this thesis is to examine "The impact of mediation of board 
roles between board structural characteristics and firm financial performance before and after 
the implementation of SECP code under multi-theoretic lens”. The corporate financial 
performance has been investigated not only with respect to market related measure (Tobin Q) 
but also with respect to accounting based measure (ROA). Relying on a single measure to 
investigate performance increases the potential for discovery oversight. The study using 
board roles as a mediation tool to judge the relationship between board composition and 
corporate financial performance is not only a less trodden area but also offers interesting 
insights.  
The study has strived to develop a theoretical model of the relationship between board 
structure and firm performance mediated by board roles, subsequently the model has been 
tested in Pakistani context on the firms listed at Karachi stock exchange (KSE) from 1999 to 
2005. The sample consisted of all the firms excluding finance  banking sector, state owned 
enterprises and the utility companies. The reason for excluding these firms was that financial 
sector and state owned enterprises (SOE) were not under the purview of the SECP. Same is 
the case for utility companies which are partially owned and managed by the state. All the 
rest of the companies were taken whose data was available for all the 6 years. Consequently, 
this study offers initial and new empirical insights, for example; firstly, the study shows that 
board roles are greater predictors of the relationship of board structural characteristics and 
firm performance. Secondly, by examining board roles under multiple theoretical 
mechanisms and board structural characteristics under SECP code this study is different as 
compared to previous research. Thirdly, this study finds that board primarily undertake two 
distinct roles, monitoring and resource dependence. This will also give all subsequent authors 
a platform on which to build their research and businessmen a better understanding of these 
relationships, so that pre-emptive actions can be taken to prevent corporate governance 
scandals in future. 
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6.2 Theoretical Contributions of Study 
There are four key theoretical contributions to theory arising from this study. First, it shows 
that board structure and board role relationship is stronger than board structure and firm 
performance linkage after the implementation of SECP code. Secondly, board roles better 
predict firm performance with respect to market measures as compared to accounting 
measures of firm performance after the implementation of SECP code.  
Thirdly, by probing several board structural characteristics and multiple board roles 
(Monitoring role and resource dependence role) simultaneously, this study provides a more 
inclusive and wide-ranging treatment of board research. Fourthly, the board structural 
variables more strongly relate with the monitoring role of the board and market measure of 
firm value. These findings have implications for board practice, board theory, and board 
policy makers.  
Parting its ways from conventional input-output mechanism based studies and finding its 
motivation more from indirectly measuring the board structural characteristics and firm 
performance relationship through board roles mediation, this study shows that board 
structural characteristics are better predictors of board monitoring activity (FOBM) and board 
resource dependence (Board size) roles as compared to firm performance. These findings 
support the other more recent studies on boards of directors.  
For example the study particularly proves that in the post SECP era the representation of 
NEDs increased on the board which shows that post 2002 boards are relatively more 
independent and larger. This also shows that increase in board size is not by adding more 
insiders, therefore, the boards’ pool changed altogether as a result of these  reforms which is 
specifically in line with authors such as Brick and Chidambaran, (2010) and (Linck et al., 
2009). This may be beneficial in Pakistani corporate governance scenario where traditionally 
the founding family influence looms over the organizations, the board independence is the 
factor that may be able to break this nexus for effective monitoring and helping the minority 
shareholders for better returns on investments and avoiding conflict between principals. 
Similarly, when the study shows that relationship of board structural characteristics and board 
roles have stronger and significant relationship with Tobin Q as compared to ROA, it can be 
discerned that compliance couldn’t bring the broad based changes in the organizational 
structure to improve the firm profitability as a result of governance reforms however, the 
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compliance with SECP code reporting generated positive signals for the external investors to 
woo them for more investments in the code compliant companies and eventually showing 
more activity in the stock market. This also shows that actual decision making on the board 
didn’t bring any structural changes to usher more profitability for the firm rather a tick box 
approach was followed. However, this positive signalling is in line with institutional theory, 
which elaborates that compliance shown as a result of pressure from external regulators 
doesn’t usually comply with true letter and spirit and therefore, doesn’t translate in 
improvement of organizational effectiveness (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
The study can’t show the relevant backgrounds and expertise of the newly added NEDs after 
2002 because of the choice of the fixed proxies which don’t capture the process changes on 
the board, however, it can be contended that to fulfil the requirements of the SECP code, the 
newly added NEDs will be eminent managers and finance experts as prescribed by the SECP 
code. The study also proves that increase in proportion of NEDs caused increase in board 
activity and size of the board which represent board monitoring and resource dependence 
roles respectively. Therefore, it can be contended that NEDs not only perform the monitoring 
role but also they bring the significant resource to the firm. This also proves that increased 
proportion of NEDs after SECP code has more stronger relationship with board activity and 
board size which is according to the past studies (such as Markarian and Parbonetti, 2007; 
Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008). Although this study can’t prove about the quality of 
decisions made by the boards after addition of more NEDs because of the non-availability of 
data and choice of proxies, however, it can be argued that independent directors prove better 
monitors and improve the quality of input needed for decision making, also indicated by the 
past literature (e.g. Huse, 2005; Shen, 2005; Machold et al., 2011). It can also be inferred 
here that major emphasis of these reforms, by adding more NEDs, is directed towards 
increasing the capability or skill level of the board and not the improvement in transparency 
(Roberts et al., 2005) without instituting the independent nomination committee on the board 
in Pakistan. Therefore, the study affirms the application of multi-theoretic lens and the 
outcomes are plausible that presence of (Independent) NEDs not only act as better monitors 
but also bring in valuable resources to the firm (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Van Ees et al., 
2008; McNulty et al., 2013).  
Similarly the results of the study shed light on the board leadership structure and reveal that 
after the SECP code the trend is more towards the separation of these roles. This has caused 
opening in the traditional dual leadership structure and separated the board leadership and 
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firm leadership roles. This is also in agreement with Noguera (2011) who recorded that after 
the implementation of SOX a majority of the board were not led by their CEOs. The 
independence of the boards caused more board activity after SECP code and board meeting 
frequency increased which caused the improvement in board monitoring capability. This 
contention is also in line with the results by Brick and Chidambaran, (2010) and Vafeas 
(1999) who elaborate that due to the prevalence of CEO, there will be lesser open discussions 
in the meetings and hence dual role will be affecting negatively to the board activity which in 
turn may hinder the monitoring role of the board under the agency lens.  Simultaneously, the 
study shows that separation of leadership roles has also caused the increase in board size in 
the same time period. This is most relevant to Hermalin and Weisbach, (1998, 2003) and 
Jensen (1993) that role duality will give unnecessary power to CEO which will undermine the 
internal controls and may hamper board roles. Past literature (e.g. Linck et al., 2005, 2008; 
Guest, 2008) suggest that excessively powerful CEOs will exert their influence on the boards 
and will try to fill the board with their cronies who can be easily managed. Therefore, the 
study reports that separation of roles is positively associated with the increase in size of the 
boards in post SECP era which may be contended for the improved resource availability to 
the firm. This is also in congruent with the results presented by Chen and Al-Najjar (2012) 
who document that board size increased after separation of board roles in the aftermath of 
governance reforms in China. 
The audit committees were either non-existent or dormant before the SECP code. However, 
study shows that diligence of audit committee increased as a direct consequence of 
enforcement of SECP code in Pakistan. The activity increased in the functioning of audit 
committee because audit committees have been considered as the most important mechanism 
of internal control after the world wide governance reforms (Goh, 2009; Krishnan, 2005). 
The results of the research further show that  an increase in audit committee diligence is 
causing positive effect on the board activities which is congruent with the deliberations of  
Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) that the positive relationship between board and audit 
committee working is the symbol of a functional board overall and vice versa. The diligence 
of audit committee will make a board more active and the board will have to generate more 
activity in order to be at par with the working of audit committee and this in turn will enhance 
the monitoring capability of the board. This argument is in agreement with Raghunadan and 
Rama (2007); Sharma (2009); and Al-Najjar (2011) who report a positive relationship 
between audit committee diligence and board activities for the large size firms. However, the 
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study doesn’t report any relationship between diligence of audit committee and board size 
which may be contended that asymmetries exist in the relationship between CEO and 
formation of audit committees and the role of CEO is very dominant, therefore, some of the 
firms may have the committees comprising of majority of NEDs, as per the requirements of 
SECP code, who may not be independent enough to strengthen the internal controls. The 
study further reveals that independence of audit committee increased in the era of SECP code 
after 2002. The requirement of the code was that audit committees be headed by independent 
NEDs. These results are in line with the findings of Hoitash and Hoitash (2009) who reported 
in their study of US firms that in the post SOX regime the composition of audit committee 
changed to comply with the requirements of SOX. Similarly, in Pakistan the audit 
committees have been mandated for the appointment of external auditors and devise the 
sound internal control mechanisms. Therefore, the audit committee independence has 
implications for the quality of the audit and the independence of the audit policy of the firm. 
The study further reports that independence in the formation of audit committee caused an 
increase in the board meeting activities as well. The activity of the board increased with the 
independence of the audit committee; hence, it can be argued that presence of NEDs in the 
audit committee helped strengthening the monitoring role of the board. The results are also in 
agreement with the prior literature (such as Goh, 2009; Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; 
Doyle et al., 2007) who have shown that adding more independent directors and widening the 
scope of audit committees in the post SOX era caused a significant increase in the board 
activity levels. Therefore, it can be contended that independence of audit committees will 
enhance the monitoring capability of the board and strengthen the internal control systems 
overall. The study also reported that the independence of audit committee and board size is 
related and the relationship is significant and positive irrespective of the time periods. 
However, composition of audit committees changed after the enforcement of SECP code and 
they were reconstituted to comply the requirements by adding majority of NEDs and headed 
by preferably an NED. This is in line with the prior studies (e.g. Klein, 2002; Ashbaugh-
Skaife et al., 2008; Braswell et al., 2012) who claim that prior to the SOX the internal 
controls were not considered the major responsibility of the audit committees and therefore 
audit committees were having little say in designing and evaluating the company internal 
controls. Therefore, it can be argued that if the boards will be dominant with the internal 
directors there will be little availability of NEDs to form the audit committee as well as the 
presence of independent NEDs on the audit committee will prove as a resource to the board 
and will be able to advise on the quality of internal control mechanism of the firm. The 
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support of board structural characteristics to the dual role of the board is plausible 
explanation that changed board structure is instrumental in strengthening the board roles 
under the agency theory as well as resource dependence theory.  
6.3 The relationship between Independent directors and firm performance mediated by 
board Roles 
The Figures 6.1A depicts the relationship without accounting for the interaction effect of 
moderating variable. The direct relationship between %_NEDs and Tobin Q is positive and 
slightly significant (β = .68, p<.1) but the value gets insignificant when controlled for 
monitoring role, however the value is significant but weaker in magnitude when controlling 
for resource dependence role  (β = .183, p<.1) but the first condition of mediation is not 
fulfilled as the relationship between %_NEDs and board size is not significant as reported by 
the data In the next step the relationship is explored using ROA as a performance indicator 
for the firm.  
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Figure 6.1A Unaccounted Moderation Model of the mediated relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance (Tobin Q)  
Figures 6.1B depicts the relationship without accounting for the interaction effect of 
moderating variable by using ROA as performance variable. The figure 6.1B doesn’t report 
any significant relationship either directly or indirectly except the relationship between 
%_NEDs and monitoring role of the board but all the other needed relationships are 
insignificant therefore, there is no mediated or direct relationship existing. Therefore, these 
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relationships are not significant and it requires that the relationship should be further explored 
by using the time interaction effect to judge more closely the impact of SECP after 2002.  
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Figure.6.1B Unaccounted Moderation Model of the mediated relationship between 
independent directors and firm performance (ROA)  
But in figure 6.1C shows the moderation effect using interaction term of SECP, both the 
monitoring role and the resource dependence roles mediate the relationship between 
independent directors on the board and firm performance (Tobin Q) when the interaction 
effect is included to focus on the behaviour of the board after the enforcement of SECP code.  
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Pre-SECP Values Post-SECP Values  
Figure 6.1C Moderated Model of the mediated relationship between independent 
directors and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
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The value of beta is .197 and p<.05 when the control role is included in the model and .792 
and p<.05 which are lower as compared to the direct relationship when the resource 
dependence role is included in the model. The relationship between %_NEDs and board 
meeting frequency and board roles are also positive and significant as (β = .28, p<.01) and (β 
= .809, p<.01) respectively. Therefore, it can be said that the relationship is mediated through 
board monitoring and resource dependence roles after SECP code. The figures fulfil the 
criteria of mediation a set by Baron and Kenny (1986). However, the same relationships are 
insignificant for the time period prior to 2002. These findings partially get their support from 
results of some prior studies regarding the activity and the efforts made by the board (e.g. 
Zona and Zattoni, 2007).  
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Pre-SECP Values Post-SECP Values 
Figure 6.1D Moderated Model of the Mediated Relationship between NEDs and firm 
performance (ROA)  
However, figure 6.1D shows that there is a positive and significant relationship between 
proportion of non-executive directors and board meetings frequency regardless of the time 
period but the relationship between %_NEDs and board size is significant after enforcement 
of SECP code. However, %_NEDs has stronger relationship with board roles after the 
implementation of SECP code in 2002 but the relationship between independent directors and 
ROA is not mediated by board roles as both roles have insignificant relationships between 
board roles and firm performance. It also offers empirical support to previous evidence, 
which suggests that insiders (managers – ROA) and outsiders (shareholders – Tobin Q) value 
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corporate governance differently (Black et al., 2006; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006), because 
ROA is unable to reflect current changes in market valuation. By contrast, as a market 
measure, the Q-ratio reflects expected future developments that may be masked by current 
fluctuations in business conditions. The findings also provide a useful perspective on 
managerial value perception. It shows that for the company managers ROA is more important 
as it provides them the space for future investment as well as the profitability of the 
organization contributes to the overall wealth effects for the top management, on the other 
hand, for the investors out in the market, increase in market value of the company stocks is 
more valuable through which they get the financial gains and therefore, Tobin Q epitomizes 
financial valuation of corporate governance structures by investors (outsiders). 
The results reveal that the relationship in terms of magnitude is enhanced for resource 
dependence role after the code is induced as compared to monitoring role and non-executive 
relationship. Bathala and Rao (1995) and Klein (2003) have tried to measure these relations 
by using either of these board roles but this study provides deeper insights using the dual role 
of the boards. This study thus advances research on boards through the provision of evidence 
that board roles are mediators of the board structure-firm performance relationship. This is an 
important theory development and its importance will continue to be shown in considering 
the relationship between other board structural measures and firm performance in the rest of 
the sections. 
These results are in line with the stream of the literature dealing with impact of board 
functions on firm performance (Van Ees et al., 2009; Vanderwaerde et al., 2011). These 
findings are supportive of agency theoretic recommendations for boards that boards’ 
effectiveness will be enhanced by more outside directors.  
Although in Pakistan where traditionally it is considered that shareholding pattern is closed 
within the founding family, however, our results show in Table 5.1 that after the 
implementation of SECP code, there is considerable change in the composition of the board 
of directors and audit committees. The board and committees have been more populated with 
NEDs as compared to executive directors after the implementation of SECP code. It can be 
inferred that compliance with SECP code will help bring effective monitoring to ensure that 
rights of minority shareholders are not compromised. Therefore, under the directions of 
SECP, this act of separation of board chair and CEO has been complemented by the non-
executive directors to usher the increased board activity. The results reveal that relationship 
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between the proportion of non-executive directors on the board and the frequency of board 
meetings increases after the implementation of the code. The role of non-executive directors 
has been documented in the literature as having an important impact on monitoring role of 
the board (Cotter, 1997; Boone et al., 2007; Guest, 2008). The monitoring role of the board 
can be shown by the increased activity of the board in the shape of increase in the frequency 
of board meetings (Vafeas, 1999; Adams, 2009). The results show a positive relationship 
between proportion of non-executive directors and the frequency of board meetings, which is 
in line with the study by Al-Najjar (2012). The obvious reason is that independent directors 
will demand more board meetings, as they will need more time in briefing the board members 
(Brick and Chidambaran, 2007). The study reveals that the relationship gets stronger and 
significant after the implementation of the code. The code demands that non-executive 
independent directors should be managerial/financial experts or retired executives (SECP, 
2002) which will result in the increased board meeting frequency for improved monitoring 
capacity of the board. Linck et al., (2010) are of the view that post-SOX scenario has changed 
the board composition and board roles which has resulted into the improved monitoring 
capability of the board. These new legislations have exerted more pressure to strengthen the 
role of the directors (Buccino and Shannon, 2003). Hence, we see that board workload 
increase as we see more board meeting frequency and boards have much more pressure to 
work for more time to resolve the board monitoring issues after the implementation of SCEP 
code. Therefore, increased board activity will be able to attain economies in agency costs. 
The results further reveal that proportion of outside directors on the board increases after the 
implementation of SECP code and firms add more outside directors than the insiders are 
removed to comply. This will increase not only the expertise and knowledge of the board 
members but also the size of the board. Firms may not remove as many inside directors as 
they hire the outside independent directors (Linck et al., 2008). Markarian and Parbonetti 
(2007) elaborate that independent directors not only provide the monitoring task but also 
prove to be a valuable resource for the firm. The board’s resource providing role is to provide 
the CEO with advice and access to information and resources, and is more efficiently 
performed by outside NEDs who can provide important connection and expertise (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). Therefore, the results are in line with Lehn et al. (2003) which state that larger 
board and proportion of outsiders can provide greater information and tend to be more 
independent in their opinions. 
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The size of the board may have positive relationship with the passing of the regulations 
(Chen and al-Najjar, 2012). Similarly, monitoring is more efficient with a larger board and 
proportion of outside directors because of greater shared information (Guest, 2008). 
Therefore the results are in line with an influential stream of the literature for example Linck 
et al., (2008); Guest et al., (2008); Al-Najjar (2012); Dalton et al., (1999) regarding resource 
provision role and board independence as well. It is also contended here that independent 
boards composed after the implementation of SECP code not only strengthen the monitoring 
but also the resource provision role of the boards. The results also show that the mediating 
effect of board roles has strengthened between the board independence and firm financial 
performance after the implementation of the code. The results show that relationship is 
significant only when performance is measured by Tobin Q. The reason may be that it was 
perceived by the outside shareholders that the organization has got non-executive directors on 
its board. In terms of ROA, no significant relationship is found, nevertheless, positive 
coefficients elaborate that the relationship is positive if not significant. The reason for this 
might be that increased board monitoring role activity increased after the implementation of 
the code which increased the firm value but could not improve its objective of making 
relatively permanent structural changes in the corporate governance practices.  
Another interpretation could be that main contribution of the increased board monitoring 
activity was in helping to identify more investment opportunities as opposed to operating 
performance and because of the media focus and regulatory pressure the firms moved quickly 
to increase the number of boards members and board meetings to signal that they had 
complied with the provisions of SECP code. It seems that they merely adopted the tick box 
approach to give a positive signal to outside shareholders and did not comply with the code in 
spirit.  
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6.4 The relationship between CEO/Chair Duality and firm performance mediated by 
board Roles 
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Figure. 6.2A Unaccounted for Moderation Model of the mediated relationship between 
CEO/Chair Duality and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
Figures 6.2A depicts the relationship without accounting for the interaction effect of 
moderating variable. The relationship between CEO duality and board meeting frequency is 
negative and significant meaning that firms with separate CEO and chairperson of the board 
demand more meetings of the board in particular time period, similarly, firms with duality 
will be tending to have smaller boards. Although the relationship between dual role of CEO 
and firm performance (Tobin Q) has lower beta value of -.256 when control role is included 
in the model and -.194 with p<.1but the first condition of mediation is not fulfilled in case of 
monitoring role, therefore, it is required to study the relationship further on filtering the data 
by time periods. However, in case of resource dependence role, the relationship is mediated 
and it shows that organizations having separate CEO and Board Chair have larger boards 
depicting improved resource dependence role as well as enhanced firm performance which 
supports the hypothesis H4b1. In the next section, the relationship is discussed by separating 
the data on the basis of time periods by using the interaction term of SECP. 
However, by looking at Figures 6.2B the relationship between CEO/Chairperson duality with 
firm performance (ROA) without accounting for the interaction effect of moderating variable. 
The coefficient of board meeting frequency and board size gets insignificant when included 
in the model. Therefore, it is clear that condition of mediation is not fulfilled as board roles 
have insignificant relationship with ROA. In the next section, however, the relationship is 
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discussed by separating the data on the basis of time periods by using the interaction term of 
SECP.  
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Figure. 6.2B Unaccounted for Moderation Model of the mediated relationship between 
CEO/Chair Duality and firm performance (ROA) 
 
Figures 6.2C shows that both the monitoring role and the resource dependence roles partially 
mediate the relationship between separation of CEO/chairman duality role and firm 
performance (Tobin Q). The value of beta is -.21 and -.313 which the board meeting 
frequency and board size are included in the model respectively, which shows that dual role 
of CEO and Board Chair are negative to the board roles and cause hampering in the 
performance.  
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Figure. 6.2C Moderated Model of the Mediated relationship between CEO/Chair 
Duality and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
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Although for the figures in pre 2002 time period, the mediation is confirmed but the post 
2002 results after the enforcement of SECP code report that the board roles partially mediate 
the relationship. This is in line with the Baron and Kenny (1986) requirement for partial 
mediation. This also shows the negative relationship between CEO duality and firm valuation 
means that market perceives CEO duality as a bad practice. This is because it tends to give 
too much power to one person who can choose to engage in opportunistic activities through 
entrenchment. 
However, figure 6.2D below here shows that relationship of CEO/chairman duality role with 
board roles after the implementation of SECP code is negative and significant with having 
coefficients of (β = -.261,p<.01 and β = -.328,p<.001) with board meeting frequency and 
board size respectively. However, the relationship between CEO duality and ROA doesn’t 
show any significance which violates the necessary condition for mediated relationship. 
Nevertheless, the negative relationships of CEO duality with board roles shows that after 
SECP code, the boards of those organizations who had separate persons as CEO and board 
chairperson performed better with respect to board monitoring capability as well as providing 
better resources to the organization. But the relationship doesn’t provide sufficient evidence 
for the mediation by using ROA as performance measure.  
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Figure 6.2D Model of the mediated relationship between CEO/Chair Duality and firm 
performance (ROA) 
According to our results in Table 5.1, there is an improved activity on the board as the 
companies start adopting independent chair for their boards as per the requirement of the 
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code. This shows that separation of roles of CEO and chairperson of the board is beneficial 
for the shareholders of the organization. We see that the relationship between CEO role 
separation and board monitoring is strengthened after the code implementation. This is also in 
line with the agency perspective (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) which postulates that the top 
management activities should not dominate the board of directors’ decisions. In the Pakistani 
environment, where the trend has been that the CEO also has been the chairperson of the 
board, most board decisions have been made behind the closed doors and the board meetings 
had been either infrequent or just informal in nature. The results show that companies have 
shown compliance to SECP code and fewer CEOs are chairpersons of the boards. This has 
led to increased board monitoring activity as board meeting frequency has increased.  
Therefore, it can be inferred from the study that the separation of the leadership structure of 
the board needed more board meetings as board needed more input from the CEO which 
could have been different if the same person is CEO as well as board chairperson. However, 
after the code implementation, the increased activity of the board meetings indicate that the 
CEO spends more time in meetings which could be argued as more interaction with the board 
members which may result in better decision making.  This clearly shows that separation of 
the board leadership role in the post-code era ushered more activism on behalf of the 
shareholders as a result of more board meetings. Brickley et al. (1997) also found a statistical 
relationship between CEO/Chair board separation and frequency of board meetings and 
Vafeas (1999) also holds this proposition. This is also in line with the theoretical argument 
developed by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) and used in many studies later on (Boone et al., 
2007). 
The relationship between CEO/Chairperson separation and board size after the 
implementation of the code was found positive. This shows that if power is concentrated in a 
single person who acts both as the CEO and chairman of the board, the supervisory role of 
the board will weaken, leading to insider control of the board activities and discouraging 
hiring independent non-executive directors from outside and potentially reducing the board 
independence. This is also in line with Boone et al., (2007); Linck et al., (2007), and Guest 
(2008) who are of the view that more powerful CEOs use their influence to bargain for a 
smaller board with fewer outsiders. In the Pakistani context, this is important change as the 
shareholder pattern has been traditionally closed one. The companies suffering from weaker 
corporate governance usually suffer from insiders’ control (Cha, 2001). This also proves that 
CEO with dual powers of the board chairperson will be more likely to promote his/her 
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associate executives to the board, leading as a result to a smaller and less independent board. 
Consequently, there will be lesser outside professionals on the board which will reduce the 
resource dependence role of the board. Therefore, it can be said that the code causes 
separation of the roles of CEO and chairperson of the board which leads to strengthened 
resource provision role of the board. The results also show that in Pakistani corporate 
governance environment this separation gives more control to outside shareholders of the 
organization.  
It is clear that the code requirement of the separation of CEO/Chairperson of the role has 
strengthened not only the monitoring but also the resource providing role of the board.  We 
have also found that strengthened board roles as a result of role separation has given good 
signals to the outside potential investors which has brought more trading in the stock 
exchange (KSE, 2007).  
 
6.5 The relationship between Audit Committee Diligence and firm performance 
mediated by board Roles 
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Figure 6.3A Unaccounted Model of the mediated relationship between Audit committee 
diligence and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
The results in Figure 6.3A show that audit committee diligence and firm performance (Tobin 
Q) for the overall time period without accounting for the interaction effect are not mediated 
by the board roles. Despite of the fact that ACM has a beta of .212, p<.1, with Tobin Q after 
including board monitoring frequency in the model but other conditions of mediation are not 
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fulfilled. However, the coefficient remains insignificant in case of resource dependence role 
of the board except the relationship between board size and firm performance (Tobin Q). 
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Figure 6.3B Unaccounted Model of the mediated relationship between Audit committee 
diligence and firm performance (ROA) 
Similarly, the results in case of relationship with firm performance (ROA) also don’t report 
any mediation of board roles or significant relationship between diligence of audit committee 
and ROA as depicted in Figure 6.3B.  
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Therefore, the results suggest that there is a need to look into this relationship by bifurcating 
the data on the basis of implementation of SECP code in 2002 by using the interaction effect 
in the next section as shown in Figure 6.3C. 
Now by looking on the Figure 6.3C, the data suggests that board meeting frequency 
(monitoring role of the board) partially mediates the relationship between audit committee 
diligence and firm performance as measured by Tobin Q. The values of beta for ACM are 
.116 and .364 for pre and post 2002 respectively which are less than .175 and .737 
respectively to fulfil the necessary condition for mediation when monitoring role is included 
in the model. However, the condition is validated only for the time period after 2002 for the 
monitoring role only as there is no significant relationship found for the data before 2002. As 
well as there is no significant statistics are found in case of resource dependence role (Board 
Size). The relationship between audit committee diligence and firm performance is stronger 
when monitoring role is included in the model and it fulfils the criterion set by Baron and 
Kenny (1986) for mediation. This can be argued that the more activity on the audit 
committees, the more coordination is needed among the directors and indeed needs more 
board meetings. However, the model does not find any significant relationship between audit 
committee diligence and resource dependence role of the board. Next the same relationship is 
explored with firm performance (ROA). 
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Now by looking at Figure 6.3D which elaborates the relationship of audit committee 
diligence and ROA, except the relationship between audit committee diligence and ROA is 
significant after 2002 which was positive for pre 2002 era but not significant doesn’t spell out 
any mediation  of board roles in this relationship. However, the audit committee diligence 
doesn’t show any relationship with board size, therefore, the relationship doesn’t fulfil the 
necessary conditions of mediation. 
As for the code, every organization will have one audit committee primarily headed by non-
executive directors and financial experts from outside. The audit committee’s principal 
function is to meet regularly with the company’s external auditors and oversee the investment 
and financial matters of the company. It is found that after the implementation of the code 
there has been more activity for audit committees which have been mandated to meet at least 
once in every quarter. The results show that as the activity or diligence of the audit committee 
increases the board activity increases. This can be contended that presence of audit committee 
is a result of more delegation. Therefore, from our results it is plausible to discern that with 
more delegation there is higher need for coordination amongst the directors, which 
necessitates more frequent board meetings. This also means that higher activity on audit 
committee will be helping release of unbiased accounting information and will require the 
board to meet more frequently to match with the performance of audit committee as board 
need to ratify all the proceedings of the audit committee as per the requirement of SECP 
code. Therefore, our evidence is consistent with the argument provided by institutional theory 
that using external regulatory pressure in audit committee creation is of little importance in 
achieving the real objectives of the internal organizational restructuring for effective growth. 
Therefore, regulatory pressure has only played a limited role in monitoring activities and did 
not become that effective to provide the advice and resources to the boards. It can be further 
inferred from the results that the diligence of the audit committee has a positive relationship 
with board monitoring role measured as board meeting frequency. This indicates that 
presence of internal control mechanism like audit committee signals better monitoring and 
generates more demand for board meetings. These results are also consistent with the results 
of Vafeas (1999); Sharma (2009); and Brick and Chidambaran (2007, 2010). This also means 
that firms are in equilibrium internally and the structural changes come internally driven not 
externally driven by regulations. 
The results from the figure 6.3D could not find any relationship between diligence of audit 
committee and board size directly as well as there is no significant statistics are reported in 
159 
 
case of ROA when regressed over audit committee diligence. Although the board size has 
increased after the code implementation as a result of inclusion of the outside directors, this 
increase can’t be attributed solely with the audit committee diligence. In the next section, the 
independence of audit committee is discussed to further judge the quality of auditing. 
6.6 The relationship between Audit Committee Independence and firm performance 
mediated by board roles       
The results show that the audit committee independence and firm performance (Tobin Q) is 
partially mediated by the board size (Resource dependence role proxy) for both the time 
periods but frequency of board meetings (monitoring role proxy) doesn’t mediate the audit 
committee independence and firm performance (Tobin Q) relationship for the time period 
without accounting for the interaction effect. Nevertheless, there is no significant relationship 
or mediation found with respect to firm performance of ROA. These results are discussed in 
the next paragraphs one by one. 
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Figure 6.4A Unaccounted Model of the relationship between Audit committee 
Independence and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
While looking on the results as shown in the Figure 6.4 A for the unaccounted period without 
using the interaction effect, the magnitude of relationship is positive and significant between 
independence of audit committee and Tobin Q, however, the coefficients get lower and 
significant when resource dependence role is included in the model which is in line with the 
assumptions of Baron and Kenny (1986) for the partial mediation.  Simultaneously, the 
relationship between independence of audit committee and monitoring role of the board is not 
reportedly significant for the period for which interaction term is not accounted for. This can 
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be attributed that a higher activity as discussed in the previous section causes the higher 
monitoring activity on the board and by mere adding more NEDs may not be enough to cause 
more activity on the board. 
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Figure 6.4B Unaccounted Model of the mediated relationship between Audit committee 
Independence and firm performance (ROA) 
Similarly, the results in case of relationship with firm performance (ROA) don’t report any 
mediation of board roles or significant relationship between activity on audit committee and 
ROA as shown in figure 6.4 B. Although the relationship between independence of audit 
committee and board resource dependence (board size) role is significant and positive but the 
relationship doesn’t hold for the rest of the conditions of mediation as postulated by Baron 
and Kenny (1986). Therefore, there is a need to look into this relationship by splitting the 
data on the basis of implementation of SECP code by using the interaction effect in the next 
section. 
Figure 6.4 C shows that monitoring role of the board partially mediates the relationship 
between audit committee independence and firm performance as measured by Tobin Q. The 
value of the coefficient for independence of audit committee is .341 and .390,p <.01 which is 
less than.44 and .680, p<.01 when control role is included in the model and value for beta is 
1.415,p<.05 and 1.532,p<.05 when board size is included in the model. Therefore, it can be 
said that it fulfils the criterion set by Baron and Kenny (1986) for mediation for both board 
roles. This finding offers empirical support to the results of previous studies that report 
statistically significant and positive association between board committees and the Tobin Q 
(Vefeas, 1999; Karamanous and Vefeas, 2005; Goh, 2009, Braswell et al., 2012). The finding 
is also consistent with the results of Mangena and Chamisa (2008) who report that the 
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presence of an audit committee significantly reduces the possibility of a firm being suspended 
from listing on a stock exchange in a South Africa based study. 
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Figure. 6.4C Model of the mediated relationship between Audit committee 
independence and firm performance (Tobin Q) 
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In the Figure 6.4D the relationship is depicted between independence of audit committee and 
ROA. The first leg of relationship is significant with board meeting frequency and board size 
after SECP code enforcement but the relationship is insignificant as it moves forward to 
judge the relationship by including the board roles in the relationship. Therefore, the figures 
don’t provide support to the hypothesized relationship in this case. 
 The code requires that the audit committee will be comprised of at least three board members 
with majority of NEDs and will be headed by an independent non-executive director which is 
the extension of the same logic that boards should also be independent by having non-
executive directors on the board. The codes also require that appointment of external auditors 
will be the responsibility of the audit committee. The study also proves empirically that there 
is a positive relationship between independence of audit committee and monitoring role of 
the board proxied by the frequency of the board meetings. It can lead to monitoring 
effectiveness of the board to make better informed decisions. 
It can be said that the independence of the audit committee not only is necessary for the 
monitoring role of the board as it has positive relationship with frequency of board meetings 
but but also for the resource dependence role of the board as the relationship with board size 
is significant and positive in both the time periods. Klein (2002) is of the view that addition 
of more independent directors on the audit committee would also lead to adding more 
resources to the board  which in turn will be helpful in better decision making. Similarly, 
Braswell et al., (2012) are also of the view that after the implementation of SOX the audit 
committees’ have been reformed by adding financial experts and audit related professionals 
to better understand the requirements of internal controls.  However, the study couldn’t find 
any significant relationship with respect to accounting measure of financial performance 
(ROA). In addition, in the context of Pakistan, we can say that the boards are still in the 
process of evolving to their newly assumed roles in an environment in which the boards has 
been dominated by the insiders traditionally. The code also helped improvement in 
development of a professional board members training and skills for better governance 
through incorporation of a body called Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance (PICG, 
2005).  
 6.7 Monitoring role of the board and corporate financial performance 
As expected, after the implementation of SCEP code, the strengthened monitoring role of the 
board is positively related with the market based measure of corporate financial performance 
163 
 
which is in line with the agency stream of governance literature (Brick and Chidambaran, 
2010). Prior to SOX, the securities laws did not directly address board composition and 
structure which caused boards to be lethargic and on the back seat but after the 
implementation of the SOX the boards were motivated enough to take the active roles which 
resulted in improved firm value (Linck et al, 2008; Ntim and Osei, 2011). The volume of the 
shares traded in the stock market increased after the implementation of the code (Javid and 
Iqbal, 2007).  We attribute it to the increased board monitoring activity as a direct result of 
the implementation of the code. We find that Tobin Q increases as the board monitoring 
increases after the code implementation, therefore we contend that level of investment 
opportunities increases as the board’s monitoring and advising activity increases. The 
positive relationship between board monitoring and Tobin Q indicates that firm performance 
increases with the level of board activity. These results are consistent with the notion that 
increased pressure from shareholders activists and regulators shift the bargaining power from 
management to shareholders, enhancing shareholder power as a result of the implementation 
of the code. Raheja (2005) is of the view that as the benefits increases, the boards will get 
bigger with outside directors and monitoring function will increase.  
Unlike Tobin Q, which increases as the board monitoring role is strengthened after the 
implementation of the code; we find no relationship between board monitoring role and 
ROA. This supports the notion that board monitoring role is more beneficial for the investors 
to identify the investment opportunities rather than improving current performance. Similarly 
there is no support found between board size and ROA. This means that board size as a proxy 
to the board resource provision role does not have specific impact on the current profitability 
of the firm with respect to return on assets. This further strengthens the notion that board 
resource provision role and monitoring role is perceived positively by the outside investors 
and they invested more in the firms who reported compliance to SECP code as compared to 
their counterparts. It can be inferred that the companies deemed it the much easier thing to 
report the board changes as per code instructions instead of making some deep rooted 
changes in the financial structure of the firms. This is also in line with the popular stream of 
the literature which shows a mixed relationship between board size and ROA (Van Ness, 
2010). Our findings indicate that the compliance to the code does not elaborate any 
relationship between board roles and firm performance with respect to the accounting 
measure (ROA). It can be inferred that in the short term time period the boards may not have 
been able to develop some long time strategy for the firm and they are still limited to the 
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compliance to the code to remain on the stock exchange and to avoid any punitive action 
from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP). The boards might not have adopted 
these mechanisms with true letter and spirit as boards traditionally have been comprised of 
closed members of the founding families of the organizations and apparently they just 
adopted the tick box approach. But the code has been able to create some waves of change in 
the corporate governance mechanisms and it has gained some confidence in the stock markets 
of Pakistan (ROSC, 2005). 
 6.8 Resource Provision Role of the board and corporate financial performance 
We found that board size (board size taken as resource dependence proxy) has interesting 
outcomes with firm performance. The positive relationship between board size and market 
based performance measure is also supported by the past literature evidence (such as Henry, 
2008; Beiner et al., 2006). In contrast to US and UK, the stock market values the ability of 
smaller corporate boards to effectively monitor and advise managers higher than the potential 
greater access to resources that is usually associated with larger boards. Within the Pakistani 
context, the positive association between board size and the Tobin Q seems to indicate that 
greater access to a firm’s external environment, which may facilitate securing critical 
resources to enhance the resource dependence role of the board that is often associated with 
larger boards, is rather highly valued by the stock market. 
There is no relationship between board size and ROA for which the reason may be that as 
with increase on board size the new members presumably having some financial or legal 
backgrounds were too cautious to engage in some entrepreneurial activity, which results in 
loss of opportunities for revenue growth. Our result shows that heterogeneity of director 
expertise increases revenue growth. This findings show that diverse ideas generated from 
diverse perspectives can help firms to identify new opportunities in firm growth. Board size 
also influenced performance in interesting ways. As board size increases, financial leverage 
as measured by the debt-to-asset ratio decreases. The literature suggests that larger boards 
may hamper consensus building (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), thus debt-funded projects may 
be a victim of board indecisiveness.  
The findings of the study also give support to Daily et al., (1999). They have argued that 
despite several decades of research designed to link the board composition and firm 
performance the relationship has been mixed and inconsistent. However, the positive board 
size and the Tobin Q relationship lends empirical support to a number of studies outside the 
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UK and US (Beiner et al., 2006; Henry, 2008) which supports its impact in the context of 
corporate governance reforms in Pakistan. This is also in line with Wan and Ong (2005) who 
contended that board composition and firm performance may not have universal relationship 
as there are too many intervening roles and functions to expect a strong direct association. 
With regard to individual board characteristics, the stronger relationship is found between 
board structure and monitoring role of the board as compared to their relationship with 
resource provision role of the board which may be attributed due to the imperfact proxy for 
the resource dependence role because of country/context and unique data set differences. In 
case of  performance indicators the relationship is found with Tobin Q but not with ROA 
which shows that corporate governance reforms are able to attract more investors and 
instilled more confidence of shareholders but the real changes in financial performance may 
be needing more longer tenure for board members to realize the effect of these reforms.  
Theoretically, this indicates that the market perceives larger size of the boards (board size 
taken as resource dependence proxy) as more effective. This is because larger boards provide 
with better networking with the outside world through the board members personal 
connections for securing of critical resources, such as more sales orders, cheaper finance,  
and raw materials etc. (Pearce and Zahra, 1992; Goodstein et al., 1994).  
6.9 The Overall Findings of the Study  
This study advances knowledge about the factors that influence firm performance and the 
influences on the control role and resource dependence role of the board of directors in 
Pakistan. Apart from the  studies by (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Wan and Ong, 2006; Van 
Ees et al., 2008), there is no other empirical study in my knowledge focussing on board 
structural characteristics and firm performance mediated by board roles in Pakistan using 
quantitative data. The results discussed previously in this section show that board structure 
and roles are more important in explaining firm performance. These findings are similar to a 
number of non-Pakistani studies (e.g. Van den Heuvel et al., 2006; Wan and Ong, 2005). 
These structural characteristics are those derived from agency theory and resource 
dependency theory and given more importance in SECP code. Specifically, agency theorists 
advocate boards should have a majority of NEDs, and a separate CEO and Chairperson of the 
board to perform effectively the monitoring function (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The importance of board structure is also recognised in resource 
dependency theory. The resource dependence theorists advocate that the primary role of the 
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board is a resource provider linking the organisation with its external environment (Hillman 
and Dalziel, 2003). The resource dependence role demands from them that board members 
should bring legitimacy to the firm by providing the strategic resources to the firm in the 
shape of expertise and advice (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Gales and Kesner, 1994; 
Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Therefore, it is imperative that  directors 
bring diverse resources to the organization because of their different backgrounds. (Hillman 
et al., 2000). Thus, according to resource dependency, larger boards are better able to bring 
such resources (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Hill man et al., 2009). 
The major revelation of the study is that all structural variables influence the higher board 
activity monitoring role while inside-outside ratio and separation of CEO/chair duality also 
influence the board resource dependence role as well. A unique contribution of this research 
is the finding that the control role and/or the resource dependence role of the board partially 
mediate the relationship between a number of board structure variables and firm 
performance. Mediation is about the intervening functions that strengthen relationships 
between variables (Baron and Kenny, 1986). Uniquely, this study finds that board roles 
mediate the relationship between board structural characteristics and firm performance in 
Pakistan after the implementation of corporate governance reforms. This has important 
implications for future research on boards. It suggests that board roles may be a means in 
which boards can add value to their organisation. There are three specific findings of note 
with regard to the mediation effect. First, both the monitoring role and the resource 
dependence role of the board mediate the relationship between proportion of NEDs and firm 
performance, CEO/chairman separation and firm performance. Second, no significant 
relationship was found between diligence of audit committee and the resource dependence 
role which is represented here as size of the board, however, the audit committee 
independence is found related with the board monitoring and resource provision activity of 
the board represented as frequency of board meetings and board size here. Third and finally, 
the monitoring role of the board and resource dependence roles showed stronger relationships 
with Tobin Q as compared with ROA.  
This study does, however, find that all structural variables were significant in explaining the 
monitoring role of the board. The proportion of NEDs, separation of CEO/chairman duality, 
audit committee diligence and independence were found significantly related to the 
monitoring role of the board when examining the relationship between a number of the board 
structural variables and it caused higher board monitoring activity to strengthen the 
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monitoring role of the board. However, only the audit committee independence was found to 
be significantly and positively related with resource dependence role of the board. This 
means boards with a higher proportion of executive directors on the board are less effective 
in undertaking their monitoring role. This suggests that boards with a higher proportion of 
NEDs and separate CEO from chairman of board are more active in their monitoring role 
activities. This is a finding in line with the predictions of agency theory (Fama, 1980; 
Eisenhardt, 1989; Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and also of recent empirical research from 
Van Ees et al., (2008). This result may be particularly applicable to the Pakistan with the 
strong emphasis on SECP codes. There is a possibility that the findings of the study may 
present some country specific differences even though it has significant implications for the 
board theory suggesting some more cross country specific studies in order to understand the 
impact of national context and particularly Anglo-Saxon contexts. As various authors suggest 
in order to better understand the workings of board of directors, greater cross-country 
comparison is required and this research adds to the studies that have taken place in US and 
UK (Huse, 2007; Minichilli et al., 2010; Pugliese et al., 2009; Wan and Ong, 2005). 
 The analysis also shows that proportion of NEDs and CEO/chairman role separations are 
influencing the size of the board after the implementation of SECP code. The study also 
showcases that board size increases after SECP code implementation. This is in line with 
Linck et al., (2008) and Minichilli et al., (2009) who argue that more skilled people are added 
to the board. However, the study didn’t find any relationship between audit committee 
diligence and board resource provision role which is against the results of Cohen et al. (2008) 
which may be interpreted that members of the audit committee solely see themselves as 
monitors and their role as resource provider is undermined due to this perception.  
When examining the relationship between all the independent variables, mediating variables 
and dependent variables in a multiple regression, this study finds that SECP code has stronger 
impact on board structure to influence the board roles and firm value. This concept highlights 
the importance of critical debate in improving level of board activity and skills (Amason, 
1996; Amason and Sapienza, 1997; Eisenhardt et al., 1997). This has implications for the 
composition and the working style and development of boards. It is implied that after the 
implementation of SECP code boards have an environment where their role is being asserted 
and encouraged. These results are in line with a number of previous studies, according to 
which one of the most important antecedents of board roles is the presence of an independent 
board and effectively working sub-committees (Finkelstein and Mooney, 2003; Minichilli et 
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al., 2009; Roberts et al., 2005; McNulty et al., 2013). A further finding is that the board size 
increases after the implementation of SECP code to comply with the independent directors 
clause and to have expert and experienced members on the board (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
Linck et al., 2008) also the study is supportive of board monitoring and resource dependence 
roles (Minichilli et al., 2009). 
This relates to the proposed new model in board structure and board role relationship, 
however, in common with calls from Pugliese et al., (2009) these findings lead to the 
suggestion that there is need for more research in board roles for better proxies in the 
Pakistani context. Our board roles research has been based upon the existing board theories: 
agency theory and resource dependence theory. But the theoretical underpinnings of the 
construct require further research. This could arise from the board roles measurement proxies 
which are imperfect and need further closer measurements. The reason being the nature of 
this unique data set being archival in nature from 1999 to 2005 for which we had to rely on 
the published data in the annual reports. However, the model in this study uses a host of 
board structure indicators, board roles and firm performance indicators which shows the 
robustness of the model. Unlike previous studies where subjective measures have been taken 
which are usually judgmental in nature and depend purely on the perception of the researcher, 
this study employs objective measures and data is collected from company annual reports 
which are considered as the strong proxy (Beattie et al., 2004). Also, the results in chapter 5 
tables 5.5, 5.6, 5.7, 5.8 show that the values of adjusted R-square and χ-square of the model 
are improved in the post SECP era, similarly the value of adjusted R-square and χ-square are 
stronger in the relationship between board structural characteristics and board roles as 
compared to board roles and firm performance.  
Therefore, overall the study reveals interesting findings. There is a clear trend of increased 
activity from the period before the implementation of SECP code to after the implementation 
of SECP code 2002. There is increase in the proportion of non-executive directors after the 
implementation of SECP code which is in line with its requirement. The code requires that 
the majority of the directors should be independent non-executive directors (SECP Code). 
There is a negative trend in the dual role of CEO and Chairperson of the board. The results 
show that the trend is on separation of role of CEO and chairperson of the board after the 
implementation of the code. The formation and working of the audit committees has been 
hallmark of the code. Previously, either the committees were non-existent or if existing they 
were by and large dormant. After the implementation of the code there is surge in the number 
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of meetings held by the audit committee and same is the case for the independence of the 
audit committee. However, the diligence of audit committee shows positive signals to board 
meeting frequency and independence of audit committee shows positive relation to board 
meeting frequency as well as board size. Therefore, the presence of NEDs on audit committee 
shows that board consists of independent NEDs which may improve its resource dependence 
role.  The most important contribution of SECP code is increased activity in the board 
meetings, which may be attributed due to the increase in proportion of non-executive 
directors or increase in the audit committee activity and independence of audit committee 
after the implementation of the code. From year 2002 to onward, there is an increase in the 
size of the board as well which may be attributed to appointment of more independent non-
executive directors on the board.  
 
KSE-100 Index 
 
Figure 6.5 Source: Karachi stock Exchange, KSE Annual Report, 2005  
 
Overall, the results show a compliant trend of the organizations with SECP code which is 
also according to the report of World Bank (2005) on the Country wise corporate governance 
assessment regarding code compliance. This report clearly indicates that after the initial 
bumpy start the companies adopted the requirements laid down by SECP code to succumb 
the external regulatory pressure. Although the empirical evidence shows that the companies 
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adopted these rules but there is no change in the firm profitability as a result of these changes 
which implies that changes were just to give positive vibes in the market which shows a 
positive increase in the value of Tobin Q to fulfil the pressures of stock exchanges.  
The firm size shows the increasing trend which may be attributed due to the reason that the 
leverage and the capital expenditure are also growing in the same time period. However, the 
percentage of directors’ share is decreasing in the overall director holdings, which may be an 
indication that the allocation of shares to the general public is increasing as may be seen from 
the graph in Fig. 6.5 (KSE, 2007). 
The results of the study go in line with the market trend as well. The SECP code imposed 
severe restrictions on the organizations and the codes were implemented through a 
mechanism of stock exchanges. This proved that the compliance to the code was deemed 
necessary to remain on the stock exchange; otherwise organizations were facing the threat of 
delisting on the organization. We also saw that organizations that could not comply with the 
code were delisted from the KSE but the effect on the other hand on other organization 
seemed positive who got complied with the code. However, we saw that the overall market 
activity increased and we those organizations who managed to remain on the stock exchange, 
their market share prices went up (KSE, 2003, 2004, and 2005). This also implies that 
compliance to code generated positive signals to local as well as foreign investors who 
considered investing in KSE in the shape of portfolio investment as a safer option as 
compared to foreign direct investment which helped improved market listed capital as well as 
overall market capitalization (Economic Survey, 2008). The following figure supplement our 
findings as well.  
Table 6.1 Listing and Delisting Activity on the Karachi Stock Exchange: 2001-2005 
Year Listed 
Companies at 
End of the 
Year 
IPOs Total Listed 
Capital  
Rs.In Millions 
Market 
capitalization 
Rs. In Millions 
Other 
Voluntary 
Delisting 
Involuntary 
Delisting 
2001 747 3 251,683.1 296,143.7 10 0 
2002 712 4 291,240.85 595,205.63 19 5 
2003 701 6 313,267.23 951,446.50 0 8 
2004 661 17 405,646.32 1,723,454.36 15 30 
2005 662 16 460,497.87 2,361,322.63 7 6 
 
Source: Karachi stock Exchange, KSE Annual Report, 2005 
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6.10 Implications for board practice and policy 
The empirical findings also have implications for board practice and policy. First, the 
important contribution played by SECP code to improving board monitoring, board resource 
dependence role and firm performance has implications for the dynamics and composition of 
the board. The boards’ ability to institute and perform an independent audit mechanism is 
also very vital for the board roles. The ability of a board to work as team is critical to board 
effectiveness, but this needs to have better measurements for board roles and to work together 
for the benefit of the organisation. This has important implications for the audit committee of 
boards which will enhance board capability in formativeness. As well as the boards need to 
have an independent nomination committee for independent board members.  
The finding that boards with more outside directors better perform their control role also 
suggests having a fine balance of outside and inside directors on the board, as well as on the 
resource dependence role. This will also help in reducing the board entrenchment prevailing 
as a result of closed family members on the board. This finding leads to board consisting of 
relevantly skilled board members as per the requirement of the code to have financial and 
legal experts on the board. The compliance to the SECP code leads to increase in board size 
as it is not easier to withdraw the services of existing executive board members. However, 
boards need to be more cautious in member selection and need to constitute a criterion 
through nomination committee for getting better board members. These findings support the 
contention of McNulty et al., (2005; 2013) that it is necessary to go beyond simply looking at 
matters of the composition of the board in terms of the independence of the board to the 
composition in terms of person characteristics that lead to open, and constructive debate in 
the boardroom. However, this study couldn’t measure the knowledge and skills of the board 
members; therefore, the implication for boards is that they need to create mechanisms and 
opportunities for this to happen through for example, continuous board evaluations and board 
development programmes through some institutional mechanism and the same should be 
published for better understanding of academia about board roles. 
Second, the results of this study have implications for the workings of the board and in 
particular the separation of role of the CEO and board chairperson. This result suggested that 
by separating CEO and board chairs, an open atmosphere has been created which is plausible 
to enhance the effective operational dynamics of the board. It also requires that the 
chairperson ensures that all the necessary information upon which such constructive debate is 
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available to board members with sufficient time for the careful scrutiny that can lead to open 
dialogue and disagreement. An annual review of overall board and individual board members 
performance may contribute to better group dynamics through a greater understanding of 
individual’s contribution to effective board roles. As well as the independence of audit 
committee has been found related with better resource dependence role of the board which is 
according to a study by Goh (2009) but this result has some implications with respect to 
formation of audit committees as well.  
Though SECP code requires three directors with two NEDs on an audit committee but the 
results suggest that firms had larger in size committees which may suggest that larger audit 
committees may lead to better internal control mechanisms and have legal experts than just 
accounting experts as advocated by SECP code. The size of the board has been assumed as 
the resource dependence role of the board. It is thus important that as a result of 
implementation of SECP code, new directors who are non-executive with specific expertise 
are involved in all board discussions and decisions where their knowledge and skills are able 
to be best utilised. This also may have implications for leadership roles inside the board room 
and to the concept of ‘shared leadership‘(Vandewaerde et al., 2011). This means to take 
advantage of members’ diverse backgrounds, board chairs should consider undertaking an 
annual audit of members’ skills and knowledge to identify gaps and look to see how such 
gaps can best be filled and try to arrange the relevant training for the existing members as 
well as strive to woo the required skilled members from the outer world to improve the board 
overall intellectual capital. In case of Pakistan, the members can be sent for the relevant 
training to Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance.  
Some additional findings regarding control variables; the proportions of shares held by the 
directors was insignificant and negatively related to monitoring role (Board meeting 
frequency) and resource depend role (Board size) of the board, which suggests that higher 
concentrations of shares tends to fewer board meetings and smaller board size and thus don’t 
require board members to actively control the actions of the executives (Himmelberg et al., 
1999; Ntim, 2012). The implication of this finding is that if in an organization the few 
directors have concentration of shares in their hands, they will not care about the disperse and 
relatively smaller shareholders which will create a different situation where principal is 
exploited by the principal which is another major issue in particularly family based 
organizations. This is because they hold enough voting power to effectively insulate 
themselves against any disciplinary action. Similarly, the relationship between firm size and 
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board monitoring (board meeting frequency) and resource dependence (Board size) roles 
provide support to the results of previous studies (Yermack, 1996; Carter et al., 2003). This 
shows that firm size is important for higher board activity and larger board size and firms can 
afford to have better equipped directors and they are frequently engaged in controlling the 
executives. By contrast, the study doesn’t find any impact of R&D ratio or Capex which is 
against the previous studies (Myers, 1977). The reason for this may be that in Pakistani 
environment, not much is spent in modernizing and revamping in the local industries. The 
leverage is also positive and significant with board roles, the reason being that high leveraged 
firms may have agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and need more monitoring 
and presence of additional board members from lenders so giving rise to resource dependence 
role by having bigger boards eventually. Our results show harmony with the previous 
literature showing that board roles and firm performance relationship may be different in 
different industries (Durnev and Kim, 2005; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006). The industry 
dummies show that chemicals and industrial sector firms (have comparatively more level of 
significant coefficient than their counterparts in the other four industries. The reason may be 
that the firms in these sectors are bigger in size on average as compared to other firm in other 
sectors and they needed more board activity and bigger size of the boards.  
Finally, the empirical findings have implications for corporate governance policy. Existing 
codes of governance like SECP code place greater emphasis on board structures and the 
importance of board independence. These results suggest that whilst recommendations on 
minimum numbers of NEDs should become mandatory rather than comply or explain and  
codes must also layout the reporting procedure to bring more transparency to internal matters 
of the board. Although, the biggest achievement of SECP code is an audit committee on the 
board which usually consists of only accounting experts, if the committee also has a legal 
expert, it will also help improve the resource provision role of the board. It is also suggested 
to have a mechanism of nomination committee for instituting the more transparent 
mechanism of finding the independent directors with a diverse range of knowledge and skills 
to fill the positions on the board and the audit committee. This will fulfil the demands of the 
disperse shareholders at large and will enhance the board monitoring and resource 
dependence roles.  Therefore, it is needed as a matter of policy that companies should 
undertake periodical board members appraisal and the results of this assessment should be 
published. Nevertheless another important policy implication for the regulators will be to 
ascertain the attributes of those firms with more active and diligent audit committees so that 
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the failing firms can learn from them to constitute an effective internal control mechanism. 
Our study also provides sufficient evidence that regulatory pressure had an influence on the 
governance structure as activity increased in audit committees and they became more 
independent.  
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CHAPTER 7 
Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
This research had four objectives at the outset to be achieved as a result of this study. First 
objective was to develop and examine a model of the relationship between board structural 
characteristics, board roles and firm performance. The objective was met by building a model 
on existing literature by employing multiple theoretical lenses. This model relates the board 
structural characteristics (Proportion of non-executive directors, CEO/Chairperson Duality, 
Diligence of Audit Committee, and independence of Audit Committee) before and after the 
implementation of SECP code to firm performance (Tobin Q and Return on Assets) through 
two mediating variables reflecting board monitoring role (Board meeting frequency) and 
board resource dependence role (board size). The model has been examined through various 
hypotheses. 
The second objective was to investigate the factors affecting board structure and firm 
performance relationship in an emerging market under multi-theoretic lens. The objective 
was met by designing a study outside US and UK context to fill the knowledge gap in this 
area of the literature by proposing that board roles are important intervening variables in the 
relationship between board structural characteristics and firm financial performance. The 
study got its inspirations particularly from a group of researchers like e.g. Hillman and 
Dalziel, (2003); Huse, (2005); Van Ees et al., (2009); Roberts et al., (2005) to propose the 
control role and resource dependence role under agency and resource dependence theory to 
be found in the existing literature. 
The third objective was to judge the influence of SECP code on board structure and firm 
performance in Pakistan. The objective has been met as the study provided evidence that 
changed board structure after the implementation of SECP code had been instrumental in 
creating an environment to strengthening the roles of the boards by increased board activity 
and board resources to enhance firm value. The model was tested through a unique data set of 
200 non-financial sector companies registered on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) in Pakistan 
from 1999 to 2005 by comparing the results of two time periods. The period of 1999-2001 is 
the time period before the implementation of SECP code and 2003-2005 is the time period 
after the implementation of SECP code. However, the change in Tobin Q only shows that 
whenever the regulations are imposed thorough external pressures, they are adopted to bring 
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change to imitate or model according to others but no broad-based changed is brought which 
is according to the deliberations of institutional theory which suggests that management 
practices and practices may be influenced by formal or informal pressures in the short run 
(Kury, 2007) while agency theory starts that managers may collude in this particular situation 
to avoid the impact of these pressures as they would always like to show relatively rosy 
picture eventually to shareholders (Rahman and Ali, 2006) .  
The fourth and the final objective was to develop the recommendations for the policy makers 
and board members on how they individually and collectively can contribute to adding value 
to the firm. The objective was met as study showed that the induction of new board members 
having relevant professional backgrounds caused an increase in board size to work as board 
resource as well as the monitoring capability of the board after the implementation of SECP 
code. The study also proved that adoption of these reforms proved instrumental in the capital 
market development in Pakistan but their impact on individual firm profitability was mixed. 
Therefore, the study suggests that SECP need to further address these issues to arrange that 
board members inducted fulfil the eligibility criterion established for them and furthermore, 
there should be regular refresher courses for the directors to keep them abreast with the 
upcoming changes in the international corporate governance scenario. The  board members 
are required to follow the reforms in letter and spirit so that the results are transmitted in the 
actual profitability of the organization as well. 
The findings accordingly have important implications for policy makers and managers, as 
well as contribute valuable comparisons and contrasts to the empirical findings and 
theoretical viewpoints to be found in the existing research literature. 
7.2. Conclusions of the Study 
A detailed literature review exploring the research on boards suggested that there is limited 
understanding of the research on board roles explaining board structure and firm 
performance. One of the stated aims of this study was to investigate this relationship in order 
to add to knowledge and to identify how corporate governance reforms restructured boards 
which may help to add value to a company through strengthening board roles. From this 
literature review, a model and hypotheses were developed to examine the relationships 
between board structural characteristics, board roles, and firm performance in the backdrop of 
SECP code. To be able to test the veracity of the model, two panel datasets were constructed. 
One panel was from 1999 to 2001 and other panel from 2003 to 2005. Both the panels were 
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for three years time period and the study saddled the year 2002 which is the year when SECP 
code was enforced   as the companies were in process of implementation of the code in that 
year. Using this model, the concepts of board roles mediation in board structural and firm 
performance relationship by using multiple theoretical lenses in the backdrop of corporate 
governance reforms by using the panel data was thought to be novel contributions to the 
board and corporate governance literature.  
Following the model, the panel dataset was conducted for two independent periods to judge 
the impact of board structural characteristics on board roles and firm performance before and 
after the implementation of SECP code. The panel dataset was examined to judge the 
presence of panel specification effects using Hausman test. The results revealed that the panel 
data had random effects. Consequently, the process of hypotheses testing was conducted 
using random effect regression analysis. The hypotheses relating to the mediating impact of 
the board control role and board resource dependence role were tested using the method 
proposed by Baron and Kenny (1986) along with the application of the Sobel Test to check 
for the significance of the Baron and Kenny (1986) method, similar to the approach of De 
Jong and Elfring (2010). Most of the hypotheses were accepted or partially accepted at the 
5% significance level.  
There was no relationship found between, audit committee diligence and resource provision 
role of the board. This may be the result from the relatively small time frame of the panel 
dataset or it could be the result of imperfect measures used for the resource dependence role. 
Another view point is by Xie et al., (2003) is that more active audit committees assume a 
variety of board tasks to help manage the finance and audit related activities and in response 
the board may be relatively inactive. However, the relationship has been significant and 
positive between audit committee independence and board roles including both monitoring 
role and resource dependence role of the board 
These results suggest that board structural characteristics are significant predictors of firm 
performance and that the monitoring and resource dependence roles of the board found their 
mediation relationship stronger after the implementation of the corporate governance 
reforms. The results confirm recent empirical findings of the importance of board roles as 
intermediary mechanisms in explaining firm performance (Aguilera and Cuervo-Cazzura, 
2009; Brick and Chidambaran, 2010; Van Ees et al., 2009). In addition, the results showed 
that characteristics of board sub-committees such as diligence of audit committee was having 
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significant relationship with board meeting frequency and firm performance which proves the 
results obtained by Raghunandan and Rama (2007) and Sharma et al., (2009). The 
relationship of independence of audit committee is significant with board size and board 
meeting frequency and shows the strengthening of not only board control role but resource 
dependence role as well. This is also in line with the study of board subcommittee structural 
significance with board independence and resources (Braswell et al., 2012; Boone and 
Mulherin, 2012; Goh, 2009). This is also in line with another research that says that benefits 
of independence of audit committee are only achieved if they are independent (Bronson et al., 
2009) and prospective investors perceive them independent. This shows that the prospective 
investors gave importance to not only boards but also to board sub-committee structures. The 
results also revealed that board structural characteristics and firm performance relationship 
was significant and stronger with market based firm performance measure (Tobin Q) as 
compared to accounting based measure of performance (ROA) which shows that investors 
consider the changes as positive but the corporate governance reforms couldn’t bring any 
structural changes in the  firms. The reason may be that at least in this time period of three 
years after the introduction of SECP, the data didn’t reveal any significant changes in the 
profitability of the firms.  
7.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
There are five new contributions this research makes to knowledge on boards of directors. 
First, the monitoring role and the resource dependence role are found to be partial mediators 
of the association between various characteristics of board structural and financial 
performance of the firm based upon the market based mechanism. Most of the previous 
researches have used the board roles as the dependent variables to judge the output of the 
board structure. This study shows its novelty by employing the monitoring role and resource 
dependence role as mediating or intervening mechanism between major board structure 
indicators and performance of the firm. Within this first contribution, there are three specific 
findings of note with regard to the mediation effect. One, both the monitoring role and the 
resource dependence role of the board partially mediate the relationship between proportion 
of NEDs on the board, separation of CEO/board chairman, and firm performance. Two, the 
diligence of audit committee has a significant relationship with monitoring role of the board 
and independence of audit committee has significant relationship with both board roles 
including resource dependence role of the board as well as control role. Three, SECP code 
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influences board structure which has an impact on firm value via the performance of the 
control and resource dependence roles of the board. 
The second contribution of the study is that it is different from the previous studies as it tries 
to use multi-theoretic perspective to prove that if the board monitoring and resource provision 
roles are strengthened, the financial performance of the organization will be strengthened. 
The study goes one step further and explains that the equivocal results of board structure and 
firm performance relationship are explained through the mediation of board roles and not 
through the direct relationship between board structure and firm financial performance. From 
the point of view of the literature, this study assumes the novelty by undertaking more than 
one board roles simultaneously in the empirical literature outside the developed world.  Most 
of the studies in the past (Forbes and Millikan, 1999; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003; Huse, 2007) 
have studied the markets of either USA or UK and EU to discuss the board functions and 
board roles, in this way, the study is a response to the slow empirical progress in this field 
and tries to bridge the gap created as a result of fast progress on the qualitative fronts.  
The third contribution of this research is to study the listed companies’ data from Pakistan, an 
emerging economy in South Asian region, where generally the research culture is low except 
India. Whilst the results show some commonalities between Pakistan and other countries, 
they also suggest some significant differences like the study shows that the changes were 
brought in the organization which only wooed the external investors however, the real control 
of the organization remained with the powerful family. This suggests that that there is a need 
to recognise the importance of national context as a contingency variable in corporate 
governance research (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Therefore, the study 
has built a unique corporate governance dataset comprising of two panel datasets that cover 
both the pre- and post-SECP code implementation periods. It also has investigated the 
changes took place in board structural characteristics since SECP was implemented. 
Therefore, by using cross sectional time series data, it provides stronger ground for the 
internal and external validity of the results. It has also discussed that changes in board 
structure after SECP code were instrumental in strengthening board roles and firm 
performance over all.  
The fourth contribution of this study is to find the critical role of corporate governance 
reforms in shaping the board structure to enhance the firm value. It also proved that more 
members were added on the boards after the reforms with different backgrounds to make use 
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of member resources. Previous studies suggest board roles are the product of the structure 
whereas they are in fact mediating mechanisms that lead to firm performance. This novelty 
will allow future research to assess the value creating potential of boards.  
The fifth and final contribution this research relates to the implications of the findings for 
board practices and policies in Pakistan on corporate governance in general and specifically 
on boards of directors. The results suggest greater emphasis on the board roles that enhance 
firm performance. Primarily, this proved that investors look the addition of more non-
executive members on the board and separation of the role of CEO and board chair positively 
in order to avoid hegemony of single person and to create the environment conducive for 
members to actively participate in critical debate. However, this is double edged and should 
be used cautiously that chairperson doesn’t have any biasedness towards any board member 
and treats all equally by providing equal chances of discussion. The findings also suggest that 
boards need to have members with a range of knowledge and skills as well as there is need 
for devising a mechanism to ensure that knowledge is used. This has important implications 
for the selection of board members and for board development. These results also suggest the 
need for boards to conduct regular reviews and evaluation of board members, to optimise the 
contribution of each member. The results also suggest that boards with a higher proportion of 
NEDs better perform their monitoring and resource dependence roles which are another 
major contribution of this study by using multi-theoretic lens. This is supportive of rules 
regarding the number of outside directors on boards. Similarly, the diligence and 
independence of audit committees have been found significant for the control role and 
resource dependence role of the board respectively. This may imply that there is need to 
make broad based changes in the information provided in the annual reports regarding 
director backgrounds and qualifications so that clear information is available regarding 
control with a diverse range of knowledge and skills respectively.  
7.4 Limitations of the Study 
As with most research efforts, this study is inevitably constrained by limitations and these 
limitations apply to the conclusions. Generally, the study suffers from five main limitations. 
Although, the study is quantitative in nature and researcher has attempted to cover all aspects 
of the quantitative approach, however, the quantitative method is not free of limitations. As in 
this case, it is the tendency of the researcher to apply the principles of scientific enquiry to 
every phenomenon under investigation which potentially leads to ignoring the difference 
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between social and natural world, similarly, when conducting analysis using statistical 
quantitative methods tend to create a view which is devoid of real life relationships.  
Second, the sample size was not consisting of all nonfinancial sector firms registered on KSE. 
The data was consisting of textile firms majorly but the sample taken was also a 
representative of overall population as the number of textile firms registered outnumbers any 
other sector on the stock exchange in Pakistan.  
Third, the data was archival in nature and there was no digital archive available for this data. 
The data was primarily 10 to 15 years older and there was no trend of keeping the data 
digitally before 2010. Secondly, the proxies used for board roles were imperfect. The study 
could have used the more near proxies for board roles by getting information directly from 
the board members but over a period of more than a decade the majority of the directors 
either left or changed the companies and their updated information was not available. 
However, in that case depending on their memory for a firm for which they served 10 to 15 
years before could have created some validity and reliability issues regarding the study. 
Therefore, directors up-to-date information regarding is notoriously difficult and this may 
limit the extent to which the conclusions can be generalised. However, the data was extracted 
from annual reports which are considered the certified and most authentic corporate data 
disclosure, thus increasing the strength of the generalisability of the results.  
Fourth, the study used a single country and thus the findings may be limited to Pakistan and 
not generalised to other countries. Unfortunately, cross country studies also have their 
limitations in board research. This may be due to different legal structures, which can create 
comparative problems. One, legal requirements may mean countries have different board 
structures, for example single tier boards versus multiple tier boards. Two, legislation may 
specify the requirements of board members to do different things in different countries. 
(Seifert et al., 2005: Wu, 2005). These difficulties may lead to problems in undertaking 
comparator cross-country studies. However, whenever the codes are taken as cross-country 
comparison, there will always be differences with respect to different legal and social 
environments and it is difficult to unify a single framework of good practices across the 
boarders in the short term (Aguilera, 2005; Daily et al., 2003; Roberts et al., 2005; 
Sundaramarthy and Lewis, 2003; Zona and Zattoni, 2007). Whilst longitudinal studies have 
their own limitations, this study only uses a window of three years in a panel which might be 
182 
 
increased and more number of years may be tested again at some point in the future for better 
generalisability.  
Fifth, whilst the study provides insights into the corporate governance reforms that influence 
board structural characteristics, board role, and firm performance, it does not examine the 
dynamic interactions of the various board roles as and when they happen due to the nature of 
the proxies used for the board roles, as well as due to non-availability of continuous historical 
data. Therefore, an event study technique couldn’t be employed because daily and weekly  
events data is not available. Also the firms are not obliged to announce the governance 
changes they incorporate into the media and they only disclose in their annual reports, 
therefore, only the end results can be captured. However, this is not a big limitation as prior 
research (Chidambaran, Palia, and Zheng, 2010) indicates that there is not enough evidence 
that governance changes at a particular time bring immediate changes in the financial 
performance of the firms, therefore, use of the proxies like ROA and Robin Q seems quite 
reasonable. Nevertheless, it may be noted with a caveat that the founding families still have 
the influence on the firm and the context may be different from the other countries because of 
the ownership structures, therefore, while making generalization from this study to other 
contexts care should be taken. Because of the difference in the nature of the context, it may 
have different governance mechanisms and the results may not be directly applicable to 
contexts with different ownership structures.  
 
7.5 Recommendations for Future Research 
The findings and limitations of this study point to a number of areas requiring further 
research. First, a study examining the impact of different board structural characteristics on 
board roles, and firm performance is an area worthy of further exploration.  
Second, the board roles may be measured by using an interactive process instead of using 
fixed proxies.  
Third, for a longitudinal study, the number of years could be increased but the problem of 
availability of data will always plague the repetition of such study in the future. This will 
allow the results of the study to be compared with future studies and help increase the 
understanding of board role effectiveness.  
Fourth, a cross country study could be undertaken to better understand the impact of national 
contexts on board structural characteristics, board roles, and firm performance. The study 
could be replicated using data from other countries enabling cross-country comparison in 
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developing a universal framework for investigating corporate governance. The findings that 
board structural characteristics are predictors of board roles lead to further questions 
regarding the dynamism of board roles, such as, discussion on meeting agendas, use of 
personal contacts and expertise and knowledge in different situations for the betterment of the 
organization. There are a number of interesting areas with regards to the board roles which 
future studies could examine. For example, the extent to which board diversity can enhance 
the board efficiency and effectiveness through more cohesive working environments.  
Fifth, this study has used the organizational board as the unit of analysis. The contribution of 
the individual director was not the focus of this study. In future, studies can be conducted to 
judge the contribution of individual board member to study the board dynamics intrinsically 
such as a study by Greve et al (2011). Studies adopting a multi-level unit of analysis will help 
enhance our understanding of both the contribution of individual directors and the board 
efficiency and effectiveness. Further to this, the multiple board members for example a CEO 
as well a non-executive member could be used as the respondent to explore the effects of the 
perceptions of other board members on board roles and performance in line with suggestions 
from Hillman et al., (2008) and Minichilli et al., (2010). 
Sixth and another very important aspect of the future direction is that our study suggests that 
larger boards are better for monitoring as well as resource dependence roles. However, there 
is no less literature suggesting that smaller boards are more effective (Yermack 1996; 
Eisenberg et al., 1998). Therefore, what could be the repercussions of affording more 
directors as more cost is not the solution for improved monitoring and finding the optimal 
board size may be the optimal solution for better firm performance.   
Another area in which the researchers in the future can shed more light is the choice of 
measures for the financial performance of the firm. Although this study used ROA and Tobin 
Q as the measures for the financial performance of the firm to capture the accounting as well 
as market based performance and the rationale and limitations for using each of these 
measures have been discussed in detail in section 4.9.1, nevertheless, in future researchers 
can use more elaborate performance measures such as market expectations and future 
abnormal returns to more closely observe the investors’ reactions to governance measures 
changes.  
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7.6 Concluding Thoughts 
 
This study has provided a useful contribution to the existing literature on board structural 
characteristics and their impact on board role and firm performance with respect to 
effectiveness of the corporate governance reforms. The novelty of this study is to use the 
multi-theoretic perspective in corporate governance studies in a context which is different 
from most of the studies conducted either in US or UK but provides support to the existing 
studies by providing empirical evidence that corporate governance reforms cause change in 
board structure to make the board perform better their monitoring and resource provision 
roles to achieve better the goals of shareholders. It contributes to the research on boards in 
several ways. First it examines through a multi-theoretic lens to explain board structural 
characteristics and board roles relationship than has hitherto taken place. Second it finds that 
board monitoring role and board resource dependence role are mediators of the relationship 
between board structural characteristics such as proportion of NEDs, separation of duality of 
board leadership structure, diligence and independence of audit committees and market based 
gauge of firm performance taken as Tobin Q. Third, it adds to the much argued area of a 
multi-theoretic approach to corporate governance. Fourth it has a number of implications for 
board practice and board policy. Specifically, the findings of the influence of corporate 
governance reforms on shaping the board structure and strengthening the board roles thereof 
is another very important contribution of this study. The induction of new board members 
having relevant professional backgrounds caused an increase in board size to work as board 
resource as well as the monitoring capability of the board. Finally, it offers suggestions on 
future directions for research on boards. 
  
185 
 
Appendix-A 
Sectors wise Companies Registered on Karachi Stock Exchange 
On 31
st
 December, 2005 
Name of Sector Total Number of 
Companies in 
Sector 
Proportion in Total 
Number of 
Companies listed 
Number of 
Companies 
Sampled in 
Sector 
Proportion 
of Sampled 
Companies 
in Sector 
Textiles 220 33% 80 13% 
Consumer Goods 104 16% 50 7.5% 
Chemicals  70 10% 36 5.5% 
Industrials 70 10% 34 5% 
Financials 138 21% Nil  
Oil and Gas 15 3% Nil  
Utilities 13 2.5% Nil  
Miscellaneous 26 4% Nil  
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Appendix-B 
Sector Wise List of the Sampled Companies 
1 GuL Ahmed textile 
 
42 Artistic Denim Mills ltd 
2 Ideal Spinning Mills 
 
43 Quetta textile mills ltd 
3 Sunrays textile 
 
43 Glamour textile mills ltd 
4 Shaheen Cotton mills ltd 
 
44 Shehzad Textile mills ltd 
5 Dewan Mushtaq textile mills  
 
45 Gadoon textile mills ltd 
6 Saleem Denim Industries ltd 
 
46 Mian Textile industries ltd 
7 Reliance cotton spinning mills ltd 
 
47 Shahpur Textile mills ltd 
8 Redco textile mills ltd 
 
48 Fawad Textile mills ltd 
9 Regent textile industries ltd 
 
49 Kohinoor Textile mills 
10 Saifex spinning mills ltd 
 
50 Dar es Salaam Textile mills ltd 
11 Sana Industries ltd 
 
51 shams textile mills ltd 
12 S.G. fibre ltd 
 
52 Nishat (Chunian) ltd 
 13 Bannu Woolen Mills ltd 
 
53 Kohinoor (Weaving) Mills ltd 
14 Din textile mills ltd 
 
54 Kohinoor Raiwind ltd 
 15 Olympia Spinning and Weaving  
 
55 Shadman cotton mills ltd 
16 Ishaq textile mills ltd 
 
56 Janana de maluchu textile mills ltd 
17 Fateh Sportswear ltd 
 
57 Masood Textile mills ltd 
18 Zahur cotton mills ltd 
 
58 Saif textile mills ltd 
 19 Taha spinning Mills ltd 
 
59 Indus Polyester company ltd 
20 Al-Qaim textile mills ltd 
 
60 Zahur textile mills ltd 
 21 Nadeem textile mills ltd 
 
61 Eastern Spinning mills ltd 
22 J.K spinning mills ltd 
 
62 yassir ndustries  
  23 Al-Qadir textile mills ltd 
 
63 The Ruby mills ltd 
 24 Asim textile mills ltd 
 
64 Chenab ltd 
 25 Sajjad Textile mills ltd 
 
65 Nishat mills ltd 
 26 Ayesha textile mills ltd 
 
66 Idrees textile mills ltd 
 27 Fateh Textile mills ltd 
 
67 Mahmood Textile mills ltd 
28 Modern textile mills ltd 
 
68 Fazal Cloth mills 
 29 Amin Spinning mills ltd 
 
69 Fatima Enterprize ltd 
 30 Dewan textile mills ltd 
 
70 ICC textiles ltd 
 31 Yousaf Weaving mills ltd 
 
71 Service Fabrics ltd 
 32 Gulshan spinning mills ltd 
 
72 Qayyum Spinning mills ltd 
33 gulistan Spinning Mills ltd 
 
73 Gillete Pakistan ltd 
 34 Apollo textile mills ltd 
 
74 Rashid Textile mills ltd 
35 Pakistan synthetics ltd 
 
75 Ravi Textile mills ltd 
 36 Premium textile mills ltd 
 
76 Maqbool company ltd 
37 Olympia textile mills ltd 
 
77 Tri Star Polyester ltd 
 38 Moonlite (Pak) ltd 
 
78 Ibrahim Fabrics ktd 
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39 Quality textile mills ltd 
 
79 Mahr Dastgir Textile mills ltd 
40 Tata textile mills ltd 
 
80 Paramount Spinning mills ltd 
41 Khurshid Spinning mills ltd 
 
 
  
2. Consumer Products 46. Wazir Ali Ind. Ltd. 
1. Adam Sugar 47. Suraj Ghee 
2. Abdullah Shah 48. Thal Ind. Corp. 
3. Al-Noor Sugar 49. Tandlianwala Sugar 
4. Ansari Sugar 50. Unilever Foods 
5. Baba Farid 3. Chemicals 
6. Chashma Sugar 1. Sardar Chemicals industries ltd 
7. Clover Pakistan 2. Biafo Industries ltd 
8. Colony Sugar Mills 3. Bawany air products ltd 
9. Data Agro 4. Haroon Mills Ltd. 
10. Dewan Sugar 5. Wah Nobel Chemicals 
11. Engro Foods Ltd. 6. Pakistan PVC Ltd. 
12. Extraction 7. ICI Pakistan Ltd. 
13. Faran Sugar 8. BOC Pakistan Ltd. 
14. Goodluck Industries 9. Gatron Industries Ltd. 
15. Habib Sugar Ind 10. Shafi Chemical Industries 
16. Hussein Sugar 11. Nimir Industrial Chemicals 
17. Haseeb Waqas Sugar 12. Mandviwala Plastic 
18. Ismail Industries 13. PTA 
19. J.D.W. Sugar 14. Cyanamid Pakistan Ltd. 
20. Kohinoor Sugar 15. Nimir Raisins 
21. Khairpur Sugar 16. Dynea Pak 
22. Khairpur Sugar 17. Agritech-V 
23. Mitchells Fruit Farms 18. Arif Habib Corp 
24. Mirpur Khas 19. Archoma Pak 
25. Morafco 20. Descon Chemical 
26. Mehran Sugar 21. Descon Oxychem 
27. Mirza Sugar 22. Dewan salman 
28. National Foods 23. Engro Frtilizers 
29. Nestle Pak. 24. Engro Polymer 
30. Noon Sugar 25. Engro Corporation 
31. Noon Pakistan 26. Ghani Gases 
32. Premier Sugar Mills 27. Fauji Fertilizers 
33. Pangrio Sugar 28. Fauji Frtilizers Bin Qasim 
34. Punjab Oil 29. Ittehad Chemicals 
35. Quice Food 30. Linde Pakistan 
36. Rafhan Maize 31. Lotte Chemicals 
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37. Sanghar Sugar 32. Leiner Pak Gelat 
38. Sind Abadgar 33. Pak Gum and Chemicals 
39. Shakarganj Mills 34. Sitara Chemicals 
40. Shahtaj Sugar 35. United Dist 
41. Shahmurad Sugar 36. Dawood Hercules 
42. Sakrand Sugar  
43. Fronteir Sugar  
44. S. S. Oil  
45. United Sugar  
 
4. Industrials 18. Sazgar eng. 
1. Aisha Steel 19. S.N. Kawasaki 
2. Crescent Steel 20. Transmission engg. 
3. Dost Steel 21. Al-Ghazi Tractor 
4. Quality Steel 22. Al-Khair Gaddon 
5. Siddiqsons tin Plate 23. Bolan Casting 
6. Atlas Batteries 24. Dewan Auto Engg. 
7. Atlas Honda Ltd. 25. Hinopak Motors 
8. Bela Automotive 26. K.S.B. Pumps 
9. Dewan Motors 27. Millat Tractors 
10. Exide Pakistan 28. Pak. Engg. 
11. Ghani automobiles 29. Balouchistan Wheels Ltd. 
12. Ghandhara Nissan 30. Taga Pak Ltd. 
13. General Tyre 31. Syed Match Comapny 
14. Honda atlas cars 32. Huffaz Seamless 
15. Indus Motor company 33. Int. Ind. Ltd. 
16. Pak. Suzuki 34. Inter Steel Ltd. 
17. Metro Steel  
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